Wilson v. Devonshire Realty of Danville

Citations: 718 N.E.2d 700; 307 Ill. App. 3d 801; 241 Ill. Dec. 129Docket: 4-99-0080

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; September 30, 1999; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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On February 11, 1998, Mildred Wilson filed a complaint against Devonshire Realty of Danville and Stradeco, Inc. for injuries from exposure to harmful chemicals at her workplace. The defendants sought summary judgment, claiming the suit was barred by the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries. The trial court granted this motion on August 25, 1998, leading to Wilson's appeal, where she contended that a genuine issue of material fact remained.

The case background indicates that Wilson, working as a realtor under an independent contract with Devonshire, reported health issues beginning in late 1994, coinciding with ongoing renovations at the office. She experienced respiratory problems and skin irritation and noted that other staff members reported similar ailments. Discussions among staff suggested the building's condition might be responsible for their illnesses. In January 1995, Reed Environmental conducted air quality tests at the site, which Devonshire reportedly claimed showed no issues. Despite ongoing health problems, Wilson was reassured by Devonshire that the building was not the source of her symptoms. She sought medical advice from Dr. Philbert Chen regarding the potential link between her symptoms and the renovations shortly after discussing her concerns with Devonshire’s management. The appellate court ultimately affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the defendants were not liable due to the expiration of the statute of limitations.

Plaintiff reported to Dr. Chen a strong odor in her office building, which caused temporary respiratory issues and skin irritation. Dr. Chen documented his uncertainty regarding the connection between the building and her symptoms. Despite her condition, the plaintiff continued working through 1995 and 1996. On April 20, 1997, she lost consciousness, leading her to seek medical attention. Dr. Purcells subsequently diagnosed her with a pulmonary illness, suggesting workplace irritants as a possible cause. Following this, the plaintiff sought information on air quality tests and ceased her role as an independent contractor for Devonshire. On February 11, 1998, she filed a complaint against the defendants for developing occupational asthma and multiple chemical sensitivity due to negligent exposure to harmful chemicals, but the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, citing her complaint as untimely under the two-year statute of limitations.

On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment, arguing that (1) there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding when she was aware of her potential cause of action, (2) the defendants fraudulently concealed the cause of her injury, and (3) she was hindered in conducting sufficient discovery. The defendants maintained that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment, asserting that the undisputed facts indicated the plaintiff failed to file within the two-year period.

Summary judgment is appropriate when no material fact issues exist, allowing the court to rule as a matter of law. The appellate court reviews the evidence de novo. The relevant statute of limitations, under section 13-202 of the Code of Civil Procedure, mandates that personal injury actions must be initiated within two years of the injury's occurrence. Generally, a personal injury claim accrues upon injury, but the judiciary has established a "discovery rule" to mitigate the strict application of this timeframe.

The 'discovery rule' delays the start of the statute of limitations until the injured party is aware or should reasonably be aware of their injury and its potential wrongful cause. Defendants contend that the plaintiff’s complaint, filed on February 11, 1998, is untimely because her cause of action arose from her initial symptoms in January 1995 or from her seeking medical help in August 1995. The plaintiff counters that her latent injury should delay the statute of limitations until her diagnosis in April 1997. It is established that a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury and its wrongful cause, and this determination is a legal question for the trial court when facts are undisputed.

The plaintiff claims she lacked awareness of her injury and its connection to the defendants' actions until her diagnosis in April 1997, despite having symptoms earlier. She cites a precedent (Nolan) involving latent injuries from asbestos exposure, where the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations until the injury was recognized. However, the current case differs as the plaintiff was aware of her occupational asthma and multiple chemical sensitivities by January 1995 and discussed potential causes with Devonshire in 1995 and 1996. The plaintiff acknowledges her exposure to harmful chemicals as early as December 1994 and developed symptoms by January 1995, raising concerns about the building's conditions by August 1995. Therefore, the court concludes that the plaintiff was aware of her injury by August 1995, and the limitations period began at that point, not when she fully realized the extent of her injuries. Thus, the undisputed facts indicate she knew of her injury and its possible wrongful cause by August 1995.

Plaintiff was aware of her injury and potential cause by August 1995, which, according to the court, provided sufficient notice for her to pursue legal action within the statute of limitations. Despite her claim that she did not recognize the wrongful cause of her injury until April 1997, the court found that her discussions with Devonshire and her doctor about the building’s potential impact on her health indicated she had the requisite knowledge to act. The court emphasized that statutes of limitations encourage timely claims to prevent stale actions.

Plaintiff also contended that Devonshire fraudulently concealed the cause of her injury, asserting that misrepresentations about air quality created a factual issue for the jury regarding the tolling of the statute of limitations. However, the court ruled that she did not meet the standards for establishing fraudulent concealment, as she did not demonstrate that Devonshire’s misrepresentations prevented her from obtaining environmental test results during the relevant period.

Lastly, the plaintiff claimed the trial court granted summary judgment prematurely before she could conduct adequate discovery. This argument was deemed forfeited on appeal due to her failure to provide supporting authority. Consequently, the circuit court's judgment was affirmed, with one judge dissenting.

Justice COOK, dissenting, identifies key factual issues in the case regarding the plaintiff's awareness of injury and its wrongful cause. First, it is questioned whether the remodeling prompted only minor discomfort or a significant injury that would alert the plaintiff to her rights being violated, as established in Golla. Second, there is uncertainty about whether the plaintiff should have reasonably recognized that her injury was due to the remodeling, rather than other factors like environmental conditions or products used in the office. Third, the conduct of Devonshire and possibly Stradeco is scrutinized concerning whether they should be estopped from asserting that the plaintiff delayed in filing a complaint, given their previous reassurances about her health.

The statute of limitations begins when a person knows or should know of their injury and its wrongful cause, placing the burden on the injured party to investigate the potential for a cause of action. This determination often becomes a question for the fact-finder unless the undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion. The dissent references the Witherell case, where the court found that a reasonable person would have recognized their medical issues much earlier than the plaintiff in the present case did. The plaintiff's reported respiratory issues and skin irritation, along with other employees' similar experiences and speculations about the building's condition, are contrasted with the more severe circumstances faced by the Witherell plaintiff.

Justice Cook argues that the reasonable standard should focus on what the plaintiff knew about her injury and its cause, rather than what she could have suspected. The dissent contends that the majority's position would unfairly burden employees, encouraging them to raise concerns over minor health issues, and emphasizes that misleading medical advice does not delay the claim against product manufacturers while potentially delaying claims against healthcare providers.

Fundamental fairness dictates that the defendant doctors cannot claim that the plaintiff should have filed her complaint earlier, given their repeated assurances that she did not have a condition. In the Witherell case, the plaintiff was aware of her injury in 1972 despite being misled by her doctors about its nature. Conversely, the plaintiff in the current case was unaware of her injury when she consulted Dr. Chen in 1995, who did not conceal malpractice but expressed uncertainty regarding the connection between her symptoms and her work exposure. The court notes that, unlike Witherell, this case presents multiple possible conclusions from the evidence, making it inappropriate for summary judgment, which typically requires a lack of genuine material fact disputes. The court emphasizes that not all trial evidence was available at the summary judgment stage, particularly since the plaintiff had not completed discovery. The plaintiff's request for discovery before the summary judgment ruling was denied, contrasting with the Golla case where discovery had been completed. Additionally, the relationship between Stradeco and Devonshire remains unclear without further discovery, raising questions about the actions of Devonshire and the medical directives given to employees in early 1995. The plaintiff's unrebutted deposition must be accepted as true, indicating that Devonshire had conducted air quality tests and assured her of the absence of problems in the building, which she believed were causing her health issues.

The majority's argument that the plaintiff should not have trusted Devonshire is criticized for failing to recognize that the plaintiff was not barred from obtaining environmental test results within two years post-injury. This oversight leads to an inadequate prima facie case for fraudulent concealment. The majority's decision places undue burdens on the plaintiff while disregarding the defendant's misconduct, contradicting established principles such as that no individual should profit from their wrongdoing, which has been used to challenge the application of statutes of limitations. The majority relies on Golla to assert that the limitations period starts at the time of injury rather than when the full extent of consequences is realized. However, Golla involved a clear, sudden injury, unlike the present case of prolonged exposure to hazardous workplace conditions, similar to Nolan, where the onset of the limitations period was a factual question. Unlike Golla’s plaintiff, who had immediate injuries indicating a violation of rights, the current plaintiff's symptoms—such as a runny nose and itch—are insufficient for establishing an immediate compensable injury. Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs should be reversed, and the case should be remanded for further proceedings.