Quick v. Murphy Oil Co.

Citations: 446 So. 2d 775; 1984 La. App. LEXIS 8043Docket: 13258

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; January 24, 1984; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Arthur Quick, an employee of Murphy Oil Corporation, filed a lawsuit against sixty-six defendants, including the corporation and its executive officers, claiming damages for asbestosis caused by his exposure to asbestos over his twenty-five years of employment. Quick alleged negligence and intentional torts, seeking damages for his condition. In response, Murphy Oil and its executives filed exceptions of no right and no cause of action, which the Trial Judge sustained, resulting in the dismissal of Quick's claims against them. Quick appealed this decision, arguing that the Trial Judge improperly applied Act 147 of 1976, which grants immunity to fellow employees for negligence claims but allows claims for intentional torts. 

The appellate court upheld the dismissal of Quick's negligence claims, agreeing that Act 147 barred such claims. However, it reversed the dismissal regarding the intentional tort claims, determining that Quick's allegations were sufficient to establish a cause of action. The court clarified that the determination of whether the cause of action arose before the act was critical, noting that a cause of action is defined by the facts giving rise to the right to sue. Thus, it concluded that a cause of action does not arise until the injury is known, referencing similar case law to support its decision.

Quick did not assert that his asbestosis injury occurred before the effective date of Act 147 of 1976, with the diagnosis occurring in February 1980, four years post-enactment. The Supreme Court's interpretation of a cause of action applies, confirming that Quick's claim arose only upon diagnosis. Consequently, the Trial Judge correctly applied Act 147, which protects fellow employees from negligence claims. In a secondary argument, Quick contends that Act 147 does not shield executive officers from liability for intentional acts. His petition claims that these officers were aware of the dangers associated with asbestos at the Murphy Oil Company and failed to provide adequate safety equipment or warnings to Quick while he handled hazardous materials from 1955 to 1980. Under Louisiana law, an intentional act is defined as one where the actor either desires the harmful result or knows it is substantially certain to follow. Quick's allegations sufficiently suggest that the defendants acted intentionally or failed to act with knowledge of the likely consequences, warranting a cause of action for intentional torts. Therefore, Quick is entitled to pursue these claims further in court, leading to the reversal of the Trial Court’s dismissal of these allegations.

The judgment of the Trial Court dismissing Quick's negligence claims is affirmed, while the dismissal of the intentional tort claims is reversed. A rehearing was granted to reconsider whether Quick's claims are barred by Act 147 of 1976, which provides immunity to fellow employees from negligence claims. The court postponed its decision to evaluate similar cases regarding injuries from asbestosis or silicosis to ensure consistency within the circuit. Upon review, the court found its initial ruling incorrect and reversed the Trial Court’s decision that Quick's cause of action was barred by the 1976 amendment. The court referenced the persuasive case of Faciane v. Seligman, which discussed the onset of silicosis, noting that the injury from silica exposure begins long before symptoms appear. The court rejects the argument that a cause of action for silicosis arises only with physical manifestation of the disease, asserting that injury occurs when the cumulative exposure to silica reaches a critical point. This conclusion emphasizes that the contraction of the disease itself is the event that gives rise to a cause of action, independent of when symptoms manifest.

The document asserts that failing to recognize the earlier contraction of a disease, such as silicosis, would disregard critical facts. Although physical disability marks a clear point for a cause of action, it is essential to acknowledge that irreversible biological changes and symptoms precede this manifestation. Medical consensus indicates that the disease's detection does not equate to its contraction date. Once silica exposure leads to irreversible damage, the disease is considered contracted, irrespective of further exposure. The plaintiff is only required to allege that silicosis was contracted prior to October 1, 1976, the effective date of relevant legislation. The trial judge erred by stating the cause of action arose only upon diagnosis. Legal principles favor liberal construction of pleadings, allowing for sufficient allegations to support a cause of action. An exception of no cause of action should be upheld only if the petition reveals no grounds for a claim. The distinction is made between when a cause of action arises—upon injury—and when prescription starts—once the injured party is aware of the injury. Although there are arguments that Quick's claim may be time-barred, the court reverses the lower ruling and remands the case for trial on its merits.