People v. Cage

Citations: 207 N.E.2d 732; 58 Ill. App. 2d 262; 1965 Ill. App. LEXIS 803Docket: Gen. 50,179

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; May 4, 1965; Illinois; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Robert Cage was convicted of murder on November 26, 1934, and sentenced to 99 years in prison. He appealed this conviction, prompting a review by the Illinois Appellate Court. The case involved an incident on September 9, 1934, at a candy store where George Torres and Charles Harakopas were working. Torres testified that Cage entered the store asking for cigarettes, followed shortly by codefendant Edward Smith, who brandished a gun and demanded money. Cage then pointed a gun at Harakopas, assaulted him, and shot him twice while Smith stole money from the cash register. 

Torres identified Cage in a police lineup on September 24, 1934, and again in the prosecutor’s office on September 26, 1934, despite initially expressing uncertainty about his ability to identify the assailants during a coroner's inquest shortly after the shooting. During cross-examination, Torres recounted his experiences at the police station, noting he did not remember the officers present during the lineup or the specific questions asked by the prosecutor prior to the arrival of the defendants. The court ultimately denied a rehearing on June 1, 1965.

Four witnesses testified during the prosecution, stating they saw the defendants together at their businesses after the shooting incident. The arresting officer noted that the defendants were silent when identified by witness Torres. The defendants, arrested on September 22, 1934, consistently denied the crime. The defense's alibi was that one defendant was playing cards at a friend's apartment before 1:00 a.m. on September 9, 1934. During cross-examination, one defendant stated he did not know his co-defendant or the other individuals mentioned, nor did he recognize the merchants who testified about seeing the defendants together. In rebuttal, the prosecutor called John Myrick, and three merchants reiterated their testimony about the defendants' presence in their stores. Motions to strike this testimony were denied, and the jury convicted both defendants of murder, sentencing them to 99 years each.

A chronological outline of the case reveals that the defendants were indicted for the murder of Charles Harakopas on September 9, 1934, and convicted on November 9, 1934. A writ of error filed in 1946 was affirmed due to lack of a bill of exceptions, and certiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court. Edward Smith filed a post-conviction petition in 1952, and Robert Cage did so in December of the same year. In July 1953, Smith was granted a new trial due to a fair trial denial, while Cage's petition was denied. Appeals affirmed both outcomes. Later, the State moved for nolle prosequi against Smith, who was released. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in Cage's case in December 1954. In April 1956, the Court ruled in Griffin v. Illinois that indigent defendants should receive transcripts, and a rule effective September 26, 1956, established this provision for such defendants.

Prior to March 1, 1957, the petitioner's request for a transcript under Rule 65-1 was denied due to the death of the Official Shorthand Reporter from his original trial. The petitioner subsequently sent the transcript, previously an exhibit in two post-conviction hearings, to the Clerk of the Criminal Court of Cook County for certification by Judge Hugo M. Friend, who certified it. However, the transcript was later filed and subsequently disappeared. In 1962, a copy of the transcript was discovered in the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States, having been filed during a certiorari denial in October 1954; a certified photostatic copy was then filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Illinois.

On August 13, 1963, the petitioner submitted 15 copies of a brief and abstract regarding a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Illinois. On May 21, 1964, the court ruled that the writ of error was barred by a common law 20-year statute of limitations. A petition for rehearing was filed on July 6, 1964, and the Supreme Court of Illinois decided to hear the case on its merits, transferring it for review. The defendant's arguments included insufficient evidence for a guilty verdict, jury instruction errors, and the admission of evidence regarding other crimes. 

The State contended that the first and third points were not eligible for review due to their absence in the written motion for a new trial and their res judicata status from a previous judgment. The court noted that a defendant’s written motion limits review to stated errors, leading to a waiver of unlisted errors. However, it rejected the State's claims, asserting the defendant did not intentionally waive his rights to a fair trial or presumption of innocence. Additionally, it highlighted that Supreme Court Rule 65-1(2) addressed the certification timing issue, rendering the statute of limitations moot, since the Illinois Supreme Court had granted rehearing and allowed the writ. The court also referenced the precedent that allows for addressing significant trial errors regardless of preservation, emphasizing the duty to examine evidence for serious doubts of guilt.

The court rejects the State's argument that the defendant's right to a merits review is barred by res judicata, asserting that the issues raised in the current case differ from those litigated in the previous Post Conviction proceedings. The Supreme Court outlined three specific issues in prior proceedings: the use of perjured testimony, suppression of favorable evidence, and a coerced statement from the defendant. The State claims these issues undermine the defendant's assertion of insufficient evidence for a guilty verdict. However, the court clarifies that the defendant’s current points do not overlap with those previously adjudicated.

The State further argues that the doctrine of res judicata should preclude the consideration of the defendant’s claim regarding the admission of evidence related to subsequent crimes. While the court acknowledges the validity of the State's reliance on existing law, it asserts that the defendant's case is distinct because he did not consciously waive his right to raise the current issues, as established in precedent. Consequently, the court affirms the defendant's right to a merits review.

In addressing the first point raised by the defendant, the State maintains that the evidence proves the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, citing George Torres' identification of the defendant as the killer. The defendant counters that Torres expressed doubt during a Coroner's Inquest and failed to identify him in a later line-up. Despite this, the court emphasizes that a lack of line-up identification only impacts the weight of the identification, not its sufficiency for a conviction. The State also notes that the defendant admitted involvement in a robbery post-arrest, which serves as an implied admission regarding the charges. The defendant, however, disputes the implications of his silence in response to accusations.

Defendant argues that his express admission was contradicted by Officer Norton's testimony, which indicated that the defendant denied involvement. He also claims that his silence was not an admission, as he was instructed by the prosecutor not to talk. The defendant asserts he initially informed police he knew nothing about the matter, implying he had no obligation to deny any incriminating statements made in his presence. The jury ultimately found sufficient evidence to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

In addressing the jury instructions, the State contends that the record does not specify who submitted the instructions, asserting that a defendant cannot claim error on instructions he or she proposed. Consequently, without clarity on who tendered the questioned instructions, any error claims cannot be considered. The defendant acknowledges the State's position but argues it only became applicable after his trial. He points out that prior to 1955, there was no requirement for instructions to indicate their source, although they did need to show who objected to them, thus negating the need for review of the instructions in question.

The State also challenges the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of other crimes. This claim is based on four witnesses who testified seeing the defendants at their places of business shortly after the offense. The State argues this evidence served to identify the defendants and illustrate their modus operandi. Although the relevance of these identifications is debatable, the court does not need to resolve this issue as the defendant claims a more significant error occurred when three of the four witnesses rebutted his denial of knowing a co-defendant prior to their arrest. The defendant cites precedent indicating that cross-examination should be limited to issues raised during direct examination, highlighting the alleged impropriety of the rebuttal testimony.

The State argues that the case of Geidras is distinguishable because it involved evidence that the defendants were seen together after the crime and that one defendant possessed a gun. However, the court finds Geidras applicable to the current case. It acknowledges that testimony may have led jurors to believe the defendant engaged in other crimes, raising concerns about the fairness of the trial. Despite this potential bias, the court concludes that the jury's verdict was not influenced by the testimony, as sufficient evidence existed to support the conviction. Nonetheless, the court recognizes that the jurors, who determined the penalty, may have been swayed by the store owners' testimony and thus increased the defendant's sentence. Citing Ill Rev Stats (1963) chap 38, par 121-9(b)(4), the court decides to reduce the defendant's sentence to 70 years in the penitentiary. The judgment is modified to reflect this reduction and is affirmed as modified. Judges Burke and Bryant concur with the decision.