Range v. Abbott Sports Complex

Citations: 269 Neb. 281; 691 N.W.2d 525; 2005 Neb. LEXIS 36Docket: S-03-1148

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court; February 4, 2005; Nebraska; State Supreme Court

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Christopher Range sustained a knee injury while playing soccer at the Abbott Sports Complex and subsequently filed a lawsuit against the Abbott Sports Complex, the Ethel S. Abbott Charitable Foundation, the Capital Sports Foundation, and the Lincoln Adult Soccer Association (collectively referred to as "the appellees"). Range asserted that he stepped into a hole on the athletic field, claiming it was a defective condition not caused by the game's play. He alleged that the appellees either knew or should have known about the hole through reasonable care, leading to his serious injuries, for which he sought damages totaling over $26,000.

The Lancaster County District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees, determining that Range, a participant in the LASA division II soccer league, had not established that the appellees had constructive knowledge of the hole. The court noted that Range did not observe any issues with the field prior to the match and that the referees also found no problems during their inspection. The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to suggest the hole had existed long enough before the injury to imply constructive knowledge by the appellees. This ruling led to Range’s appeal.

Range bore the burden of proving a prima facie case for premises liability. The court ruled in favor of the appellees, stating they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, primarily because Range could not ascertain how long the hole had been present. Range appealed this judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in concluding the appellees were entitled to judgment and in failing to recognize a genuine issue of material fact regarding their constructive knowledge of the hole that led to his injury.

In the analysis, it is noted that summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, as established in relevant case law. The appellate court must view evidence favorably for the non-moving party. Range’s deposition revealed he did not notice any issues with the field before the incident, nor had he seen a hole at the Abbott Sports Complex prior to that day. He described his fall, which resulted from stepping into a hole he later identified as being small and likely caused by a burrowing animal, but he had no knowledge of how long it had been there. 

Witness testimony from the center referee indicated that he had conducted a thorough inspection of the field before the match and found no holes. The referee also stated that players typically report unsafe conditions, yet no such reports were made prior to the match. Following his injury, which required multiple surgeries, Range's teammate attempted to assist him, resulting in an ambulance being called.

Sestak, a referee, routinely inspected the penalty box and goal area before matches and found no holes. He noted that in Lincoln and Omaha, soccer players typically report unsafe conditions to referees, but no such reports were made prior to the match. A land possessor can be liable for injuries to lawful visitors if they either created or knew of a dangerous condition, or could have discovered it through reasonable care, recognized it posed an unreasonable risk, expected visitors would not notice the danger, failed to protect visitors, and the condition caused damage. In this case, the trial court focused on whether Range could prove the appellees had constructive notice of the hole on the field. Range needed to show evidence of the hole's presence and that the appellees either created it or had actual knowledge. The court found no supporting evidence, concluding that the referees' inspections did not meet the standard of care required to detect issues. The court cited Nebraska case law, stating constructive notice requires a condition to be visible long enough before an accident for it to be discovered. Without evidence of the appellees' actual or constructive knowledge of the hole, the court ruled that they could not be held liable. Citing Herrera v. Fleming Cos., the court emphasized the need for evidence of negligence leading to the plaintiff's injury, ultimately affirming that Range could not establish constructive knowledge of the hole.

Evidence of negligence is deemed insufficient if it requires speculation about the cause of an accident. In the summary judgment hearing, the store presented Herrera's deposition, where she admitted uncertainty regarding the duration of water on the floor. The store maintained a policy for regular floor inspections and cleanliness, leading to the conclusion that no reasonable inference could be made about how long the water had been present. There was no evidence suggesting the store caused, was aware of, or should have been aware of the water’s presence. Consequently, if these facts were uncontested, the store was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

In the case discussed, the court referenced *Herrera v. Fleming Cos.*, establishing that the burden shifted to Range to demonstrate the appellees knew or should have known about a hole on the soccer field prior to his injury. For Range to succeed, there must be a reasonable inference that the hole existed before the match. Viewing the evidence favorably towards Range, he described the hole as approximately 4 to 5 inches in diameter, round, with grass growing around it, suggesting it was not newly formed. Although Range could not specify how long the hole had been there, his description supported a reasonable inference that it was not created during the match.

In contrast, in *Herrera v. Fleming Cos.*, it was impossible to determine how long water had been on the floor, as the puddle could have formed rapidly. Inferences based on speculation do not create material issues of fact for summary judgment purposes. However, Range’s testimony and interrogatory responses indicated no fresh dirt around the hole, allowing for a reasonable inference that it existed prior to the match. Thus, a genuine issue of material fact regarding the appellees' constructive knowledge of the hole was established.

As a result, the trial court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees was erroneous, leading to the reversal of the judgment and remand for further proceedings.