Miron v. University of New Haven Police Department

Citations: 931 A.2d 847; 284 Conn. 35; 26 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1142; 2007 Conn. LEXIS 374Docket: SC 17596

Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut; September 25, 2007; Connecticut; State Supreme Court

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Susan M. Miron appeals the trial court's judgment favoring the University of New Haven Police Department and two of its sergeants, David Sweet and Richard Montefusco, in a tort action. Miron argues that the court improperly granted Sweet a qualified privilege for his statements, excluded relevant testimony on the impact of those statements, and barred evidence of disparate treatment. The jury found that Miron began her law enforcement career with the university in July 1999 and completed her training at the Connecticut state police academy. Following a two-week absence due to a severe ear infection in January 2000, her performance was evaluated as satisfactory in sixteen areas and commendable in two by Police Chief Henry Starkel. However, in June 2000, an evaluation indicated deficiencies, particularly in report writing. During her application process for positions with the Glastonbury and Enfield police departments, Sweet and Starkel provided negative evaluations, citing excessive absenteeism and poor performance. Specifically, Sweet described her leadership skills as poor and her police skills as marginal. Ultimately, the Glastonbury police department rejected Miron's application, but she was hired by the Enfield police department in August 2000 on a probationary basis. The trial court's judgment was affirmed.

The plaintiff participated in a five-week segment of a sixteen-week training program with the Enfield police department, supervised by field training officer Charles Grasso. Daily performance evaluations were conducted by Grasso and weekly summaries by Sergeant William Zaczynski, using standardized forms with a scoring system from one to seven, where scores of four and above were deemed acceptable. Grasso rated the plaintiff predominantly with a score of four, but noted lower scores in orientation and officer safety, criticizing her radio use and temperament. Zaczynski expressed concerns over her overall performance, particularly regarding officer safety and stress management, and extended her training by four weeks, indicating that without significant improvement, she would not be recommended to continue. For two of those weeks, the plaintiff trained under a different officer, Marianne Christensen, who also reported similar deficiencies in basic skills and recommended against her progression. Ultimately, Zaczynski recommended termination from the program, but the deputy chief mandated one additional week of training with Edward Kaczmarek, who similarly concluded that the plaintiff was unprepared to advance. On November 14, 2000, the plaintiff was terminated from the department. She subsequently filed claims for defamation and tortious interference related to her applications to other police departments, as well as for intentional infliction of emotional distress against specific individuals. The jury sided with the defendants, and the plaintiff's motion to overturn the verdict was denied. The appeal focuses on the trial court's determination that Sweet's statements regarding the plaintiff's employment were protected by qualified privilege, which the plaintiff argues is contradicted by Connecticut's personnel files and blacklisting statutes.

The court, over the plaintiff's objection, instructed the jury that Sweet's statements to the Glastonbury police were protected by qualified privilege. The jury was informed that such privilege could be overcome if it was demonstrated that Sweet acted with malice, defined broadly to include feelings of hatred or ill will, as well as improper motives or actions taken with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Despite the jury finding that Sweet defamed the plaintiff, it did not conclude that malice was present. The determination of whether a communication is protected by privilege is a legal question subject to plenary review. The issue of qualified privilege for employment references given with consent is novel in the state but is supported by precedents from various jurisdictions that recognize such a privilege. The plaintiff did not provide contrary authority, and this aligns with the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states that former employers may be conditionally privileged to make defamatory statements regarding an employee's character to potential employers.

Defamation claims in this state are guided by the Restatement (Second), as seen in cases like Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical Co. and Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The court concludes that a qualified privilege exists for employment references provided by current or former employers with the employee's consent, aligning with established precedents that protect statements about employee qualifications and performance. This privilege is essential for managing business interests and maintaining the integrity of employment references, which benefit both prospective employers and employees.

Concerns arise about the potential chilling effect on employer communications, as recognizing compelled self-publication defamation could lead to a reluctance to share truthful information due to fear of liability. The court emphasizes that allowing a qualified privilege for good faith employment references is crucial to avoid fostering a "culture of silence."

The plaintiff argues that the personnel files act, specifically §§ 31-128e and 31-128f, precludes this qualified privilege by governing communications between former and prospective employers. However, the court disagrees, stating that the act primarily grants employees rights regarding their employment files, such as inspection and correction, without undermining the purpose of protecting employment references.

The personnel files act prohibits employers from disclosing individually identifiable information from an employee's personnel file without written consent, except for verifying dates of employment, title, and salary. The plaintiff contends that employment references lack a qualified privilege for information outside the personnel file and that employees should review or correct such information. However, the act does not limit an employee's consent scope for employment references, which can include the employer's observations and impressions. Prospective employers may assess these observations alongside the employee's file. Furthermore, the plaintiff's argument that the court's conclusion contradicts the blacklisting statute is unfounded. The blacklisting statute prohibits actions intended to prevent an employee from obtaining future employment unless the statement is truthful. Proof of improper intent is required to establish a violation. The court instructed the jury that qualified privilege is forfeited when malice or improper motives are present, indicating no conflict with the blacklisting statute. Additionally, the plaintiff claimed the trial court wrongly excluded her testimony regarding statements made to her by Grasso about rumors of an affair. The court deemed this testimony hearsay, despite the plaintiff's argument that it was relevant to Grasso's state of mind rather than the truth of the rumor.

The trial court's exclusion of the plaintiff's testimony as inadmissible hearsay was upheld. The plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence from her training with the Enfield police department, claiming that Grasso relayed comments from fellow officers about Sweet alleging the plaintiff was having an affair. This testimony was argued to be relevant not for its truth, but to show that Sweet's statements negatively impacted the plaintiff's employment evaluations. However, the court allowed only a limited inquiry into whether Grasso had asked the plaintiff about the affair. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the testimony was admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, arguing it demonstrated the motive of the field training officers to treat her unfairly.

The court clarified that hearsay is defined as a statement made outside of court, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and is generally inadmissible unless an exception applies. The plaintiff's proposed evidence included three layers of hearsay: Sweet's statement to an unnamed officer, the officer's statement to Grasso, and Grasso's statement to the plaintiff. While Sweet's statement is admissible as a party opponent's statement, the other statements were excluded as hearsay. The plaintiff's argument about Grasso's state of mind failed to account for the layers of hearsay, as the unidentified officer's statement was intended to prove the truth of Sweet's assertion about the plaintiff’s affair, and no exception for this statement was argued.

Lastly, the plaintiff claimed the court wrongly excluded comparative evidence regarding the training and evaluation of other police candidates, positing that such evidence could suggest her termination was influenced by defamatory statements rather than her performance.

The plaintiff alleged that Sweet and Montefusco made defamatory statements about her to members of the Enfield police department, supporting her claim with the testimony of Officer Catherine Dolan, who claimed to have overheard these statements. However, no other field training officers testified regarding interactions with Sweet or Montefusco. The plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence of scores and evaluations of four other officers who advanced in the field training program to counter the defense's assertion that her termination was due to poor performance. The trial court excluded this evidence, deeming it irrelevant as the program was not competitive and ruled that the burden of presenting the evidence outweighed its probative value. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the scores were relevant to demonstrate that her opportunity was negatively affected by the defamatory rumors. The defendants maintained that the exclusion was appropriate due to a lack of adequate foundation for the evidence and the weak connection between the scores and the plaintiff's claims. The court concurred with the defendants, noting that the jury would need to make several inferences to link the alleged defamatory statements to her termination, which was deemed too tenuous. The trial court's discretion in excluding the evidence was upheld, and the plaintiff's reliance on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green to justify the introduction of comparative evidence was rejected.

A burden-shifting mechanism has been established, allowing a plaintiff to use comparative evidence of treatment of similarly situated employees to demonstrate that an employer's reasons for adverse action are pretextual regarding discrimination. In the current case, the plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence from the Enfield police department rather than the defendants, which the court deemed minimally relevant to the defendants' liability. Consequently, the trial court exercised its discretion to exclude this evidence, affirming the judgment. The opinion notes the concurrence of other justices and outlines procedural elements about the appeal process, including the transfer to the court under specific statutes. Additionally, the plaintiff provided consent for her current employer to be contacted about her qualifications and work performance. She testified about being seen on her night off and that she had completed a physician-prescribed recovery period. Relevant statutes are included: General Statutes § 31-128e allows employees to contest information in their personnel files; § 31-128f restricts disclosure of identifiable employee information without written consent; and § 31-51 prohibits blacklisting employees while allowing truthful statements about former employees under certain conditions.

The plaintiff contests the court's provision of an instruction on qualified privilege but does not dispute its content. The court refrains from deciding whether a plaintiff can prove actual malice to overcome qualified privilege in defamation cases with a lesser standard of recklessness. Relevant case law, such as Bishop v. Kelly, discusses recklessness, while Dun & Bradstreet highlights that the First Amendment does not negate damages in defamation claims involving nonpublic figures and private matters. The court also does not address whether a plaintiff can bypass the requirement of proving actual malice by demonstrating a lack of good faith from the employer, referencing cases like Bleich v. Ortiz and Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co. that allow for overcoming qualified privilege through bad faith. Additionally, it notes that lack of good faith alone is insufficient to defeat the privilege, as established in Miles v. Perry and supported by the Restatement (Second) Torts.

Regarding Sweet's statements to the Glastonbury police, the jury found that Sweet made a defamatory statement, but it was not proven true, and there was no evidence of malice. Consequently, this led to a verdict favoring Sweet and the university. Section 595 of the Restatement (Second) Torts outlines that a publication is conditionally privileged if it is made in circumstances that justify a reasonable belief in the necessity of the communication. It emphasizes that the context of the publication—especially if made in response to a request—affects its privilege status. The court notes that the employment context may compel a former employee to disclose defamatory statements when asked by prospective employers, as indicated in Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical Co.

General Statutes § 31-128b mandates employers to allow employees to inspect their personnel files upon written request within a reasonable timeframe, provided such files exist. Inspections must occur during regular business hours at a location near the employee's workplace. Employers are required to retain personnel files for at least one year post-termination. However, the statute does not obligate employers to maintain these files if they do not exist. The plaintiff argues that her consent was limited to her personnel file, citing Brown v. Soh, which addressed the invalidity of exculpatory releases but is deemed irrelevant to the current case regarding consent to contact a former employer. 

Section 8-3 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence allows certain hearsay statements, including those reflecting a declarant's then-existing mental state. The plaintiff initially claimed Grasso's statement was relevant to Sweet's intent to interfere with her business relations but later asserted its relevance to Grasso's state of mind. Sweet's alleged statement is considered a party opponent's statement, so its admissibility under the state of mind exception does not need further examination. Grasso's statement regarding Sweet’s remark about the plaintiff does not indicate Grasso's mental state as defined under the hearsay exception. The court noted that limiting comparative evidence to only four officers would be impractical, allowing defendants to present evidence on other candidates from the training program.