Verson Allsteel Press Co. v. Major Spring & Manufacturing Co.

Citations: 434 N.E.2d 456; 105 Ill. App. 3d 419; 61 Ill. Dec. 303; 1982 Ill. App. LEXIS 1677Docket: 81-780

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; March 30, 1982; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Verson Allsteel Press Company (Verson) initiated a lawsuit against Major Spring Manufacturing Company (Major) and Grand Sheet Metal Products (GSM) to recover losses from a tort judgment related to an injury that occurred on October 12, 1972. John Smith, an employee of GSM, was injured due to a malfunction of a press brake manufactured by Verson, which had a spring supplied by Major. Following a successful lawsuit by Smith, the jury awarded him $800,000, a decision that was later affirmed by the appellate court. 

Subsequent to the judgment, Major and Smith entered into a loan agreement, whereby Major paid Smith $250,000; however, this agreement was later deemed void by the court, which ruled that the amount should be recognized as a partial satisfaction of the judgment against Verson and Major. Verson subsequently paid Smith a total of $642,125 to satisfy the judgment fully.

Verson's complaint against Major includes claims for common law indemnity and contribution under Illinois law, while a claim against GSM for contribution was dismissed by the trial court on the grounds that the relevant statute did not apply, as it only covers causes of action arising on or after March 1, 1978. Verson contended that the cause of action for contribution arose when the judgment was paid in 1980, asserting that this should fall under the statute. GSM argued that the statute pertains to occurrences leading to claims for contribution rather than the payment of judgment. The trial court's decision relied on a precedent from the Illinois Supreme Court, which limited the applicability of contribution among joint tortfeasors to actions arising after the specified date.

The Skinner opinion was modified and delivered on March 1, 1978. Following this, the Illinois Legislature introduced Senate Bill 308 on March 20, 1979, which became law on September 14, 1979. The statute's language, 'causes of action arising on or after March 1, 1978,' is similar to Skinner's but omits 'out of occurrences.' GSM argues that this difference is insignificant, while Verson contends it indicates a legislative intent to broaden the application of Skinner. Various courts have recognized the date similarities but have not conducted in-depth analysis, concluding that the statute's applicability aligns with Skinner. Verson asserts that the statute's plain language must be upheld, referencing cases suggesting that a cause of action for contribution 'arises' upon judgment or settlement payment. However, the analysis indicates ambiguity in the law regarding when a cause of action 'arises' versus 'accrues.' Although some cases use these terms interchangeably, the legislature's choice of 'arising' suggests an intent to establish a new cause of action, rather than codifying existing law. The statute's meaning is not definitively clear and requires further interpretation to ascertain legislative intent, especially given the significant shifts in Illinois tort law following the Skinner decision.

The opinion, initially released on December 12, 1977, was modified on March 1, 1978, to include nonretroactivity language. Senate Bill 308, introduced on March 20, 1979, built on the principles established in the Skinner decision, with legislative sponsors explicitly stating the intention to codify the Supreme Court’s ruling. The effective date of the legislation was set for March 1, 1978, which aligns with the Skinner decision. If the construction of section 301 proposed by Verson were adopted, it would render the effective date arbitrary, as it would broaden the statute's scope beyond the Skinner ruling. The statute is intended to apply to contribution actions arising from torts committed after March 1, 1978.

Verson's argument referencing section 14.2 of the Limitations Act, which establishes a two-year limitations period for contribution actions beginning when a party makes a payment exceeding its share, does not support their position. The statute allows actions for contribution to be initiated before payment is made. The right of contribution arises when negligent acts occur, although it only becomes actionable once a tortfeasor pays more than their share. This principle aligns with Wisconsin law, where the right of contribution is contingent until payment is made.

Verson also argues that the recent Illinois Supreme Court decision in Alvis v. Ribar supports a recovery based on comparative fault, which differs from Skinner as it applies to actions coming to trial after the June 8, 1981 mandate. Verson seeks to amend its complaint to include a count for comparative negligence, which is subject to the court's discretion.

Denial of Verson's motion is supported by multiple factors. Firstly, the comparative negligence theory was not raised during the trial, despite the subsequent release of the Alvis opinion. Secondly, Verson's liability to Smith is based on strict liability in tort, with no Illinois court having previously applied comparative negligence principles to such cases. Notably, while the dissent in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice argued for a balance between negligent conduct and no-fault liability, the majority's position in Daly v. General Motors Corp. allowed for comparative negligence in strict liability, highlighting a legal divide. Most critically, extending Alvis to a contribution action is unjustified, as Verson is a defendant seeking contribution, not a plaintiff seeking damages for negligence. Alvis described contribution as a 'collateral issue' resolved by the principles established in Skinner and relevant statutes. Thus, it would be inconsistent to apply Alvis to a cause of action already addressed by these precedents. Consequently, Verson's motion to amend the complaint is denied, and the trial court's dismissal of count III is upheld. Affirmed.