Rebardi v. Crewboats, Inc.

Citations: 906 So. 2d 579; 2005 A.M.C. 1272; 2005 La. App. LEXIS 223; 2005 WL 327799Docket: 2004 CA 0642

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; February 10, 2005; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Plaintiffs Glen Rebardi and Hilton J. Rebardi filed a lawsuit against Crewboats, Inc., its captain Davis B. McGriff, and several insurance companies after their skiff was overturned by the wake of the crewboat M/V Sun River on August 26, 1997, causing them injuries. They sought compensatory and punitive damages, alleging the defendants acted with gross negligence. In response, McGriff raised a peremptory exception claiming that punitive damages were not recoverable under Louisiana or general maritime law. The trial court agreed, referencing Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., and dismissed the punitive damage claims with prejudice. The plaintiffs appealed, challenging the trial court's ruling on the basis that it improperly sustained the objection of no cause of action. The appellate court reviews such objections de novo, focusing on whether the law provides a remedy for the facts alleged, typically without introducing evidence unless it expands the pleadings. The court ultimately reversed the trial court's dismissal of the punitive damages claim and remanded the case for further proceedings.

All facts presented in the petition are accepted as true, with any ambiguities resolved in favor of the petition's sufficiency. The primary focus during the trial of an exception is whether the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought based solely on the petition's face. If the petition includes sufficient facts to establish a legally cognizable case, an objection of no cause of action must fail. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court misapplied legal standards and reached unsupported conclusions contrary to existing jurisprudence. They assert that punitive damages remain available under general maritime law even after the Supreme Court's decision in *Miles*, which limited damages recoverable in wrongful death actions for seamen. The court recognizes that while punitive damages are rarely awarded, they can be pursued in cases involving intentional or reckless misconduct. However, following *Miles*, some courts have become more reluctant to permit punitive damages in maritime personal injury or death cases. The *Miles* decision emphasized uniformity in wrongful death actions, leading to limitations on recoveries in related contexts. The trial court accepted Mr. McGriff's argument that *Miles* barred punitive damages in all general maritime cases, but this court disagrees with that broad interpretation. It references *CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer*, which explored the principles of uniformity from *Miles* in similar cases, underscoring that recoveries under various maritime statutes typically allow only for pecuniary relief.

The Supreme Court in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. emphasized the need for uniformity in wrongful death claims involving seamen, asserting that the remedies available under maritime law should align with the limitations established by Congress in statutes like the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) and the Jones Act. The Court rejected the idea of expanding remedies for unseaworthiness claims beyond what Congress has permitted, prioritizing legislative guidance over judicial expansion of maritime tort remedies. Subsequent cases have reinforced this principle by denying nonpecuniary relief, such as punitive damages, in situations where claims could fall under DOHSA or the Jones Act. Courts have ruled against punitive damages in unseaworthiness actions involving seamen, and some have extended this reasoning to bar nonpecuniary relief for non-Jones Act plaintiffs. However, exceptions exist, such as when a claim does not fall under the Jones Act or DOHSA, allowing recovery of nonpecuniary damages. The Fifth Circuit's ruling in Guevara confirmed that certain claims, traditionally viewed as lacking statutory counterparts, are indeed governed by the principles established in Miles, though it does not necessarily provide a broad defense for all maritime tort claims.

The court first assessed the applicability of statutory frameworks, specifically the Jones Act and DOHSA, to the case's factual scenario. Upon identifying an overlap between statutory and general maritime law, the court applied the "Miles damages uniformity principle," which led to the exclusion of punitive damages. The rationale was to avoid fragmentation in admiralty law by preventing punitive damages in certain maintenance and cure cases while allowing them in others. The court noted that the case at hand lacked any legislative guidance regarding the reckless or willful destruction of property, thus indicating that the Miles principle did not preclude nonpecuniary relief. Although the defendants argued that permitting greater relief for property damage than for personal injury was unusual, the court clarified that Miles focused on avoiding inconsistencies with congressional intent rather than mandating uniform results across all maritime actions. Consequently, the absence of relevant legislation allowed the court to determine that the uniformity principle was inapplicable, entitling plaintiffs to traditional maritime law relief, including punitive damages.

The court referenced two subsequent cases, Williams and Ellender, to support its position. In Williams, the plaintiffs, commercial crab fishermen, successfully sought punitive damages for injuries sustained due to a state-operated vessel's negligence, establishing that such damages are recoverable under general maritime tort law when the wrongdoer acts with willful disregard for the plaintiff's rights. In Ellender, the court reversed a lower court's dismissal of punitive damages claims related to unseaworthiness, reaffirming that punitive damages are available under general maritime law despite the implications of Miles.

The Court clarified that while the Jones Act does not explicitly limit recoverable damages, it incorporates the Federal Employees Liability Act (FELA), which restricts recovery to pecuniary losses. The Supreme Court determined that the limitation on damages in FELA, which predates the Jones Act, was intentionally included by Congress, thus prohibiting recovery for loss of society in wrongful death actions under the Jones Act. However, the Miles decision did not address punitive damages, which serve to punish the defendant rather than compensate for losses. The Court affirmed that punitive damages remain permissible under general maritime law, as they are not constrained by the principles established in Miles. Consequently, the trial court's ruling sustaining Mr. McGriff's objection of no cause of action, which dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages, was deemed erroneous. The Court reversed this judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, with costs of the appeal assigned to Mr. McGriff. Additionally, it noted the substitution of Ruth L. Rebardi as a party plaintiff following the death of Hilton J. Rebardi.