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Dorsett v. R.L. Carter, Inc.

Citations: 702 N.E.2d 1126; 1998 Ind. App. LEXIS 2193; 1998 WL 870991Docket: 55A02-9805-CV-455

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; December 16, 1998; Indiana; State Appellate Court

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David Dorsett appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of R.L. Carter, Inc. and Roy L. Wade after he was injured in a collision with their tractor-trailer. Dorsett, who could not recall the incident, hired an expert accident reconstructionist who concluded that the tractor-trailer crossed the center line at the time of the accident. In his appeal, Dorsett argued that summary judgment was inappropriate due to the existence of genuine material facts regarding the accident. He relied on his expert's opinion and photographs of the accident scene, although the court could not locate the photographs in the record. The appellate court emphasized that summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the burden lies with the moving party to demonstrate this. It also noted that the nonmoving party must present specific facts to contest the motion. Ultimately, the court reversed the summary judgment, indicating that Dorsett's expert testimony was sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the tractor-trailer’s position during the accident. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Walters opined during his deposition that a tractor-trailer crossed the center line more than Dorsett's vehicle during an accident investigation, suggesting that Carter and Wade breached their duty of care to Dorsett, resulting in his injuries. Despite this, the trial court deemed Walters' opinion inadmissible, agreeing with Carter and Wade that it lacked sufficient factual foundation. They cited Walters' inability to adequately explain his reasoning or the relevance of observed damage to his conclusion. Under Indiana Evidence Rule 702, expert testimony must be reliable, assist the fact-finder, and come from qualified witnesses. While Carter and Wade did not dispute Walters' qualifications or the relevance of accident reconstruction, they argued his opinion lacked support due to insufficient explanation. However, according to Indiana Evidence Rule 705, the admissibility of expert testimony is not contingent upon the expert first disclosing supporting facts or reasoning; such deficiencies affect the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility. A similar case, Scott v. City of Seymour, illustrates this principle regarding expert testimony and admissibility.

The city sought summary judgment, which prompted Scott to submit an affidavit from a safety engineer asserting that low-cost methods for patching street holes were available. The city contended that this expert opinion was conclusory, lacking evidence that the expert had observed the accident site or detailed explanations of the repair methods. The appellate court determined that the expert's opinion was sufficiently founded on deposition testimonies from the city's witnesses, photographs of the location, and the expert's qualifications. It was noted that any lack of detail in the affidavit affected the weight and credibility rather than its adequacy to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Similarly, Carter and Wade challenged Walters' opinion as conclusory, but the court reaffirmed that such issues pertained to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility. Consequently, Walters' opinion regarding the tractor-trailer crossing the center line was deemed admissible, sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning Carter and Wade's potential breach of duty and causation of Dorsett's injuries. The ruling was reversed and remanded. Judges Kirsch and Robb concurred.