Jafarzadeh v. Feisee

Citations: 776 A.2d 1; 139 Md. App. 333; 2001 Md. App. LEXIS 116Docket: 1174, Sept. Term, 2000

Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland; July 5, 2001; Maryland; State Appellate Court

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In Behjat J. Jafarzadeh v. Seddigheh Feisee, M.D., the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland addressed a medical malpractice claim concerning personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Dr. Feisee. Jafarzadeh alleged she was injured due to Feisee's negligence during treatment in Virginia on June 7, 1995. After initially filing a suit in Virginia, which was dismissed presumably due to the statute of limitations, Jafarzadeh filed a similar suit in Maryland on March 1, 1998. The case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, where Feisee moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

Initially, Judge Ahalt granted the motion to dismiss on August 18, 1998, but later reversed that decision on January 22, 1999, allowing Jafarzadeh's motion. However, on May 19, 2000, Feisee renewed her motion to dismiss, which Judge Platt granted on June 13, 2000. Jafarzadeh contended that the January order established the law of the case and that Judge Platt erred in dismissing the case again. However, the court noted that a subsequent judge is not bound by prior rulings unless a statute or rule dictates otherwise, which was not applicable in this situation. The court affirmed that Feisee's motion to dismiss was valid as she did not waive her defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, thus upholding the dismissal.

Appellant argues that appellee's activities in Maryland warrant personal jurisdiction under Md.Code § 6-103(b)(4), which allows jurisdiction over individuals causing tortious injury in Maryland through acts performed within the state or through consistent business conduct. However, the court finds appellee's connections to Maryland inadequate for establishing personal jurisdiction. Appellee, a Virginia resident since 1973, provided treatment exclusively in Virginia. Appellant claims that appellee purposefully engaged in Maryland business by holding a medical license there, serving as a Medicaid provider, and advertising in regional directories. 

The court distinguishes this case from *Presbyterian University Hospital v. Wilson*, where the Maryland Court of Appeals found sufficient contacts for jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania hospital that actively registered as a Medicaid provider and was the sole liver transplant center for Maryland Medicaid patients, thereby establishing a direct link to the cause of action. The court emphasizes that while minimal contacts are necessary for jurisdiction, the appellant's claims do not directly arise from appellee's Maryland activities, thereby necessitating more substantial contacts for general jurisdiction to be applicable.

Appellee's minimal contacts with Maryland were insufficient to establish jurisdiction related to appellant's cause of action. The case referenced, Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behning, illustrates that appellee did not invest in marketing or advertising in Maryland, having ceased attempts to solicit business there after an unsuccessful effort in 1982. Unlike in Presbyterian University Hospital, appellant's referral to appellee was not based on any of appellee's Maryland contacts. To establish general jurisdiction, continuous and systematic business conduct is required, which was not present. There was no evidence that appellee engaged in activities leading to Medicaid payments or was listed in local directories through purposeful action. Appellee did not conduct business or derive significant revenue from Maryland, failing to purposefully avail herself of the state's laws. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment, with costs assigned to the appellant.