State v. Tomanelli

Citations: 153 Conn. 365; 216 A.2d 625; 1966 Conn. LEXIS 534

Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut; February 1, 1966; Connecticut; State Supreme Court

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In the case of State of Connecticut v. Michael R. Tomanelli, the defendant was convicted of speeding, with the conviction upheld by the Appellate Division. The state’s evidence relied solely on a radar speed detection instrument used by the police. Key issues on appeal included the judicial notice of radar's scientific principles, the qualifications of the radar operator, and the admissibility of partial evidence from the radar’s graphic record.

The incident occurred on a rural highway with a posted speed limit of 45 miles per hour. The radar instrument, tested for accuracy with tuning forks before and after the incident, recorded the defendant traveling at 64 miles per hour. Despite conceding to exceeding the speed limit, the defendant argued that his speed was reasonable given the conditions. He contested the admissibility of the radar evidence, claiming a lack of proof regarding radar's accuracy.

The court ruled that it could take judicial notice of radar's established utility in measuring speed, allowing the evidence to be admitted. The ruling on judicial notice highlighted its function as a means for courts to recognize facts that are sufficiently known or accessible, thereby eliminating the need for further evidence.

Judicial notice allows a court to accept certain propositions as true without requiring proof from the party expected to provide it. However, this acknowledgment is not conclusive, and opposing parties can dispute these facts with evidence if they choose. The matters judicially noticed are those widely known through ordinary experience or generally accepted truths that can be easily demonstrated. In the case discussed, the defendant did not provide counter-evidence.

The excerpt distinguishes between true radar technology and the police radar used in this case. True radar, known as pulse-type radar, sends out electromagnetic waves to measure range, direction, and speed, while police radar employs the Doppler shift principle, emitting a continuous wave to determine speed based on frequency differences. The accuracy of the Doppler shift, established over a century ago, is scientifically accepted. The court may take judicial notice of this principle's scientific validity, thus not requiring expert testimony to introduce radar evidence, especially since no opposition was presented. However, judicial notice does not extend to evaluating the accuracy or efficiency of specific radar devices that utilize the Doppler principle.

The admissibility of evidence from a radar speedmeter hinges on the demonstration of its accuracy and proper operation to the satisfaction of the trier of fact. There are potential external influences that could compromise the radar's reliability, as noted in limited literature on the subject. Disputes regarding these influences necessitate further examination by the trier. 

The qualifications of the radar operator were deemed sufficient by the trial judge based on a review of evidence, and it was concluded that specialized technical knowledge was not required for radar operation. The operator confirmed the radar's accuracy through tuning-fork tests conducted before and after recording the defendant's speed, observing that the radar readings matched the tuning forks set to specific speeds (40, 60, and 80 mph). However, the accuracy of the tuning forks was not established, nor was it challenged by the defendant, leaving the radar's accuracy unassailed.

The defendant's claim of being barred from presenting expert testimony on the radar's reliability based on judicial notice of its accuracy is viewed as a misunderstanding of judicial notice's implications. Additionally, the defendant contended that only a portion of the graphic record showing his vehicle's speed was improperly admitted into evidence, asserting that the entire roll should have been presented. This objection was deemed invalid for two reasons, although those reasons are not specified in the excerpt.

The radar operator's testimony regarding the observed speed of the defendant's vehicle led to the state introducing a portion of the graphic record from the radar, which the defendant objected to, seeking to admit the entire roll instead. The objection was rejected, as it was not based on the admissibility of the evidence for corroboration but rather on a misunderstanding of the "best evidence" rule, which does not apply since the radar operator's testimony was based on his independent observation rather than solely on the graphic record. The court found no error in admitting the evidence. 

Additionally, a state police trooper testified about the principles of radar and the operation of the radar device, which the defendant challenged due to lack of expert testimony on the scientific accuracy of radar as a speed measurement tool. The court denied the motion to strike, citing that the judges had previously determined radar's acceptance as an established method for speed measurement, thus negating the need for expert testimony. The dissenting opinion criticized this approach, asserting that judicial notice should allow for opposing evidence presentation, and that the established scientific principles of radar should not be considered self-evident without proper evidentiary support.

The opinion references various authorities, including Richardson, Kopper, Carosell, Coombs, and the McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology, which were not submitted as evidence in the trial court. The court questions its authority to utilize these sources without evidence of the authors' qualifications or the reliability of their content. It cites Kaplan v. Mashkin Freight Lines, Inc. to emphasize that it is erroneous to include such treatises in jury arguments when they are not part of the case. Additionally, the opinion is criticized for shifting the burden of proof to the defendant in a criminal case, suggesting that anyone caught speeding by radar would be presumed guilty. The text argues that if radar readings are to serve as prima facie evidence of speeding, this should be enacted by legislation, pointing to laws in Virginia and Maryland as examples. It notes that while radar is used by law enforcement in forty-five states, only four have adopted the judicial-notice theory regarding radar evidence. The author expresses no objection to judicial notice if it follows the precedents set in New Jersey and Arkansas, where expert testimony on radar reliability was presented in trial courts before judicial notice was taken by higher courts. Without legislative acknowledgment of radar, the judgment should not be upheld based on the current record and procedures.