Farmery v. WCAB

Citations: 776 A.2d 349; 2001 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 438; 2001 WL 691755

Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania; June 21, 2001; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Kelly Farmery, a former Philadelphia police officer, filed a petition for review after the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board reversed a Workers' Compensation Judge's (WCJ) decision granting her benefits for a mental disability under the Workers' Compensation Act. Farmery began experiencing abdominal pain linked to job-related stress in 1991, which worsened following a threatening incident in 1993, necessitating an emergency visit. Initially treated by a gynecologist, she was later referred to gastroenterologist Dr. Harvey B. Lefton, who diagnosed her with a work-related stress-induced condition known as 'spastic irritable bowel.' After being assigned to a desk job, her symptoms improved, but she eventually stopped working and was terminated after utilizing sick leave. Dr. Lefton testified that her stress stemmed from concerns about her safety on the job and confirmed that her condition significantly affected her ability to perform police duties. By mid-1994, her condition had improved enough for her to discontinue medication and follow-up visits.

The City countered Claimant's evidence with expert testimony from Dr. Lawrence Spitz, who stated that Claimant did not suffer from irritable bowel syndrome and was thus not disabled from her duties as a police officer. However, the Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) found Dr. Spitz's opinion less credible than that of Claimant's treating physician, Dr. Lefton, for several reasons: Dr. Lefton’s established relationship with the Claimant provided his testimony greater weight; his findings were corroborated by Claimant's assertion that her symptoms worsened during work and improved when she left; Dr. Lefton's views were supported by medical literature indicating stress can exacerbate irritable bowel syndrome; and Claimant ceased medication when work-related stress was alleviated. Consequently, the WCJ ruled Claimant disabled due to work-related stress and awarded benefits.

The City appealed, and the Board reversed this decision, determining that Claimant did not meet the statutory definition of an injury under the Act, referencing the case Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Mascolo). The Board concluded that Claimant's physical symptoms were solely a result of the mental stress from her police duties and did not persist during her modified desk work. The courts have acknowledged three categories of claims involving psychological components: (1) psychological stimulus leading to physical injury; (2) physical stimulus causing psychological injury; and (3) psychological stimulus causing psychological injury. 

Claimant argued that she proved she had a diagnosed physical condition, spastic colon, attributable to the mental stress of her job, distinguishing her case from Old Republic, which involved only psychological injuries. The City maintained that Claimant did not establish a compensable 'mental/physical' claim, as her symptoms did not disable her outside of her patrol duties.

Where there is no remaining physical manifestation of stress after a claimant's cessation of work due to stress, the mental/mental standard applies, which requires a finding of abnormal working conditions. In Old Republic, it was established that a claimant's mental injury, rather than a physical ailment, must be shown to prevent job performance. Claimants bear the burden of proving all elements for benefits, including demonstrating that their injury resulted from work-related factors. A mental/physical injury must have two components: a psychological stimulus causing a continuing physical injury after the stimulus is removed, and a disability from the physical condition rather than the psychological stimulus. The Supreme Court clarified in Davis v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board that to recover benefits for a mental injury with mental or physical symptoms, claimants must prove abnormal working conditions. In Davis, a police officer diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and physical symptoms failed to prove his condition was caused by abnormal working conditions, thus preempting Old Republic's analysis. The shift to focus on 'abnormal working conditions' means it's no longer necessary to determine if a physical condition persisted after the mental stimulus. Subsequent cases, including McCarron v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, have reinforced that the distinction between mental/mental and mental/physical claims is effectively nullified, emphasizing the need to establish abnormal working conditions.

A denial of benefits for hypertension, anxiety, nervousness, insomnia, and loss of concentration was affirmed. It has been established that while certain jobs, particularly policing, are inherently stressful, for a working environment to be considered as having abnormal working conditions, a claimant must demonstrate that their work performance was unusually stressful compared to typical experiences or that a specific unusual event increased the stress. Claimants in high-stress jobs do not face a higher burden of proof, but it is more challenging to prove abnormal conditions. In this case, the claimant's symptoms arose merely from requests to perform routine tasks, without evidence of abnormal conditions or duties beyond normal expectations for a police officer. A specific incident where the claimant faced a man with a knife did not substantiate a finding of abnormal working conditions. Consequently, the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board's order was upheld. The record indicated no intention to pursue a mental/mental claim, and even if it had, the absence of evidence for abnormal working conditions would preclude recovery under that theory as well. The review standard focused on supporting evidence for findings, constitutional rights, and legal errors.

In Martin v. Ketchum, Inc., Martin's widow claimed benefits after his suicide, asserting it was due to job-related stress following his reassignment to a less prestigious account after being removed from a major campaign. The referee granted benefits, but both the Board and the High Court reversed this decision, emphasizing that claimants must provide objective evidence of a psychiatric injury stemming from abnormal working conditions, which were not established in this case. 

In Daneker, the claimant alleged that job stress led to her major depression and physical symptoms but was found not to have experienced abnormal working conditions despite the stress from job changes and disciplinary actions. Consequently, under the Supreme Court's decision in Davis, claimants must now demonstrate that abnormal working conditions caused any physical injury or death resulting from mental stress, including heart attacks. 

In Krawchuk v. Philadelphia Electric Co., the Supreme Court ruled that a heart attack caused by work-related stress could be compensable if related to employment. However, subsequent decisions, particularly Erie Bolt Corporation v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, indicated a shift in this precedent, requiring proof of abnormal working conditions even in cases involving heart attacks resulting from workplace stress. The Supreme Court's ruling in Erie Bolt reaffirmed the necessity for claimants to demonstrate that their stress was linked to abnormal working conditions to obtain benefits.