Sonnier v. Crain

Citations: 613 F.3d 436; 2010 WL 2907484Docket: 09-30186

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; February 9, 2011; Federal Appellate Court

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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Jeremy Sonnier's petition for panel rehearing in his case against several officials from Southeastern Louisiana University. The court highlighted that Sonnier had previously accepted the district court's approach to defer evidence presentation to aid in a preliminary injunction decision. The court found no abuse of discretion in rejecting Sonnier's facial challenge, noting that the context was important given the nature of the defendants as university officials rather than representatives of a city or public body. Citing precedent, the court emphasized that for a successful facial challenge, the plaintiff must demonstrate that no circumstances exist under which the law would be valid, as established by the Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno. The court further explained that while criticisms exist regarding the Salerno standard, it remains applicable, and Sonnier's failure to assert an overbreadth challenge meant that the more lenient "plainly legitimate sweep" standard was not relevant. Consequently, the panel concluded to deny the petition for rehearing.

Circuit Judge Dennis dissents from the majority's denial of panel rehearing, criticizing the majority's reliance on the "no set of circumstances" test for facial constitutional challenges, as established in Sonnier v. Crain. He argues that the majority misinterprets recent Supreme Court cases, specifically United States v. Stevens and Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party. Dennis contends that these cases do not endorse the no set of circumstances test; rather, they acknowledge a divide among Justices regarding facial challenge methodologies. The Court refrained from deciding the correctness of the no set of circumstances test, indicating that a facial challenge can succeed only if the challenger proves the law lacks a "plainly legitimate sweep." Dennis emphasizes the distinction between this formulation and the overbreadth doctrine, clarifying that a facial challenge must fail if the statute has a plainly legitimate sweep, regardless of the overbreadth doctrine's considerations.

The overbreadth doctrine inquiry differs from the analysis of whether a law possesses a plainly legitimate sweep. To determine a law's plainly legitimate sweep, the Grange case illustrates the necessary approach. The Court in Grange affirmed that a facial challenge to a statute fails if the statute has a plainly legitimate sweep. The analysis applied the substantive test from Burdick v. Takushi, which assesses the constitutionality of state election laws under the First Amendment. Unlike Stevens, which ruled a statute unconstitutional due to overbreadth without determining its plainly legitimate sweep, Grange established a method for analysis. 

In Grange, the Court first evaluated whether the law I-872 severely burdened associational rights and concluded it did not. It then considered the state's interest in providing voters with relevant candidate information, finding it sufficient to support I-872's constitutionality. The Court clarified that if a law does not significantly burden rights, the state's regulatory interests can justify reasonable restrictions. Additionally, Grange emphasized that election regulations imposing severe burdens are subject to strict scrutiny, while modest burdens warrant a lower standard. A seemingly isolated statement in Grange about the state implementing I-872 in various ways should not be misconstrued as relying on the no set of circumstances test; rather, it illustrates the law's potential constitutionality.

The majority opinion in Grange utilized the flexible Burdick standard, determining that the challenged law was facially constitutional. The Court explicitly rejected reliance on the no set of circumstances test, with consensus among members that a facial challenge fails if a statute has a plainly legitimate sweep. This concept necessitates a court to evaluate the legitimacy of a law's scope using the appropriate substantive constitutional test relevant to the law type being contested. The speech regulations in question must be assessed under the constitutional standards applicable to content-neutral restrictions on speech.

Grange highlighted the importance of distinguishing between facial and as-applied challenges, asserting that arguments relying on speculative voter confusion regarding a party-preference designation were insufficient. It emphasized that a facial challenge cannot succeed if the statute has a plainly legitimate sweep. The Washington primary system was deemed to withstand scrutiny under both challenge standards. 

Additionally, the dissent argued that the majority erred by not addressing as-applied challenges raised by the plaintiff. The case of International Women’s Day March Planning Committee v. City of San Antonio mirrored Grange, as it similarly evaluated the legitimacy of a law's sweep through relevant constitutional tests. The panel determined that only facial claims were appropriately before it and conducted a merits analysis, concluding that the city's financial support of parades did not constitute government speech or discrimination based on content or viewpoint, and that the law provided adequate discretion for fee assessments related to traffic control.

The panel evaluated whether an ordinance restricting speech is content-neutral and meets constitutional standards. The analysis focused on whether the ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest while allowing ample alternatives for dissent. The panel found that the law satisfied these criteria, rejecting the plaintiffs' facial challenges. It emphasized that facial challenges are generally less favored than as-applied challenges and that the plaintiff had presented evidence regarding the application of the speech restrictions in his case. The panel argued against the majority's assertion that the absence of an overbreadth challenge negates the application of the plainly legitimate sweep standard, citing that the Supreme Court's decisions in Stevens and Grange support the assertion that a law can be facially constitutional if it has a plainly legitimate sweep. The dissent further referenced the D.C. Circuit's handling of similar issues in General Electric Co. v. Jackson, which emphasized applying substantive constitutional tests to assess the legitimacy of laws. The dissent criticized the majority for misinterpreting relevant case law and argued that the majority's reliance on the no set of circumstances test wrongly restricted First Amendment rights, particularly for non-disruptive religious speech on a public university campus. The dissent concluded by expressing disagreement with the denial of rehearing.