HILLSMERE SHORES IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION, INC. v. Singleton
Docket: 1373 September Term, 2007
Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland; October 30, 2008; Maryland; State Appellate Court
In the case of Hillsmere Shores Improvement Association, Inc. v. D. Gregory Singleton, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland addresses a dispute concerning ownership of portions of a Community Beach within the Hillsmere Estates Subdivision. The appellant, Hillsmere Shores Improvement Association (HSIA), is the record owner of the Community Beach, which is accessible to all lot owners in the subdivision. The appellees—D. Gregory and Susan Singleton, Edward and Leah Hertz, and Parviz Sahandy—own adjacent properties and filed quiet title actions, claiming they obtained title to portions of the beach through adverse possession.
After a remand from a prior decision, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County ruled in favor of the appellees, determining they were entitled to the disputed beach areas based on their adverse possession claims. HSIA appealed, presenting seven questions regarding potential errors made by the trial court, including issues related to the consideration of subjective intent, the renouncement of claims by Dr. Sahandy, the tacking of possessions, the extent of land awarded, sovereign immunity, subdivision of platted lots, and the ability of a community association to lose title through adverse possession under the county code.
The court ultimately affirmed the lower court's decision, supporting the ruling that the appellees had established their claims to the beach portions in question. The factual context includes the development of the subdivision between 1952 and 1959, with the appellees owning three noncontiguous lots along East Bay View Drive, which connect to the Community Beach area.
Access to the Community Beach is available from East Bay View Drive at the west end, where Hillsmere Drive ends. Adjacent to Lot 1 at this terminus lies a playground and a large portion of the Community Beach. Two main sections of the Community Beach are connected by a narrow strip running behind Lots 1-17, which separates the rear property lines of these lots from Duvall Creek's shoreline. The disputed areas are specifically behind Lots 9, 15, and 17.
In May 1952, the Developer recorded a "Deed of Covenants, Restrictions and Conditions" regarding Section 1 of the Subdivision in Anne Arundel County. Key provisions included:
1. A committee from the Developer must approve all construction plans, with a maximum building height of 2½ stories.
2. No fences, signs, or similar structures may be erected without the Developer's written approval.
3. No public dedication of roads, parks, or the Community Beach occurs until the Developer chooses to convey them to a public authority.
4. Waterfront property owners must obtain written permission from the Developer before erecting any structures that might obstruct water rights.
5. These covenants will run with the land and must be referenced in future property transfers.
In June 1965, the area became the Hillsmere Estates Special Benefit District, allowing the County to provide special benefits and levy taxes on district properties. The district is managed by an incorporated civic association, HSIA, which was established to oversee community interests. A "Deed and Agreement" dated July 9, 1965, transferred certain community assets, including the Community Beach and Path, to HSIA for recreational use by bona fide lot owners in Hillsmere Estates.
The Deed and Agreement stipulates that the designated parcels of land are to be held for the exclusive benefit of the appellant and all Hillsmere lot owners, in fee simple, under specific conditions. The land and associated rights must be used solely as a beach, boat park, and recreational area, limited to owners within Hillsmere Estates. The Developer retains the right to grant access to the Community Beach to current and future purchasers of other properties within the designated boundaries, allowing shared use among permitted owners.
The appellant is responsible for enforcing and maintaining the property in a clean and safe condition, dedicated solely to the specified recreational purposes. It is permitted to impose reasonable charges for property use, as determined by the lot owners. Additionally, existing rights of owners and residents of Hillsmere Estates to access the Community Beach remain intact.
If the appellant ceases to exist or fails to utilize the property as intended for six months, the Developer can reclaim the title to the property after providing thirty days' notice of noncompliance.
The parties acknowledge that the appellant has utilized special tax funds for a playground but has not invested in the Community Beach area adjacent to the appellees' properties. The appellees have maintained control over the disputed land for over 30 years, marking it with hedges, fences, and bulkheads, while both the appellant and the community have recognized this area as belonging to the appellees. Ownership questions only arose after the appellant commissioned the Meekins Survey in 2001, which revealed that many property owners, including those of Lots 1-17, had been treating parts of the Community Beach as their own. In 2003, the appellant first claimed ownership of the disputed land and requested the removal of the appellees' barriers.
The Singletons, owners of Lot 9 since 1977, filed a "Complaint to Quiet Title" on August 6, 2003, asserting adverse possession over a portion of the Community Beach adjacent to their property. Their claim, depicted in a plat drafted by David M. Green in 2004, covers approximately 0.1812 acres. The Singletons purchased their property with the understanding that its boundaries extended from hedge to hedge down to the water. Following hurricane damage in 1979, they constructed a bulkhead, obtaining the necessary permits from both the county and the appellant, with the HSIA Board approving the construction at a meeting.
The Singletons constructed a 4 to 4.5-foot-tall bulkhead at what they believed was their property boundary at the water's edge and built a swimming pool in 1980, which partially intruded into a disputed area. They replaced a hedge on the eastern side of their property with a new hedge and fence to comply with County law regarding pool enclosures, while maintaining the existing fence on the western side. The Singletons consistently maintained the property from the waterfront to the street, asserting sole maintenance of the area up to the water's edge without any claims from others until 2002, when they first learned of a rival claim.
The Hertzes filed a "Complaint to Quiet Title" on September 18, 2003, seeking title by adverse possession to a portion of the Community Beach adjacent to their property, described in a May 5, 2004 Hertz Plat as approximately 0.0394 acres. The Hertzes purchased Lot 15 in 1979, which had been owned by the Giacofcis since 1955, who believed their property extended to the waterline and built a bulkhead in 1960. They later acquired Lot 16 and enclosed both lots with hedges and a pool, never facing disputes about their property boundaries. The Hertzes rebuilt the bulkhead after Hurricane David in 1979, created water access by altering the hedge, and fully enclosed Lot 15 down to the bulkhead. Prior to 2002, they were unaware of any claims to land between their hedges and the bulkhead.
D. Sahandy filed a "Complaint to Quiet Title" on August 14, 2003, asserting adverse possession over a portion of the Community Beach, specifically the area between his property’s southern border, the landscaping on either side, and a bulkhead at Duvall Creek (referred to as "Sahandy Disputed Property"). This area was depicted in a plat dated May 5, 2004, showing approximately 0.103 acres (4486 sq ft). Sahandy purchased Lot 17 in 1966, with the deed indicating he acquired it "in fee simple" but subject to certain covenants. The lot was initially vacant, overgrown, and affected by erosion. After acquiring the property, Sahandy planted hedges along its eastern edge and made various attempts to address shoreline erosion, including using natural and artificial materials.
In 1973, the Homeowners' Association (HSIA) decided to construct a bulkhead to combat erosion affecting both the Community Beach and the adjacent community pier. Sahandy requested that this bulkhead be extended to connect with existing structures behind his lot, but the Board denied this request, citing a policy against work on private property. Subsequently, Sahandy received approval to construct his own bulkhead, which he connected to the bulkheads of the neighboring properties. By 1974, his property was enclosed by hedges and the newly constructed bulkhead.
In June 1974, HSIA informed Sahandy that it had made an error, claiming his bulkhead encroached approximately 10 feet onto Community land, thereby enclosing a triangular area of the Community Beach, referred to as the "Eastern Triangle." This triangle was defined by Sahandy's hedge, the claimed encroachment of his bulkhead, and the purported property line.
Sahandy testified that he disputed the claim that his bulkhead or bushes encroached on appellant's land, stating any encroachment was due to appellant's mistake, and demanded compensation for the bulkhead and removal of the bushes. Minutes from a Board meeting in June 1974 revealed an agreement to determine the proportion of the bulkhead on their property and to pay for it, but this action was never taken. In 1980, the Board revoked Sahandy's permission to plant bushes on community property after he refused to acknowledge the bushes were on community land.
Sahandy had installed rip-rap for additional protection of his bulkhead in the mid-1970s, later adding larger rocks around 1990. He maintained the bulkhead and surrounding bushes until removing the hedges in 2003, after which appellant first claimed encroachment on Community Beach. Sahandy asserted that no one disputed his ownership of the enclosed area until 2003, and he only allowed invited guests to use it.
Over the years, Sahandy appealed his property tax assessments multiple times, raising similar issues in 1982-83, 1985-86, 1988-89, 1994-95, and 2002-2003. He argued that a strip of community land prevented him from building a pier and that his lot was not waterfront due to lack of riparian rights. He highlighted that his bulkhead needed frequent repairs and compared his limited water view negatively to other properties with better views. Along with his appeals, he submitted a hand-drawn map indicating the Community Beach area, although it did not show the location of his bulkhead. In 1996, Sahandy purchased an unrelated lot in the subdivision at a tax sale, which does not border the properties involved in this dispute.
Appellant filed motions to dismiss in three separate suits on August 18, September 9, and October 7, 2003, raising defenses such as sovereign immunity, failure to join all lot owners as necessary parties, and claims regarding the disputed area being part of a single lot held in trust for community use. On January 5, 2004, the court heard arguments on the motions, and on January 6, 2004, issued a "Memorandum Opinion" denying the motions. In May 2004, both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, leading to a court order on May 20, 2004, granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees, based on their motion’s legal reasoning. The appeal in Hillsmere I followed, during which the court determined that other lot owners were necessary parties and remanded the case for further proceedings without addressing other issues raised.
On remand, the case was tried on June 5 and 6, 2007. The circuit court issued a "Memorandum Opinion and Order" on July 19, 2007, finding that appellees had continuously and openly possessed the disputed properties for over 20 years, thus establishing title through adverse possession. A separate "Order" on the same day declared judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, confirming their ownership of the disputed properties free from appellant's interests. The court authorized the recording of this order among the Land Records of Anne Arundel County after all appeal rights were exhausted and attached detailed property descriptions. Additional facts and rulings will be discussed further.
The standard of review for non-jury trials follows Md. Rule 8-131(c), allowing appellate courts to assess both law and evidence. A trial court’s factual findings are upheld unless deemed "clearly erroneous," meaning there is no competent evidence to support them, with the appellate court deferring to the trial court's credibility assessments. In contrast, legal interpretations made by the trial court are reviewed de novo, without deference to the lower court's conclusions.
The discussion of adverse possession highlights its significance in the appeal. Adverse possession allows a non-owner to gain legal title to property over time. The doctrine serves several policy aims: it helps "quiet" property titles by eliminating outdated claims, penalizes landowners who fail to assert their rights, safeguards the interests of those relying on the status quo, and promotes land development by rewarding productive land use.
To establish title by adverse possession, a claimant must demonstrate possession of the property for a statutory period of 20 years, as outlined in Maryland law. The possession must be actual, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, under claim of title, and continuous. The burden of proof lies with the claimant, and the evaluation of the claim is based on objective manifestations of adverse use rather than the claimant's subjective intent. In the current case, disputes do not involve all elements of adverse possession, prompting a focused examination on specific claims.
Regarding riparian rights, Hillsmere contends that the construction of bulkheads by the appellees cannot constitute adverse possession because it was done without permission from H.S.I.A., the riparian owner. Hillsmere argues that the title to the bulkheads automatically vested in them upon completion. They reference Maryland law prohibiting deprivation of riparian rights established before 1970. Conversely, appellees assert that their claims do not involve riparian rights, focusing instead on their adverse possession of land defined by their physical possession and the bulkheads erected by them, which were never adjudicated in relation to riparian rights.
Appellant's argument that it acquired immediate title to the bulkheads upon their construction fails on the merits, irrespective of whether it preserved the point as claimed by appellees. Appellant asserts ownership based on its ownership of the Community Beach, referencing case law including White v. Pines Community Improvement Ass’n and Mayor, City Council of Baltimore v. St. Agnes Hospital. However, even if title to the bulkheads did vest with appellant at construction, this does not negate appellees' claims of adverse possession.
In St. Agnes Hospital, the court ruled that the City did not own property for which it built a dock due to lack of proper ownership or compensation, determining that such improvements belonged to the riparian owner. This case is distinguishable from the current situation because the trial court found that appellees possessed the land in question up to the bulkheads for the statutory period.
In White, landowners claimed adverse possession over community property between their lots and a creek, but their claims were interrupted by community association activities. The court also dismissed the notion that mere construction of piers transferred ownership to individual landowners. Therefore, the principles established in these cases do not support appellant's claim.
Judge Davis referenced St. Agnes Hospital to assert that improvements made in front of a lot belong to the riparian owner. The appellant failed to provide legal support for the argument that constructing a bulkhead and backfilling constitutes erasing Community Land. The Court of Appeals affirmed that, despite some contrary evidence, sufficient evidence existed to support the trial court's findings regarding adverse possession. The trial court determined that the appellees had adversely possessed the land between their rear lot lines and the bulkheads for over 30 years, distinguishing this case from St. Agnes Hospital and White, where either no claim of adverse possession was made or the possession was not continuous.
The appellant contended that riparian land could not be adversely possessed; however, the Court of Appeals noted uncertainty on this issue, specifically regarding claims solely for riparian rights without accompanying land claims. In this case, the appellees sought adverse possession of land adjacent to their properties, which could include riparian rights. The trial court's legal principles were highlighted regarding adverse possession claims under color of title and the extent of such claims. The appellant argued that the trial court incorrectly applied these principles, asserting that the awarded land extended beyond the visible boundaries occupied by the appellees. The Singletons testified to having maintained the area up to the bulkhead, which the appellant claimed ownership of.
The Trial Court's Order erroneously granted the Singletons title to land up to the bulkhead, as well as title to the bulkhead and the area from the bulkhead to the mean high tide, despite a lack of evidence showing their possession or ownership of that land. The appellant argues similarly regarding the Hertzes and Sahandy, noting they testified about an "impenetrable hedge" obscuring the bulkheads, which the appellant claims prevents control over the land beyond. Conversely, the appellees maintain that they built or maintained their bulkheads during the statutory period and challenge the existence of any land between the hedges and the bulkheads, asserting that the hedges’ maintenance constituted possession of the bulkheads themselves. The appellees argue that the trial court's findings were fact-based and adequately supported by evidence, including testimony from the Singletons regarding their maintenance of the area and the Hertzes’ reconstruction of their bulkhead post-Hurricane David. The record indicates Sahandy also actively maintained his bulkhead, with photographic evidence suggesting that the hedges were directly adjacent to or atop the bulkheads, contradicting the appellant’s claim of non-existent land between them. The circuit court did not make factual findings regarding possession of land from the bulkhead to the mean high tide by the Hertzes or Singletons.
Metes and bounds descriptions in the circuit court's Order delineated the land held by the Singletons and the Hertzes, specifying boundaries extending to existing wood bulkheads near the South River. The evidence demonstrated that the appellees enclosed and utilized all the awarded land, and any land potentially between their possessions and the water was not granted to them. The appellant argued that the Singletons and Sahandy could not claim adverse possession due to their acknowledgment of the appellant's rights, as they sought permission to install bulkheads and build a fence. This included the Singletons obtaining a permit for their fence and Sahandy for his bulkhead. The appellant contended that this permission indicated the appellees' subordinate status, negating the possibility of adverse possession regardless of the duration of their use. However, the trial court found that the focus of adverse possession should be on objective actions rather than the claimants' beliefs or intentions. The court emphasized that even if the appellees acted out of ignorance or mistake, it would not affect the adverse possession claim. Ultimately, the trial court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding the subordinate status of the appellees.
The court found that doubts about property ownership regarding the bulkhead construction could be resolved by a letter from the appellant granting the Singletons permission to build the bulkhead on their property at 117 E. Bay View Drive. Testimony from the Singletons indicated they sought permission from the appellant, undermining the appellant's claim that the Singletons acknowledged their ownership. Regarding Sahandy, the court noted that he initially requested the appellant to build a bulkhead, but the appellant refused, stating it would not work on private property. When the Board approved Sahandy's permit application, it noted no objections to the bulkhead he planned to build on his property. The appellant argued that the trial court erred by considering the subjective motives of the appellees in seeking permission, asserting that their motivations were irrelevant to whether they subjected the property to the appellant's control. The appellees countered that their application for permits stemmed from the covenants' requirements and argued against the appellant's claim that permit applications implied ownership. The appellant's reliance on the case Yourik v. Mallonee was deemed misplaced by the court, which noted that the hostility requirement for adverse possession must be understood in the context of the claims presented.
Alternative methods exist to demonstrate that a claimant's possession of land is sufficiently "hostile" to be considered "adverse." According to Maryland law, these methods can be categorized under the terms "color of title" and "claim of right." "Color of title" refers to a claim based on a seemingly valid title that is, in fact, defective, thereby supporting a good faith belief in ownership. The current case and the precedent case, Yourik, do not involve claims under color of title. Instead, the focus is on "claim of right," which requires demonstrating an intention to appropriate and possess the land as an owner, excluding others.
To establish the requisite hostility for adverse possession, a claimant must show that their use of the land has been open, continuous, and without permission for at least twenty years, which creates a presumption of adverse use. "Hostile" possession means that it occurs without the owner's permission and without recognizing the owner's rights to the property. Mere acknowledgment of another's claim does not negate hostility; instead, a true recognition of another's valid right to the property would defeat a claim of adverse possession.
The court examined whether Sahandy and the Singletons sought permission to build on disputed land, which could indicate recognition of the appellant's superior ownership rights and thus negate the hostility required for a claim. The essence of determining whether possession is adverse lies in the non-recognition of any authority that would allow the original owner to prevent or permit the claimant's use of the property.
Adverse possession is assessed based on objective manifestations of use rather than the possessor's subjective intent. In Miklasz v. G.W. Stone, Inc., the context of the parties' actions during a permitting process is significant in determining the nature of their claims. The case of Senez illustrates this principle: Mr. and Ms. Collins and Ms. Senez owned adjacent properties divided by a wall that did not align with the true property line. Collins sued Senez for trespass on land that was legally theirs but located on Senez's side of the wall. Senez counterclaimed for adverse possession of the disputed area.
Prior to the statutory twenty-year limit, Senez planned to erect a fence along the wall, leading to discussions with Collins about its placement. The accounts of these conversations differed, with Collins stating that Senez acknowledged the Collins' superior rights to the land, which would negate the hostility needed for adverse possession. Conversely, Senez's account suggested no such acknowledgment. The circuit court did not resolve these conflicting accounts and remanded the case for fact-finding, highlighting that the legal implications depend on the conversation's details.
In this case, unlike Senez, there is no conflict in evidence regarding the actions of the Singletons and Sahandy, who sought permission from the appellant to build a fence and bulkhead as mandated by the "Hillsmere Rules." The trial court concluded that their compliance did not imply acknowledgment of the appellant's superior rights to the disputed area, thus not undermining their claim of adverse possession.
The trial court found that both the appellees and the appellant demonstrated a clear belief that the disputed properties belonged to the appellees, rejecting the appellant's claim that the decision was based on subjective motives from the appellees. The appellant argued that a series of tax assessment appeals by Sahandy amounted to a renunciation of any adverse possession claim. Specifically, Sahandy had claimed in these appeals that a strip of land belonged to the community, which the appellant contended could invoke collateral estoppel and judicial admissions due to the quasi-judicial nature of the tax review board. Hillsmere asserted that the tax proceedings conclusively determined that Sahandy did not own waterfront property or riparian rights, suggesting that this renunciation precluded any future adverse possession claims.
Hillsmere referenced various documents from the 1982 assessment, alleging that notations indicated a reduced assessed value based on Sahandy's lack of waterfront ownership. The appellant claimed that Sahandy's acknowledgment of the appellant's authority over the waterfront area was an explicit renunciation of ownership. However, the appellees countered that the Tax Court had actually indicated that Sahandy retained riparian rights unless he could not see the land at high tide, which led to the denial of his appeal.
Sahandy testified that the Tax Court did not agree with his claims regarding waterfront property and did not reduce his property value based on those claims. The trial court ultimately concluded that Sahandy did not renounce his ownership of the disputed parcel in his tax appeals, despite the appellant's assertions regarding Sahandy's acknowledgment of the property ownership lines.
Dr. Sahandy is not a licensed surveyor and did not utilize a survey when creating his property drawing. The presence of certain marks on the map could have undermined his claim, particularly if they indicated the location of the bulkhead. Nonetheless, Sahandy's assertion regarding the boundary of his property is supported by his statement that his bulkhead requires repairs after severe storms, suggesting he believed the bulkhead was on his property with the appellant's land lying waterward of it. The court found this position corroborated by credible evidence, and no clear errors were identified in its conclusions.
Even if it were determined that Sahandy claimed not to own the disputed property in his tax appeals, this would not automatically negate his claim. The case of Yourik serves as a precedent, where a mother maintained possession of her son's house despite the record title being in his name. The court ruled that her acknowledgment of the title did not negate her claim of adverse possession, focusing instead on whether she believed the son could prevent her occupancy. Similarly, Sahandy’s assertion of the appellant's ownership does not equate to recognizing the appellant's right to evict him, especially since Sahandy explicitly rejected such authority and maintained that the bulkhead was on his land. He also refused to acknowledge any permissive use or to refrain from claiming adverse possession as requested by the appellant. The appellant's reliance on 19th-century cases does not contradict the principles established in Yourik, as those cases involved different legal contexts.
The Court dismissed the adverse possession claim, stating that the standards for proving adverse possession in typical ejectment cases do not apply when a tenant seeks to claim against a landlord. The Court emphasized the need for evidence of an actual ouster to counter the presumption of possession being in line with the title. It noted that the Yourik case differentiated instances of possession with the consent of the title holder, which is considered permissive rather than a claim of right. In contrast, the claimant in Stump had acknowledged the title's ownership during the statutory period, attempting to purchase the disputed property, which the Court interpreted as recognition of the title owner’s rights. The record indicated no similar attempt by Sahandy.
Judge Adkins, in Yourik, highlighted the policy reasons for allowing adverse possession claims by those who acknowledge another's record title, arguing that requiring claimants to assert false legal title promotes dishonesty. Thus, Sahandy's honesty in acknowledging he did not own the disputed property did not invalidate his adverse possession claim, provided he did not also acknowledge the appellant's superior possession rights.
The circuit court found that all appellees had adversely possessed their properties for over the required twenty years. It noted that the Singletons had continuously possessed their section of the right of way since at least 1979, and the Hertzes since their purchase in 1979. The Hertzes’ adverse possession might date back to the 1960s, due to tacking from a previous occupant. Sahandy's adverse possession dates back to 1974, with a refusal to acknowledge ownership in 1980, but was interrupted by the appellant's letter in 2003. Appellant challenged the circuit court's duration calculations regarding the Hertzes' claim.
Appellant contends that the trial court incorrectly allowed the tacking of successive possessions regarding adverse possession claims. However, the trial court did not find that successive possessions were tacked and did not rely on this principle for its determination that the statutory twenty-year period was satisfied. The court stated that, through tacking, the adverse possession of the right of way could date back to the 1960s or early 1970s when Mr. Giacofci enclosed it, but it was unnecessary to address tacking since the Hertzes’ adverse possession was established from 1979, when they purchased the property, until 2003, when they received a challenge, totaling over twenty-three years. Thus, the court’s decision did not depend on any previous owners’ possession being tacked to that of the Hertzes.
Additionally, appellant challenges the trial court's conclusion regarding the end of the statutory period, asserting that the Hertzes' adverse possession claim ended in 1996 due to a tax sale involving another property in the subdivision. This argument draws on the Court of Appeals decision in Lippert v. Jung, where adverse possession was terminated by a tax sale judgment that extinguished previous titles and encumbrances. The Court emphasized that valid tax deeds confer complete title, barring all prior claims. Consequently, the principles established in Lippert are pivotal to understanding how adverse possession rights can be impacted by tax sales.
Nineteen years of adverse possession were based on a prior property title, which was extinguished by a new title created through tax sale and foreclosure proceedings before the adverse possession could mature. The prior title no longer exists, and the appellee holds a new title established in 1992. Adverse possession cannot run against a non-existent title, and for adverse possession to mature, the requisite twenty-year period must commence from the creation of the new title. The court emphasized that the General Assembly's intent in enacting the tax sale statute prioritizes marketable titles from tax sales over individual hardships. The appellant contended that Dr. Sahandy's tax sale purchase eliminated adverse possession claims, referencing the Lippert v. Jung case, which voided any claims that interfered with an easement under a 1965 Deed. However, the circuit court found this argument unpersuasive, noting that tax sales grant an absolute title free from prior encumbrances, except for certain recorded easements. The court distinguished the current case from Lippert, stating that applying its logic would lead to unreasonable outcomes, particularly since the tax sale purchaser was also among the adverse possessors. The court clarified that while reentry by a titleholder can interrupt adverse possession, it generally requires intent, and ruling otherwise would contradict established principles of adverse possession. The appellant disputed the court's consideration of the "wishes of the interrupting party."
Claims are not voided by a tax deed, as the purchaser at a tax sale seeks to acquire such claims. Two claims are at issue: whether appellees have obtained title to the property from appellant through adverse possession, and whether they have eliminated the easement rights of other lot owners in the subdivision. Appellees argue that the property acquired by Dr. Sahandy at the tax sale may have once had an easement for use of appellant's waterfront property, but the tax deed does not explicitly convey this right. It only conveys rights associated with 621 Tayman Drive, without granting any title claim to appellant's shoreline property. Appellees contend that the tax sale has no effect on appellant's retained title, as Dr. Sahandy's purchase does not confer any claim to the waterfront property. If a right of use were conferred by the tax deed, it would only protect Dr. Sahandy, not the other subdivision members or appellant. Appellant seeks to extend any rights granted to Dr. Sahandy under the tax sale deed to all subdivision members, despite none of them purchasing a tax sale property. Appellees assert that existing law does not support this extension. Additionally, the circumstances are distinct from the case of Lippert v. Jung, as the property at issue (621 Tayman Drive) is separate from the disputed property. Unlike Lippert, where the properties were the same, Sahandy’s purchase did not include any interest in the disputed areas or in the Community Beach as a whole. No Maryland cases have addressed whether easement rights benefit from a tax sale in the same way they might in a private sale.
An easement established for the benefit of a specific tract of land is considered an "appurtenant right" that transfers with ownership of that land. In this case, Sahandy, as the owner of 621 Tayman Drive, possesses easement rights to use the Community Beach in conjunction with other subdivision owners. However, it is not necessary to determine if these rights survived a tax sale since Sahandy, as the purchaser, has not claimed any easement rights against the disputed properties. The appellant cannot assert Sahandy's potential easement rights, nor demonstrate that such rights benefit them or other lot owners. Consequently, the claim that adverse possession was interrupted by the tax sale of 621 Tayman Drive is rejected.
Regarding sovereign immunity, the appellant argues that its role as administrator of the Hillsmere Estates Special Community Benefit District renders it a "State agency," thus immune from adverse possession claims. This argument relies on Article 26 of the Maryland Annotated Code, defining a "governmental entity" and outlining the criteria for immunity from civil liability for officials acting within their authority. Appellees counter this assertion, characterizing it as a significant legal misinterpretation.
Article 26 does not grant sovereign immunity regarding adverse possession claims. There is uncertainty about whether the Subdivision qualifies as a "special tax district." Immunity under Article 26 and C.J. 5-511 applies to officials of governmental entities, not the entities themselves. Appellees argue that the immunity does not extend to associations or to claims of adverse possession under C.J. 5-103. They assert that property held by a governmental entity can be adversely possessed if it has not been dedicated to public use. The Community Beach, as stated in the 1965 Deed and Agreement, is reserved for the benefit of Hillsmere lot owners and is not dedicated for public use. The appellees reference case law to support the claim that public use requires property rights conferred to the public at large, not just to subdivision residents. The circuit court, relying on Washington Land, determined that the Community Beach is not protected by governmental immunity since it serves a specific group of property owners. The appellant's claim of being a "State agency" is rejected, with the court referencing a three-pronged test from Zimmer-Rubert to clarify the distinction between State agencies and political subdivisions. The test highlights that the State does not control the appellant, its concerns are local to the Subdivision, and State law does not extend broader treatment to the HSIA than it does to officials of municipalities. Consequently, Hillsmere is not classified as a State agency, and adverse possession principles apply, as such claims do not run against the State but are limited to land held for governmental or public use.
In City of Baltimore v. Chesapeake Marine Ry. Co., the court addressed the limitations on a non-State agency's claim to immunity from adverse possession, which is restricted to the immunity enjoyed by municipalities. The Court of Appeals in Siejack v. Mayor and City of Baltimore established that property owned by a municipal corporation for public use cannot be subject to adverse possession. The court reaffirmed that dedicated property and property held as a public trust are also immune from such claims. However, it determined that if a municipal corporation does not devote property to public use, it can be acquired through adverse possession.
The court evaluated whether the Community Beach was held for public use. It concluded that the Community Beach did not meet the criteria for public use as defined by Maryland law, which requires that property be accessible to the general public rather than just a specific group, such as homeowners in a development. Consequently, the recreational area condition for the subdivision did not constitute a public dedication, as it was intended solely for the residents. The court stressed that property cannot be dedicated to a homeowners association, affirming that public access is essential for a legitimate dedication.
In *Gregg Neck Yacht Club v. County Comm'rs of Kent County*, the court held that the Developer's conveyance of the Community Beach to the Yacht Club did not constitute a public dedication, as the deed restricted use exclusively to lot owners within Hillsmere Estates. It emphasized that the recreational area was intended solely for these residents, which negated any public dedication claim and consequently barred the Yacht Club from asserting adverse possession.
The Yacht Club also contended that County Code provisions limited adverse possession claims on properties like the Community Beach. It argued that the subdivision laws required compliance before any changes in title could occur, asserting that since the appellees claimed only a portion of the property, this constituted illegal subdivision, thereby invalidating their adverse possession claim. However, the appellees countered that the County ordinances pertained to property use rather than title change and that their possession did not create new lots, only a shift in lot lines.
The circuit court supported the appellees, citing precedents indicating that subdivision restrictions do not impede adverse possession, thus rejecting the Yacht Club's arguments and affirming the validity of the appellees' claims.
No Maryland cases were found relating to the arguments presented by the appellant, with only one relevant case from Nebraska, Wanha v. Long, which addressed similar issues. In Wanha, the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that a statute prohibiting certain owners from subdividing land without local authority approval did not affect the doctrine of adverse possession. The court emphasized that an adverse possessor’s title arises from possession itself, not from a transfer from the previous owner. Once the statutory period for adverse possession has elapsed, no further action is required by the possessor to gain title, as the statute only applies to property subdivision by the owner, not by an adverse possessor. The appellant’s situation is complicated by reliance on a County ordinance rather than a State statute, raising questions about whether such an ordinance can influence adverse possession claims, which are fundamentally governed by State law. In Maryland, adverse possession is rooted in statutory law, specifically a twenty-year limitations period under C.J. § 5-103(a) and a cause of action to quiet title under R.P. § 14-108, enabling an adverse possessor to seek clear title after the statutory period.
The County ordinances referenced by the appellant may conflict with R.P. 14-108 and C.J. 5-103, raising the question of whether the Express Powers Act permits the County to override state law regarding zoning and planning. However, this issue does not need resolution because the County has not exercised any power to limit adverse possession through ordinance. The ordinances do not contradict the doctrine of adverse possession, as they are codified in Article 17 of the County Code, which governs subdivision and applies to all land in the County. Article 17 defines "subdivision" as the division of land to create multiple lots and requires that this division be recorded via deed or plat. The circuit court concluded that adverse possession does not constitute a subdivision because it does not involve recordation, but rather is established through occupancy over a statutory period. Furthermore, the current County Code allows for property consolidation by deed without subdivision. The appellant's reliance on earlier versions of the County Code is misplaced, as the present Article 17, enacted in 2005, does not affect the ability to claim adverse possession of disputed properties. The appellant incorrectly cites ordinances that were not in effect on November 1, 1969, when earlier regulations were applicable, which included a grandfather clause for lots recorded prior to that date.
Bill 76-69, enacted on December 1, 1969, and effective January 15, 1970, contains provisions relevant to the legal context of a grandfather clause cited by the appellant. The ordinance did not take effect until after November 1, 1969, meaning prior County Code provisions—specifically Chapter 32 (1957, 1961 Supp.)—governed during that timeframe. Under the earlier code, "subdivision" was defined as the division of land into two or more lots for building development purposes, which did not encompass the appellees' adverse possession of properties, as their use did not aim at rental or sale.
The appellant claims that certain subdivision ordinances regarding "recreational areas" prevent entities other than community associations or the County from holding title to such areas. However, the grandfather clause in Bill 76-69 exempts the disputed properties from these provisions. The relevant ordinances, specifically Sections 32-21 and 32-23, require compliance in subdivision layout and reservation of recreational space, respectively. The appellees argue that their properties, recorded on May 28, 1952, predated the first subdivision regulations adopted on July 1, 1952, and thus were not subject to those new requirements. Consequently, the court agrees that the regulations regarding recreational space do not apply to subdivisions that existed prior to the enactment of those regulations.
Recreational space in the subdivision is designated for the common use of all property owners through a covenant in the deeds. This provision applied to the developer's subdivision creation, but the developer established Section 1 before the enactment of relevant County Code provisions. The appellees' adverse possession of the disputed properties does not meet the County Code's definition of "subdivision." Consequently, the County Code does not restrict the appellees' right to acquire title to these properties via adverse possession. The judgment is affirmed, with costs to be paid by the appellant.
The appellees are represented by the same attorney, and the circuit court consolidated three lawsuits into one order affecting all parties. In a prior case (Hillsmere I), summary judgment for the appellees was vacated due to the failure to join necessary parties. Upon remand, the appellees filed an amended complaint naming additional defendants, including other lot owners and lien holders. The circuit court noted that no individual defendants participated in the trial, and it appears the appellant did not renew its counterclaim from the initial suits.
A "Stipulated Statement Of The Facts" was provided in lieu of extensive docket entries and pleadings. The factual summary is based on this stipulation, trial exhibits, and the circuit court's Memorandum Opinion and Order from July 19, 2007, alongside procedural history from Hillsmere I. Two exhibits were appended to the opinion for clarity, depicting property locations and party names.
In January 1955, upon subdividing Sections 2 and 3, the developer executed and recorded a new deed of covenants that mirrored the language of the 1952 deed. The stipulation outlines that the "Hillsmere Rules" require a permit from the appellant for any work needing a County permit, and that waterfront owners must obtain association approval for constructing obstructions to water rights. References to Dr. Sahandy indicate he is a medical doctor, although further details are not provided. The elements of adverse possession are acknowledged as terms of art, which can complicate understanding in legal contexts.
Possession is deemed "actual," "open and notorious," and "exclusive" when it is visible and recognized by others, as established in Maryland case law. The terms "claim of title," "color of title," "claim of ownership," and "claim of right" serve as alternative methods to demonstrate that possession is "hostile" and therefore "adverse." It is clarified that a claim of ownership is not a separate element but part of proving hostility in an adverse possession claim. The appellees affirm that various bulkheads are situated at the mean high water line. Under Maryland Rule 8-131(a), appellate courts typically do not address non-jurisdictional issues unless they were clearly raised in the trial court. The appellant only briefly raised a point regarding the irrelevance of bulkhead installation to community property during closing arguments. The record lacks information on whether taxes were paid on the disputed properties, but tax payment is a relevant factor for adverse possession, albeit insufficient on its own. The parties presented tax assessor worksheets related to Sahandy's tax assessment challenge, but their significance is unclear, and no formal Tax Court decision was included in the record. The appellant referenced a case (Baltimore City v. Rowe) that cannot be cited as precedent due to being unreported, following Maryland Rule 1-104. Furthermore, Sahandy's prior letter to the tax assessor, which disclaimed ownership during a tax appeal, does not invoke judicial estoppel regarding his current claim of ownership through adverse possession; his statements during the tax appeal align with his present assertion of ownership.
Sahandy was not the title owner of the disputed property when he appealed his tax assessments, and the statutory period for adverse possession had not yet expired. He gained ownership of the property through adverse possession, which the trial court determined began in 1974 when he enclosed his lot and the disputed area with bushes. By the time Sahandy purchased another property in 1996, the twenty-year period for his adverse possession had already elapsed. The appellant argues that a tax sale temporarily transfers title to the State, which would hold rights under a 1965 Deed and Agreement, but this argument only applies to the Hertzes and lacks clarity regarding its impact on adverse possession. The State no longer holds title to the property in question and is not involved in the case. The appellant's claim aligns with a precedent stating that a tax sale purchaser receives a title free from prior encumbrances. Following a previous remand, no other landowners in the Subdivision joined the suit to claim easement rights. The distinction between state agencies and municipalities is noted concerning immunity from adverse possession, emphasizing that while the appellant is subject to state laws, this does not equate to "control" in the relevant legal context.
A litigant argued on appeal that the trial court failed to recognize that public policy should prevent the adverse-possession doctrine from applying to statutorily platted residential subdivisions. The appellate court dismissed this argument, citing res judicata, as the issue had not been raised in an earlier appeal. In Maryland, the adverse possession doctrine originated from the Limitation Act of 1623, which mandated that land recovery suits must be initiated within twenty years. This Act is no longer in force in Maryland. The grandfather provisions of Bill 76-69 were initially codified in the County Code and later recodified. The appellees claimed that the first subdivision regulations in the County were adopted on July 1, 1952, referencing cases that discussed a new zoning plan rather than subdivision regulations. Research indicates that the relevant subdivision regulations were enacted on July 14, 1953. Despite this, the appellees correctly noted that the County regulations were not in effect when Section 1 of the Subdivision was established.
