Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. La Salle National Bank

Citations: 395 N.E.2d 1193; 77 Ill. App. 3d 478; 32 Ill. Dec. 812; 1979 Ill. App. LEXIS 3405Docket: 79-295

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; October 11, 1979; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company (A&P) initiated legal action in the Cook County circuit court to prevent the construction of a drive-in bank facility in the parking lot of a shopping center where it operates a store. Defendants, La Salle National Bank (as trustee) and Northbrook Trust, Savings Bank, are the property owner and lessee, respectively, for the site of the proposed facility. The trial court dismissed A&P's complaint, ruling that A&P lacked any leasehold or possessory interest in the site. A&P appealed the dismissal.

The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. A&P's lease, originally held by National Tea Company and assigned to A&P, described the leased premises and included rights to use a large parking area specifically for its customers. Despite La Salle’s legal title to the property for the drive-in bank, they do not own the store property occupied by A&P. The court noted that A&P's complaint consisted of two counts: one seeking to enjoin construction due to interference with its leasehold interest, and another claiming the construction constituted a nuisance. The dismissal was based on the defendants’ assertion that A&P's lease did not confer any interest in the property where the bank was to be built, a claim supported only by an affidavit stating La Salle's ownership status.

Areas labeled 'Future Stores', 'Contemplated Future Use', and 'Contemplated Future Parking' are depicted on the plot plan. The property, owned by defendant La Salle, is within the 'contemplated future parking' area, distinct from the parking areas designated for National Tea Co. or A&P. The initial phase of the shopping center included the store premises and parking for 230 cars. The lease agreement specifies that Plot Plan 'A' is approved by both parties, prohibiting changes without the lessee's written consent. It also requires the lessee to contribute to 'Common Area Maintenance Charges,' covering costs for maintenance, repairs, and liability insurance related to the parking and common areas. The lease's terms bind the heirs and assigns of the original parties.

Count I of the complaint alleges trespass, asserting that A&P, as assignee of National Tea’s lease rights, holds an interest in both the store area and common areas, including the parking lot where Northbrook plans to build a drive-in facility. A&P claims this construction will unlawfully interfere with its leasehold interest. Defendants argue that the lease only covers the designated store premises and a specific parking area of 84,000 square feet, asserting A&P has no claim over the area leased to Northbrook. To establish a trespass claim, the plaintiff must show wrongful interference with actual possessory rights. A lease conveys current possession of the premises, including necessary easements for enjoyment. Such easements may pass with the lease and can warrant injunctive relief against interference. 

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts favor the plaintiff's pleadings, allowing recovery if any aspect of the stated facts supports it. Although Count I is labeled as trespass, it adequately presents a cause of action to enjoin interference with the leasehold interest and associated easements, thus surviving the motion to dismiss.

Determining the plaintiff's interest in the property hinges on the lease agreement, where the court's primary role is to ascertain the parties' intentions as expressed in the document. The intent must be derived from the lease's language unless it is ambiguous, in which case extrinsic evidence can clarify it. The lease in question describes a parking area of 84,000 square feet for 230 cars but includes conflicting provisions regarding common parking use, creating ambiguity that undermines the defendants' motion to dismiss. The lease indicates the parking lot is part of common area parking, intended for use with other lessees, yet the defendants’ interpretation suggests A&P must share the parking without gaining rights to future parking lots, which contradicts other lease provisions requiring A&P to contribute to the maintenance of the entire parking area. The parking lot was the only one available when the store opened, raising doubts about whether it meets the minimum supply requirements or represents the full extent of the tenant's interest in common parking. Although there is no explicit provision for future parking use, the attached plot plan indicates areas reserved for anticipated parking, relevant to the ongoing dispute. Judicial opinions generally affirm that shopping center tenants acquire an easement appurtenant for designated common area parking. In a related case, tenants were upheld in their right to unobstructed access to shared parking areas, emphasizing the necessity for adequate ingress and egress for tenants surrounded by property owned by the landlord.

Ingress and egress to Evergreen's property is essential for the tenants' use and enjoyment of their leased spaces, constituting an easement appurtenant that is automatically included in the lease. The easements for the plaintiffs are explicitly granted in their leases, not merely implied by law. The case of Walgreen Co. v. American National Bank illustrates that tenants can have a protectible interest in common areas of a shopping center, derived from lease terms or external evidence if the lease is ambiguous. The current dispute centers on whether A&P holds an easement in the parking area, with the court lacking external facts to clarify the lease's intent. As the case involves genuine factual issues regarding A&P's interest, the trial court erred in dismissing the first count of the complaint. 

In the second count, A&P claims a cause of action for nuisance, defined as a non-trespassory invasion affecting the enjoyment of land. The determination of what constitutes unreasonable use involves considering the extent and character of harm, social value, suitability of the use to the locality, and the burden on those harmed. A&P asserts that the construction of a drive-in facility would cause irreparable harm by reducing parking spaces and disrupting customer access and visibility. This potential loss of parking is deemed irreparable, supported by precedents such as Walgreen Co. v. American National Bank.

The construction of a kiosk infringes on property rights and results in the loss of three parking spaces that have been utilized for over a decade. The existing stores in the shopping center are designed to draw customers to a central pedestrian mall; however, the kiosk's separation from this area would likely deter foot traffic, disrupting customer flow and the use of parking facilities. This situation constitutes an irreparable injury due to the permanent nature of the loss and disruption. Consequently, the allegations made by A&P are deemed legally sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, necessitating a comparison of the conflicting interests involved. The trial court's decision to dismiss the complaint with prejudice has been reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. JIGANTI, P.J. and JOHNSON, J. concur. The Atlas Rothberg Co. is mentioned as a defendant, but its specific involvement in the case is unclear.