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Alfano v. BD. OF TRADE OF CITY OF CHICAGO

Citations: 395 N.E.2d 384; 76 Ill. App. 3d 248; 32 Ill. Dec. 274; 1979 Ill. App. LEXIS 3229Docket: 78-899

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; August 30, 1979; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Edward S. Alfano, an employee of M.W. Ryan Company, was injured falling from a scaffold while installing ceiling tiles at the Board of Trade Building. He filed suit against several parties, including Fullerton Construction Company, alleging negligence and violations of the Structural Work Act. Fullerton sought summary judgment, claiming it was not liable under the Act and denied negligence. The trial court ruled in favor of Fullerton, prompting Alfano's appeal.

Alfano contended that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding Fullerton's liability under both the Act and negligence claims. During the project, while Fullerton's crew was installing drywall, Alfano's crew was installing ceiling tiles amidst trenches for electrical wiring. Fullerton was instructed to store drywall near these trenches, which Alfano argued forced him to use a less stable "Baker" scaffold instead of a safer "pipe" scaffold. He claimed the placement of the drywall made it impossible to use two Baker scaffolds, which would have been safer. He alerted Fullerton and the general contractor about the safety concerns, but was told to proceed with the work.

Alfano argued that Fullerton, as the subcontractor in charge of the drywall, was liable for violating the Act by creating an unsafe work environment and that this constituted negligence. The court noted that liability under the Act requires proof of a willful violation while having charge of the work. The definition of a "violation" and "having charge of" remains undefined by the Illinois Supreme Court, but a violation is assessed against the standard that a scaffold must be "safe, suitable and proper" to ensure worker safety. The court's decision hinged on whether Fullerton's conduct contravened the Act's safety provisions. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defects in scaffolding, improper safety procedures, device unsuitability, and hazardous work conditions can all constitute violations of the relevant Act. The interpretation of "having charge of" is broad and considers the context of each case, generally meaning to have care of the work. The statute aims to protect individuals engaged in high-risk structural work, extending liability to owners and others involved in the erection or alteration of structures. The Illinois Supreme Court has clarified that a party can be deemed to have charge of work based on familiarity with construction methods and the ability to address safety issues, even without direct supervisory control.

In the case at hand, evidence suggests Fullerton may have been responsible for the placement of drywall near trenches, potentially creating unsafe conditions for Alfano's scaffold and contributing to his injuries. Fullerton's familiarity with construction practices and its control over the work imply it could have addressed these hazards. Consequently, genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Fullerton's liability under the Act, warranting a reversal of the summary judgment ruling on negligence.

Fullerton argues that the trial court's order should be upheld, asserting that the placement of the drywall does not legally constitute the proximate cause of Alfano's injuries and that Alfano was contributorily negligent. Fullerton claims the drywall only created a dangerous condition and that an independent intervening act may have led to Alfano's injuries. Citing Felty v. New Berlin Transit, Inc., the court notes that proximate cause is typically a jury question, especially when an intervening force is involved. The record lacks clarity on the actual cause of the accident, and it is plausible that another factor contributed to Alfano's injuries, alongside the drywall's role. Thus, summary judgment is deemed inappropriate. Regarding contributory negligence, while past cases suggest a workman may be negligent for knowingly encountering a danger, the specific knowledge of danger must be established—a detail lacking in Alfano's case. Therefore, whether Alfano's actions amount to contributory negligence should be determined by a trier of fact. The judgment in favor of Fullerton is reversed, and the case is remanded for further consideration.