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E. N. Maisel & Associates v. Canden Corp.

Citations: 398 N.E.2d 1366; 73 Ind. Dec. 551; 1980 Ind. App. LEXIS 1269Docket: 3-977A217

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; January 17, 1980; Indiana; State Appellate Court

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E.N. Maisel and Associates (Maisel) appeals a trial court's decision that removed it as a party and vacated a sheriff's deed in a foreclosure case involving Pioneer National Title Insurance Corporation (Pioneer) and Canden Corporation (Canden). The court had previously ruled in favor of Pioneer, ordering the sale of Canden's shopping center to satisfy outstanding liens. Following this judgment, Pioneer contracted to sell the property to Maisel, contingent upon receiving a sheriff's deed. Pioneer and Meadows Associates then sought to set aside the sheriff's deed, leading Maisel to file for intervention, which was initially granted ex parte but later reconsidered.

The trial court ultimately ruled to remove Maisel from the proceedings, asserting that no party other than Maisel objected to the deed's vacating. Maisel argued it had the right to intervene under Indiana’s Trial Rule 24(A)(2), which requires that an applicant demonstrates a direct interest in the action, that the action's outcome could impede their ability to protect that interest, and that existing parties do not adequately represent that interest. The court acknowledged that a contract purchaser's interest is typically sufficient for intervention, despite Pioneer and Meadows' claims that Maisel's contract was void or rescinded. The court emphasized that the merits of Maisel's claim should not be determined during intervention motions unless it is clear that no interest exists as a matter of law. Thus, the appeal centers on whether Maisel had a sufficient interest in the proceedings to warrant intervention.

If the deed is annulled, Pioneer could assert that Maisel lacks rights to the property due to an unsatisfied condition. Annulment would hinder Maisel's ability to protect its interest, and the current parties cannot adequately represent Maisel, as they all support the deed's annulment while only Maisel opposes it. Therefore, Maisel had the right to intervene in the proceeding to contest the sheriff's deed's annulment. The trial court's decision to set aside the deed without allowing Maisel a chance to be heard is deemed improper, necessitating a reversal of the judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings. HOFFMAN and STATON, JJ. concur.