Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; April 22, 1965; Massachusetts; State Supreme Court
In *Commonwealth vs. Ernest C. Stasiun*, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the appeals of Stasiun and two co-defendants, Michael J. Manning and Richard B. Rymszewicz, following their convictions for soliciting a bribe and conspiracy. The case arose from actions in January 1959, when Paul R. Vermette proposed leasing a part of a building he intended to construct to the Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles. After discussions with registry officials, Vermette was advised to connect with a Governor's Councillor, leading him to Stasiun, who expressed support for the lease.
Subsequently, Vermette met Stasiun and Manning at a hotel in Boston, where Stasiun initiated a social interaction over drinks. During this meeting, Manning explicitly solicited a bribe of $1,000, with an additional $500 due upon completion of Vermette's building, threatening that failure to comply would jeopardize the lease approval. Vermette refused the demand, stating that he would not pay the requested amount, and left with his friend, Arthur Powell. The trial resulted in guilty verdicts under two indictments, prompting the defendants' appeals.
In late February, Vermette visited Stasiun in his New Bedford office after receiving a phone call. Stasiun expressed his displeasure regarding rumors that Vermette had spoken negatively about him and demanded $1,500. Vermette dismissed the accusation. Stasiun then wrote "8" on a paper and threatened that Vermette must pay this amount to secure his lease, or he would never obtain it. Vermette left angrily. Concurrently, Vermette was finalizing a lease with the registry of motor vehicles, which was dated February 27, 1959, for a five-year term starting July 1, 1959. After signing, the lease was sent to the Governor and Council for approval.
The lease was initially placed on the Council's agenda on April 2, 1959, but was repeatedly tabled. On May 14, Stasiun moved to reject it, but the motion failed. A motion to approve the lease on May 21 was defeated, with Stasiun and four others voting against it. In early June, while Devine, a deputy registrar, supported the lease, Stasiun left the room, expressing he did not want any decisions made in his absence.
In late May or June, Stasiun unsuccessfully attempted to contact Vermette, who hung up on him. The next day, Rymszewicz, Stasiun's cousin, visited Vermette to discuss the situation, suggesting Vermette pay $500 to secure the lease. The lease was eventually approved on June 25, 1959, but the individual votes were not recorded. In early July, Stasiun asked Vermette for $500, which Vermette refused, stating the lease was already approved. Stasiun claimed he had incurred costs to influence other Councillors. Their heated exchange was overheard by Vermette's wife. The solicitation indictment against the defendants alleges they violated G.L. Ter. Ed. c. 268.8, which prohibits executive officers from corruptly soliciting or accepting gifts with the expectation of influencing their official actions.
The indictment against the defendants alleges solicitations of bribes occurring between January 31 and July 31, 1959, with specific dates unknown. Although the statute mentions only officers, case law (Commonwealth v. Mannos) establishes that private citizens can be jointly indicted with officers for soliciting and accepting bribes. The defendants argue that the indictment improperly treats solicitation as a continuing offense; however, the court clarifies that this is not the case. Instead, the indictment specifically charges the defendants with soliciting a bribe for a favorable vote from an executive officer regarding a particular matter, distinguishing it from ongoing offenses recognized in prior cases. Each solicitation, regardless of timing, is seen as part of a singular criminal act. The court notes that while multiple solicitations can be charged separately, they may also indicate a single corrupt scheme, as supported by the repeated requests related to the same issue, which reflects a unified intent. The relevant statute defines the offense as the corrupt request for a bribe concerning a specific vote, affirming that separate solicitations can be treated as distinct offenses, but do not negate the overarching scheme of solicitation.
Motions to quash and motions for directed verdicts filed by the defendants were properly denied. There was sufficient evidence indicating that Manning, Stasiun, and Rymszewicz solicited bribes from Vermette at different times. It was not necessary to prove Stasiun's presence during the solicitations by Manning and Rymszewicz. The precedent set in Commonwealth v. Mannos established that a private citizen could be convicted of requesting and accepting bribes if they participated in essential steps of the criminal conduct, but does not require presence during the solicitation. Manning's argument regarding the inadmissibility of evidence from January 27, 1959, was rejected; the case did not involve a continuous offense as in Commonwealth v. Runge, where time was a key element. The charge against the defendants centered on soliciting a bribe for Stasiun's favorable vote on a registry lease. Each defendant could not be retried for the same offense after a conviction or acquittal. The judge instructed the jury that if they found a conspiracy among the defendants to solicit a bribe, they could convict all based on the actions of one without needing proof of the others' participation in the solicitation.
In this jurisdiction, liability for a substantive offence requires a coconspirator to actively participate or assist in its commission. Case law, including Commonwealth v. Knapp and Commonwealth v. Lucas, emphasizes that mere proof of conspiracy does not suffice to establish that a conspirator committed the offence. The court clarified that while the existence of a conspiracy can serve as evidence suggesting participation, it does not automatically create a legal presumption of involvement unless the conspirator disproves it. This distinction upholds that conspiracy and the substantive offence are separate crimes, each subject to individual punishment. The essence of conspiracy lies in the illegal agreement, not in the execution of the substantive crime. Criminal liability is personal, meaning individuals are punished for their own actions rather than those of others, countering any notion of vicarious liability akin to civil law. The court cautioned against interpreting the phrase "partnership in crime" too broadly, as it does not imply shared liability for all actions of coconspirators. While some cases suggest that the acts of one may be attributed to all when pursuing a common goal, this principle is valid only when each participant is involved in the substantive offence. Thus, entry into a conspiracy alone does not incur liability for crimes committed by other group members without individual participation.
A conspirator is not automatically considered an aider or abettor in the crimes they conspired to commit, as established in Commonwealth v. Bloomberg. This contrasts with the federal rule from Pinkerton v. United States, which the court declines to follow, favoring the dissenting opinion of Justices Rutledge and Frankfurter. The defendants challenge the denial of their motions for directed verdicts on a conspiracy indictment covering the period from January 31, 1959, to July 31, 1959. Before assessing these motions, the court must address the admissibility of evidence, specifically related to an incident at a Boston hotel. The court asserts that the timeline of the conspiracy does not restrict the exploration of relevant facts, allowing for the presentation of the conspiracy's full history. Evidence from the hotel incident is deemed admissible against Rymszewicz, who joined the conspiracy later, as conspirators are held accountable for acts of their co-conspirators prior to their entry. The acts and declarations of one conspirator can be used against others, contingent upon a preliminary judicial finding that a conspiracy exists, which can be supported by circumstantial evidence. The court finds sufficient evidence, aside from the statements of Stasiun and Rymszewicz, to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy against Manning, inferring his involvement in soliciting a bribe from Vermette. Thus, Manning's motion for a directed verdict was rightly denied.
Sufficient evidence existed to preliminarily conclude that Stasiun was part of a conspiracy, particularly due to his interactions with Manning regarding soliciting a bribe from Vermette. The jury could reasonably infer Stasiun's involvement based on the conduct exhibited by both him and Manning. Stasiun's motion for a directed verdict was correctly denied. A prima facie case against Rymszewicz was also established, as his actions indicated he acted as an agent for Stasiun in the solicitation process. Their frequent communications supported bringing the case to the jury.
Defendants Manning and Stasiun challenged a portion of the judge's instructions, arguing that testimony about Rymszewicz's solicitations could wrongfully implicate them. Initially, evidence of each defendant's actions was limited to that specific defendant, but this restriction was lifted during the trial. The judge explained that once all evidence was presented, its relevance could be reassessed to imply connections between defendants based on the totality of the testimony.
The judge's decision to lift this limitation was deemed appropriate, as Rymszewicz's actions were adequately linked to the conspiracy involving Stasiun and Manning. However, Manning and Stasiun's arguments were upheld concerning Rymszewicz's association with them. While Rymszewicz had familial ties and campaign connections to Stasiun, these alone did not constitute sufficient evidence of conspiracy to solicit bribes. The admission of Rymszewicz's actions and statements as evidence against Stasiun and Manning was found to be erroneous and not harmless, as it suggested Rymszewicz solicited a bribe from Vermette on Stasiun's behalf.
Manning challenges the validity of his indictment and trial in Bristol County, asserting the Commonwealth did not provide evidence of any criminal acts he committed there. Before the trial, the Attorney General sought permission to proceed under G.L. Ter. Ed. c. 277, § 57A, expressing uncertainty about the jurisdictional basis of the indictments against Manning. Manning's motions to dismiss the indictments and a plea in abatement were denied by the court. The Commonwealth's motion was granted based on the rationale that Manning's alleged actions in Boston were part of a broader scheme involving solicitation of a bribe, primarily occurring in Bristol County. The court found no error in this approach.
Section 57A allows for a defendant's trial even if the crime's situs is uncertain, provided the Commonwealth petitions and the court hears the case. Citing Commonwealth v. Mannos, the court noted that activity in both counties related to a single criminal plan justified jurisdictional doubt about Manning's actions in Bristol County. Additionally, the venue for the conspiracy indictment was deemed appropriate since conspiratorial acts were carried out in Bristol County, despite Manning's lack of presence there during the conspiracy.
In conclusion, all alleged errors were considered; those not discussed were deemed meritless or irrelevant for retrial. The verdicts for the solicitation indictment are reversed, as are the conspiracy indictment judgments against Manning and Stasiun. The court also determined that Rymszewicz's conviction should be set aside for consistency. Justice requires that all defendants’ judgments be reversed. Dissenting, Judge Kirk agrees with setting aside the judgments but emphasizes the need for a more thorough examination of the Commonwealth's case, particularly regarding the substantive indictment for bribery, which he believes is fundamentally flawed and should not stand.
The dissent emphasizes the deliberate avoidance of the terms "solicit" or "solicitation," asserting that these terms do not appear in the relevant statute (G.L.c. 268. 8) or the indictment, and their use could obfuscate the legal issue at hand. The dissent critiques the majority's ruling that the motions to quash the substantive indictment were properly denied, arguing that the indictment is invalid as it charges a crime not recognized by law. It highlights that the indictment alleges a continuing offense based on a single act, referencing established legal precedent (Commonwealth v. Fuller, 163 Mass. 499), which indicates that each request for a bribe constitutes a separate crime that must be individually charged. The dissent contends there is no statute defining a request or series of requests for a bribe as a continuing offense, nor any precedents supporting such a classification. It underscores that any violation of the bribery statute occurs upon the making of the request, and multiple requests should be treated as distinct offenses, requiring separate indictments. The dissent cites historical cases to support this interpretation, noting the legal clarity established by Chief Justice W.A. Field in the Fuller case, which quashed an indictment for improperly charging multiple offenses within a single count.
Adultery is characterized as a separate offense for each act rather than a continuing offense, a principle reaffirmed by the court. The Fuller case is cited as representative of existing law regarding the necessity of separate indictments for distinct offenses, which is applicable to the current case involving bribery. The dissent emphasizes that a crime, such as the act of requesting a bribe, is complete upon the request's initiation, contrasting it with larceny by false pretence, which involves ongoing reliance by the victim. The dissent critiques the majority's reliance on larceny cases to support the notion of a continuing offense in bribery, arguing that the analogy is flawed and that established larceny precedents do not substantiate the majority's position. Furthermore, the dissent argues that the statute G.L.c. 268.8 explicitly criminalizes each bribe request without consideration for protracted negotiations or offers, thus establishing each request as an independent offense.
The opinion asserts that the notion of separate requests being charged as independent offenses lacks support in legal precedent and is contrary to Commonwealth v. Fuller, which mandates distinct charges for each offense. This leads to uncertainty regarding the current legal status of Fuller and raises concerns about the potential for prosecutors to pursue unknown offenses based on previously disallowed indictments, leaving the courts to retroactively determine their validity. The principle of certainty in criminal pleading is also called into question. The court's decision to uphold the indictment creates a new crime without prior precedent or authority, highlighting a significant departure from established legal understanding.
The Commonwealth's case is further weakened by several factors: the indictment alleges all three defendants are principals in a continuing offense of bribery, but only one, Stasiun, meets the statutory definition of a principal. Thus, Manning and Rymszewicz should be entitled to favorable judgments as the substantive crime has not been adequately proven. The substantive indictment and the conspiracy indictment are materially similar, differing only in a few phrases, which allowed the prosecution to improperly use evidence intended solely for the conspiracy charge against the substantive charge, leading to unjust convictions. The majority's opinion emphasizes the need to maintain a clear distinction between substantive offenses and conspiracy, as each constitutes a separate crime subject to independent punishment.
A conspiracy to commit a crime is classified as a misdemeanor in this Commonwealth, with all participants considered principals. It is crucial to maintain a clear distinction between conspiracy and the substantive offense to prevent unjust convictions based on the actions of others rather than personal culpability. The principle of personal guilt underlies criminal law, meaning individuals should be punished for their own actions, not those of their associates. In the case discussed, there is insufficient evidence linking defendants Manning and Rymszewicz to the actions of another conspirator, Stasiun, as each request made to Vermette by Stasiun occurred independently and without their knowledge. The evidence illustrates distinct, separate acts rather than a continuous offense, undermining the validity of the indictment for a continuing offense. Therefore, the substantive indictments against Manning and Rymszewicz should be dismissed based on the lack of proof that they participated in, or were aware of, the alleged substantive crimes committed by Stasiun. The court should follow precedent that requires the offense to be proven as charged for a conviction to stand.
The evidence presented indicates only one request each from Manning and Rymszewicz, which is insufficient to establish guilt, even under statutes defining offenses as continuing. Convictions based solely on a single act cannot be upheld, referencing case law that supports the necessity of separate charges for each offense. The indictment used by the Attorney General is criticized for being overly broad, allowing for the potential misuse of evidence that conflates conspiracy and substantive charges, thus enabling wrongful convictions based on actions unrelated to the defendants. The majority opinion is seen as contradictory, as it condemns the conspiracy dragnet while endorsing a substantive indictment that leads to similar unjust outcomes. The excerpt emphasizes the need for clarity and fairness in legal pleadings, suggesting that indictments requiring inadmissible evidence should be quashed to prevent confusion and injustice during trials. Finally, the author disagrees with the majority's interpretation of the Mannos case, arguing that the details of the charges and supporting evidence are crucial for understanding its implications for the current case against Manning and Rymszewicz.
Proof of receiving bribes was sufficient to establish the crime charged, with each bribe accepted counted as a separate offense. Convictions were secured on all four indictments. Evidence indicated that prior to Lyons approving contracts, three architects, including Greco, had made corrupt deals with Mannos, who acted as Lyons' agent. Although Mannos initiated the bribery scheme, he was not present during the payments to Lyons, leading to a reversal of his convictions related to Greco. However, Mannos's conviction was upheld for the other architects, as he was involved in arranging and collecting the bribes.
The court addressed a statute (G.L.c. 268, § 8) prohibiting public officers from accepting bribes, noting that both public officers and private citizens can be charged as principals. The distinction between a principal and an accessory before the fact is significant in criminal law. A principal is present during the crime, aiding the actual offender. In the Mannos case, it was ruled that for a private citizen to be charged as a principal alongside a public officer, evidence must demonstrate their active participation in the crime. In the current case, evidence showed that Stasiun was not present during the requests made by Manning and Rymszewicz, which led to a conclusion that convicting them as principals would imply the existence of a crime not defined by the legislature. The statute specifically targets public officers, reinforcing the absence of a legislative intent for broader applications.
The penalty clause mandates that an offender "shall forfeit his office," clearly indicating that the statute targets public officers. Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 268A outlines specific classes of individuals subject to its provisions, including state, county, and municipal employees, and defines the offenses related to corrupt practices. The court has implicitly created a new crime in this case, leading to several key conclusions: (a) the trial's issues stemmed from an indictment type not recognized by the court, with prior disapproval noted in Commonwealth v. Fuller; (b) failure to quash the indictment was erroneous since it alleged an offense not recognized by law, resulting in a lack of jurisdiction for sentencing; (c) denying directed verdict motions was an error as the prosecution did not prove the continuing offense; and (d) judgments should favor defendants Manning and Rymszewicz on the substantive charge due to insufficient evidence of their involvement as principals. A new trial is necessary for the conspiracy indictment, but discussing convictions related to it is deemed unnecessary at this stage.
Jurors allege that Ernest C. Stasiun, an executive officer of the Commonwealth, along with Michael J. Manning and Richard B. Rymszewicz, engaged in corrupt practices between January 31, 1959, and July 31, 1959, in New Bedford and other locations. They purportedly requested gifts and promises from Paul R. Vermette in exchange for influencing Stasiun's official decisions on pending matters. Additionally, the three individuals are accused of conspiring to request and accept these gifts under the premise that Stasiun would render a favorable judgment in his official capacity. Notably, the indictment highlights the difference between the substantive charge and the conspiracy charge, with the latter including the term "to corruptly accept." Furthermore, a specific request made in July 1959 was not considered an offense under the statute since the related lease had already been approved and was no longer before the Executive Council at that time.
