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Whitener v. State
Citations: 696 N.E.2d 40; 1998 Ind. LEXIS 67; 1998 WL 289670Docket: 20S00-9607-CR-477
Court: Indiana Supreme Court; June 4, 1998; Indiana; State Supreme Court
Michael Whitener was convicted of murder and attempted murder, resulting in consecutive sentences of sixty years and forty-five years, respectively. He appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed the trial court's decision, determining that Whitener had received effective legal representation. The case background shows that following a gang-related shooting by a police officer, Whitener attended a meeting with fellow gang members where they discussed retaliating against white individuals. Although Whitener requested a firearm from a gang member, he ultimately used a gun provided by another member, Michael Hawkins. Witnesses for the state testified that Whitener shot into a car containing two white men, resulting in one death and serious injury to the other. Whitener's defense focused on his claim that he did not intend to shoot the men and that he had attempted to dissuade the group from violence. His trial counsel faced scrutiny for three specific actions: allowing him to testify, not providing jury instructions on defense of abandonment, and failing to challenge the State's application of aiding or inducing statutes. The court rejected these claims, concluding that the counsel's performance met the standard of effectiveness required for a fair trial. To succeed in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must demonstrate both components of the Strickland v. Washington test: (1) counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable, and (2) the inadequate performance prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial. A fair trial is compromised only when a breakdown in the adversarial process leads to unreliable trial results. Isolated poor strategies do not constitute ineffective assistance. The defendant claims ineffective assistance when counsel allowed him to testify, arguing that this enabled the prosecution to alter its theory of the case. However, the decision for a defendant to testify is a strategic choice made by counsel, which is generally afforded deference. Four witnesses identified the defendant as the shooter, and the only way for him to counter this evidence was through his own testimony. The defendant also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to present a jury instruction on an abandonment defense, asserting that he attempted to dissuade others from shooting and left the group before the act. Counsel's choices regarding defense strategies are also deemed matters of trial strategy. Although the option for an abandonment defense existed, trial counsel focused on disputing the aiding and inducing charge. Even if performance was substandard, the defendant fails to demonstrate the prejudice required to meet the second prong of the Strickland test. Counsel for the defendant vigorously challenged the State's case during the trial, questioning witness credibility, the sequence of events, and the aiding or inducing theory of guilt. Both the State's and the defendant's narratives were presented to the jury, ensuring a fair trial through the adversarial process. The defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel due to a failure to object to the State's change in legal theory and the prosecutor's emphasis on aiding or inducing. To prove ineffective assistance, a defendant must demonstrate that an objection would have been upheld, a standard the defendant did not meet. The court noted that a defendant can be convicted under aiding or inducing statutes even if initially charged as a principal, meaning any objection regarding the State's theory would likely have been denied. Additionally, the State is permitted to discuss applicable facts and law, which negated the possibility of successful objections to the prosecutor's references to the aiding or inducing statute. The conviction was affirmed. Further notes clarify the legal definitions and defenses related to aiding or inducing offenses, emphasizing the requirements for asserting an abandonment defense. Previous case law indicates that a defendant might withdraw support for a crime before its completion to avoid liability, contrasting with the Brownlow ruling, which denied the abandonment defense due to the defendant's continued involvement in the criminal act. The resolution of these interpretations remains open for future consideration.