Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, Minn.

Citations: 740 F. Supp. 654; 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7815; 1990 WL 87332Docket: Civ. 4-89-78

Court: District Court, D. Minnesota; June 21, 1990; Federal District Court

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Plaintiffs Cornerstone Bible Church and Pastor James Bzoskie filed a lawsuit against the City of Hastings, Minnesota, alleging violations of their constitutional rights, including freedom of speech, association, due process, equal protection, and the free exercise of religion. The dispute arose concerning the Church's location, which was initially held in Bzoskie's home, then at Hastings Senior High School, and eventually at the Caturia Building, located in a commercial zone. The City of Hastings has a zoning ordinance that allows churches in residential areas but prohibits them in commercial and industrial zones. In late 1986, the City informed the Church that its use of the Caturia Building violated the ordinance, offering the option to appeal the decision; however, the Church did not appeal and instead sought to purchase a former theater in a commercial zone, requesting an amendment to the zoning ordinance. The planning commission recommended denying this request, and the city council subsequently denied the Church's application. The Church also explored other properties in Hastings but was unsuccessful in securing a suitable location. The court ultimately granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

The Church sought to rezone the Tenth Street property, located in a commercial zone, to facilitate its intended use. This request occurred during ongoing negotiations for the property. The planning commission recommended denial of the request, which the city council unanimously upheld after its own hearing. Despite the denial, the Church purchased the property in fall 1984 and subsequently made another rezoning request, which was again denied. Additionally, the Church expressed interest in a property at 515 East Third Street, zoned for industrial use, requesting it be reclassified to a residential zone where churches are permitted. The city planner endorsed this request, and the city council approved it, advancing the amendment through two readings in September and October 1987. However, the Church withdrew its request before the final reading, preventing the amendment from taking effect.

The Church has also attempted to lease or buy other facilities in Hastings, with no transactions completed, leading to its continued occupation of the Caturia Building. The City granted multiple extensions for the Church to remain there until the last expired on January 1, 1989, after which the Church was ordered to vacate. Following this order, the Church was informed of non-compliance with the zoning ordinance and subsequently filed a lawsuit against the City, claiming violations of constitutional rights including freedom of speech, association, equal protection, due process, and free exercise of religion. The City has moved for summary judgment on these claims.

The Hastings Zoning Ordinance stipulates residential zones (R-1 through R-5) where churches are permitted, a commercial zone (C-3) for the Caturia Building, and an industrial zone (I-2) for the Tenth Street property. Specifically, the R-1 zone aims to manage residential expansion and protect the living environment, allowing for one-family detached dwellings, public recreational areas, churches, schools, and customary home occupations.

Uses by special permit include fire stations, hospitals, day care centers, old age homes, rest homes, and cemeteries. The R-2 Medium Density Residences district aims to protect pre-WWII residential areas from conflicting uses while allowing for future development that meets health, light, air, and aesthetic standards. Permitted uses include those allowed in the R-1 Low Density district, two-family dwellings, conversions of single-family homes to multiple-family units, agricultural operations with specific storage requirements, fire stations, nursing homes, day care centers, libraries, and bed and breakfast facilities under certain criteria. Special permits are required for short-term residential emergency shelters accommodating six to eighteen persons.

The R-3 Moderate High Density Residential district addresses the demand for rental housing through townhouses, quadriminium, and 4-plex housing, allowing for increased design flexibility. Permitted uses encompass various residential types, nursing homes, dormitories, schools, churches, fire stations, professional offices, day care centers, libraries, and accessory uses like garages and recreational facilities. Customary home occupations are permitted under specific conditions.

The R-4 Medium Density district recognizes the demand for rental housing and encourages high-quality apartment developments under three stories tall, permitting the same uses as the R-3 district, with no special permits required. The R-5 High Density Residential district also acknowledges the demand for rental housing, promoting high-quality apartment developments over three stories, with identical permitted uses as in R-4 and no special permits. 

The C-3 Community-Region Commerce district is established to support existing downtown commercial development and its future expansion, rehabilitation, and redevelopment.

Commercial establishments permitted under the zoning ordinance include a variety of retail businesses, personal services, offices (excluding merchandising), finance and real estate services, repair services (excluding auto repair), entertainment venues, lodging services, public buildings, private clubs, and apartments located above the first floor. Accessory uses related to these establishments, such as off-street parking and storage, are also permitted. 

Certain uses, including automobile service stations, drive-in establishments, creameries, and small animal clinics, require a special permit. 

The general industry district aims to accommodate existing heavy industrial developments and potential future expansions while minimizing conflicts with incompatible uses. Permitted activities include fabricating, manufacturing, processing, and wholesaling, alongside accessory uses. Commercial recreational activities are allowed with a special permit.

Regarding constitutional law, Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for summary judgment when no material facts are in dispute, thereby enabling a legal judgment. The Hastings Zoning Ordinance restricts church establishment to residential zones, which the Church argues violates its First Amendment free speech rights. The ordinance permits churches, but only in designated areas, not in commercial or industrial zones.

The Hastings ordinance is comparable to the Renton ordinance, as both do not outright ban specific establishments (adult theatres and churches, respectively) but rather restrict their placement within designated areas. The Supreme Court's precedent in Renton established that such regulations are time, place, and manner restrictions. The recent reaffirmation of this principle in Ward v. Rock Against Racism emphasized that reasonable restrictions on protected speech must be content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental interests, and allow ample alternative channels for communication. The Hastings ordinance meets these criteria, as it regulates land use without reference to the content of the speech involved. Its intent is to create designated zones for certain land uses to prevent conflicts with surrounding areas, thereby ensuring that the purpose of the regulation is independent of the specific messages conveyed by the entities it affects.

The ordinance establishes geographic divisions to facilitate downtown commercial development and allocate space for industrial use while preserving the residential character of certain areas. Its content neutrality is highlighted in contrast to the Renton ordinance, which differentiates between types of theatres based on film content. Unlike Renton, the Hastings ordinance treats all churches equally without singling them out, and although churches are permitted in residential zones, they are not excluded from commercial or industrial zones. The ordinance's structure indicates that permitted uses are explicitly listed, while exclusions are implied. This design is significant for the Church's free speech claims; if such challenges were accepted, it could undermine the City’s ability to enforce content-neutral regulations, conflicting with free speech precedent.

The Hastings Zoning Ordinance also addresses the need to be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. The court confirms that municipalities have a substantial interest in establishing content-neutral zones for various establishments. The ordinance is deemed to serve this interest effectively. The court references a Supreme Court ruling regarding a sound ordinance, clarifying that the validity of time, place, and manner regulations does not hinge on the existence of less restrictive alternatives. Thus, the Hastings Zoning Ordinance is confirmed as content-neutral and appropriately tailored to achieve its significant governmental goals.

Regulations concerning the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate, content-neutral governmental interest, but they are not required to be the least restrictive means. In this case, the Hastings Zoning Ordinance effectively promotes a significant governmental interest, meeting the standard of narrow tailoring. The ordinance allows for church use in residential areas, which comprise 45% of the city’s land, providing ample alternative channels for communication. The court addresses the Church's claim of practical unavailability of property, noting that similar arguments were dismissed by the Supreme Court in Renton, where it upheld zoning regulations despite claims of limited availability. The court concludes that the Hastings Zoning Ordinance does not violate constitutional standards regarding free speech and thus grants summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

Regarding freedom of association, the plaintiffs argue that the ordinance infringes on their constitutional right. The right to freedom of association encompasses three aspects: associating for economic or non-fundamental purposes, associating as part of the due process and privacy rights, and associating for activities protected by the First Amendment. The court's analysis appears to consider these dimensions but does not provide a definitive ruling on this aspect in the excerpt.

The Church claims that the City has infringed upon its freedom of association by limiting where it can hold meetings and worship services. This claim is evaluated under the principles established in *Buckley v. Valeo*, where the Supreme Court indicated that a freedom of association claim requires proof of actual harm or hardship suffered by the organization’s members. In *NAACP v. Alabama*, the Court noted that the plaintiffs demonstrated significant harm, such as economic reprisal and threats, which was not present in *Buckley*. The current case parallels *Buckley*, as the Church has not provided evidence showing that its members have faced any harm due to the City's zoning ordinance. The lack of evidence and the Church's minimal discussion of the issue indicate no genuine issue of material fact exists, justifying the defendant’s entitlement to summary judgment on this claim.

Regarding due process, the Church asserts that the Hastings Zoning Ordinance violates its rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. It argues that the city planner has excessive discretion in applying the ordinance due to undefined key terms like "commercial establishment," "private clubs," and "churches." The Church specifically highlights concerns with the definition of "private clubs" in the ordinance, which it believes allows for arbitrary enforcement by the city planner without meaningful review. The court will consider these due process arguments separately.

The Church argues that the term 'private clubs' is vague, allowing the city planner broad interpretative discretion, which may lead to arbitrary changes in its definition based on the planner's perspective of different entities. The Church cites two U.S. Supreme Court cases where city ordinances were deemed unconstitutional due to granting excessive discretion to officials. In *City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.*, the Court struck down an ordinance regulating newsrack permits because it did not provide explicit limits on the mayor’s discretion, allowing him to deny permits with vague justification or grant them under unreasonable conditions. In contrast, in *Ward v. Rock Against Racism*, the Court upheld a noise control ordinance, recognizing that while it allowed for some discretion, it did not constitute a due process violation since the ordinance included general goals and prohibited officials from selectively impairing sound quality based on content. The Court acknowledged that evaluating due process in ordinances is not precise and that some level of discretion is acceptable as long as it does not reach an unconstitutional degree. The holding in *Ward* aligns with the view that language may never yield absolute certainty, leaving room for interpretation in legal contexts.

When interpreting statutes or ordinances, courts are required to give words their common meanings. The Church contends that the term "private clubs" is not defined in the zoning ordinance, leading to inconsistent interpretations by the city planner. It highlights that organizations like Masonic Lodges and Alcoholics Anonymous are permitted in the C-3 commercial downtown area, while the Church itself is not, arguing that this discrepancy stems from vague language in the ordinance. The Church's assertion implies that the city planner has excessive discretion in defining "private clubs" without objective standards. However, the ordinance must be applied consistently, and the Church's argument can only succeed if it accurately reflects what the ordinance allows in its entirety. 

The Church's claim to be classified as a "private club" is undermined by the fact that the ordinance distinctly classifies churches as permitted uses, while the other organizations mentioned are not explicitly listed. This suggests that equating the Church with "private clubs" contradicts the plain meaning of the ordinance. Furthermore, the Church is clearly identified as a "church" under the ordinance and has formally registered as such in Minnesota, making its argument for classification as a "private club" untenable. The Church also argues that the lack of definitions for "private clubs" and "commercial establishments" grants the city planner excessive discretion; however, this argument is flawed as it demands stricter definitions without sufficient justification. Overall, the Church's position appears weakened when viewed against the comprehensive framework of the zoning ordinance.

The ordinance outlines seven categories of establishments, providing no fewer than 30 examples that collectively define a "commercial establishment." The court asserts that this extensive enumeration should sufficiently address the term's definition and questions what further clarification would satisfy the plaintiff's concerns. It notes that the ordinance’s lack of a specific definition for "private clubs" does not imply that churches fall under this category. A proper definition includes both what a term encompasses and what it excludes; thus, a church cannot be classified as a private club. The court emphasizes the unique nature of churches, suggesting they merit a distinct classification within the zoning ordinance.

Regarding the Church's due process arguments, the court finds that the zoning ordinance does not grant the city planner unrestricted discretion. The Church's claim that the ordinance is unconstitutional due to lack of meaningful review is dismissed as the city planner's decisions are subject to two review processes: appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals and potential legislative action to seek rezoning. The Board has granted extensions allowing the Church to remain non-compliant with the zoning ordinance and has altered the city planner's decisions multiple times since 1987. The plaintiffs have also sought legislative avenues to rezone properties for church use.

Two forms of review provide land-use applicants with necessary due process protections, as established in case law. The court finds the Church's due process arguments unpersuasive. A city planner's role in assessing a request to use land for a church involves determining if the proposed use qualifies as a "church" under existing ordinances and checking the zoning map for permissibility. Disagreements with the planner's decision can be appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals or resolved through rezoning requests. The court concludes there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the plaintiffs' due process claims, granting the defendant summary judgment.

The plaintiffs also assert that the Hastings Zoning Ordinance violates their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Their claims are based on being treated differently from similarly situated entities and being discriminated against due to religious beliefs, which they argue warrants strict scrutiny. Specifically, they contend that they cannot locate their church in a C-3 zone while other non-commercial entities, such as Alcoholics Anonymous and the Masonic Lodge, can. The court will first assess whether the Church is indeed similarly situated to these other entities. The plaintiffs cite the quasi-religious nature of Alcoholics Anonymous and the Masonic Lodge as justification for their claim. In response, the City refers to definitions of "clubs," including those eligible for liquor licenses in Minnesota. Both parties' arguments exceed what is necessary to resolve this issue.

The ordinance in question clearly differentiates between "churches" and "private clubs" based on common understanding. The Church claims equivalence with Alcoholics Anonymous and the Masonic Lodge due to their spiritual aspects, but it is noted that the Church self-identifies as a "church," while the other entities do not. This distinction renders the Church not similarly situated to these groups concerning the ordinance and the equal protection clause. The Church argues it faces differential treatment due to its religious affiliation, which should trigger strict scrutiny. However, the court cites *New Orleans v. Dukes*, establishing that unless a classification infringes on fundamental rights or is based on suspect distinctions (like religion), it is presumed constitutional and only needs a rational relation to a legitimate state interest. The court finds that the ordinance classifications do not stem from the religious nature of churches and are not motivated by anti-religious intent, as other non-religious entities are also excluded from the C-3 zone. Consequently, the ordinance is not subject to strict scrutiny and is deemed rationally related to legitimate governmental interests. The court concludes there are no material facts in dispute regarding the equal protection claim, granting summary judgment to the defendant. Additionally, the plaintiffs challenge the ordinance under the First Amendment's free exercise clause, asserting it infringes their religious rights.

The United States Supreme Court, in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, addressed the free exercise clause in relation to state regulations, specifically evaluating an Oregon statute that banned peyote use. The Court determined that the ban did not infringe upon the free exercise rights of Native Americans using peyote for religious purposes, asserting that individuals' religious beliefs do not exempt them from complying with valid laws. The ruling established that neutral laws of general applicability cannot be successfully challenged solely under the free exercise clause, although it acknowledged two exceptions that warrant strict scrutiny: laws that directly regulate religious beliefs or conduct, and "hybrid situations" where free exercise rights intersect with other constitutional rights like freedom of speech.

In the current dispute, the Church contends that a zoning ordinance directly regulates religious worship and should undergo strict scrutiny. The Court's prior comments suggest that a law would infringe on free exercise if it specifically targets actions based on their religious nature. However, the zoning ordinance in question does not exclusively target churches nor exhibit anti-religious intent, leading the court to reject this aspect of the plaintiffs' challenge. Additionally, the plaintiffs argue a "hybrid situation" exists due to overlapping constitutional rights. The Court noted that past rulings protecting religiously motivated actions involved additional constitutional protections alongside the free exercise clause, suggesting that without such overlap, the plaintiffs' claims would not succeed.

The Church asserts that the ordinance infringes upon its rights to free exercise of religion, free speech, equal protection, and due process, necessitating strict scrutiny. However, the Court determined in previous sections (A, C, and D) that the ordinance does not violate the Church's rights related to free exercise, due process, or equal protection. Consequently, the Church's claim lacks merit, as it failed to demonstrate a violation of any constitutional rights, thus rendering its free exercise claim insufficient for a legal cause of action. The Court found no genuine material issues regarding this claim, leading to the conclusion that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment on all claims brought by the plaintiffs. The Court ordered the following: 1. Summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiffs' free speech claim; 2. Summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiffs' freedom of association claim; 3. Summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiffs' due process claim; 4. Summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiffs' equal protection claim; 5. Summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiffs' free exercise claim. The excerpt also notes that strict scrutiny applies only in cases where laws disadvantage suspect classes or interfere with fundamental rights.