State v. Palmer

Citations: 962 A.2d 758; 2009 R.I. LEXIS 10; 2009 WL 89217Docket: 2006-226-C.A.

Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island; January 15, 2009; Rhode Island; State Supreme Court

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On January 15, 2009, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Jason Palmer, who was found guilty by a Providence County Superior Court jury on multiple charges, including conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery, attempted robbery, and various counts of armed robbery and assault. The jury's verdict stemmed from a series of armed robberies occurring on June 4 and 5, 2003, involving several accomplices, including Anthony Perez and Charisse Robles, who provided testimony against Palmer. During the trial, Palmer contested the trial justice's jury instruction on flight and the handling of a peremptory challenge by the prosecution, arguing that it demonstrated purposeful discrimination. 

Evidence presented included witness accounts of the robberies and Palmer's behavior post-crime, notably his reaction when informed of his accomplices' arrests. His arrest took place on July 26, 2003, after a prolonged search by law enforcement, during which he attempted to evade police by fleeing into yards upon making eye contact with officers. The arrest occurred while officers were patrolling the West End of Providence, where they noticed a vehicle obstructing traffic, leading to Palmer's apprehension. The court concluded that the trial justice's decisions did not constitute reversible error, thus upholding the lower court's judgment.

Officer Zincone observed the defendant operating a Cadillac and, after shining a flashlight into the vehicle, realized the driver was the defendant. Startled, the defendant attempted to flee by shifting the vehicle into drive. Officer O'Brien, driving a separate police vehicle, positioned himself to block the defendant's escape. As Officer Zincone approached the Cadillac, he noted the doors were locked and the windows rolled up. He ordered the defendant to stop, which he eventually did. Officer O'Brien faced resistance while arresting the defendant, who humorously claimed his name was not Jason, despite Zincone knowing otherwise.

The defendant faced a grand jury indictment on thirty-four counts related to a series of robberies from June 4-5, 2003. After a mistrial on February 3, 2005, due to a hung jury, a second trial began on May 2, 2005, resulting in convictions for conspiracy, multiple counts of first-degree robbery, attempted robbery, carrying a pistol without a license, committing a crime of violence while armed, and assault with a dangerous weapon. Sentences included concurrent terms of fifty years for robbery counts, with additional sentences for other charges, totaling a suspended ten-year sentence with probation for violent crimes.

The defendant appealed, challenging jury instructions regarding flight and the handling of a peremptory challenge against a juror. The relevant legal standard requires trial justices to instruct juries on applicable law, ensuring that instructions do not diminish the state's burden of proof, as established in prior case law.

The Court employs a de novo standard when reviewing jury instructions, meaning it evaluates the instructions afresh rather than deferring to the trial court's decisions. It does not assess individual sentences in isolation but examines challenged portions within the full context of the instructions given. The Court interprets these instructions as ordinary jurors would. Reversal of a trial justice's instructions due to error is only warranted if it can be shown that the jury could have been misled to the prejudice of the complaining party.

In addressing peremptory challenges, a defendant must first establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. If successful, the burden then shifts to the prosecution to provide a neutral, non-discriminatory reason for the juror's exclusion. The prosecution's explanation does not need to meet the standards for a challenge for cause, and unless inherent discriminatory intent is present, the explanation is considered race-neutral. The trial court must then determine if the defendant has demonstrated purposeful discrimination, often relying on the credibility of the prosecution's explanation and the demeanor of the attorney.

Regarding the flight instruction, the defendant claimed reversible error based on the inclusion of the instruction itself, but this issue was not preserved for appellate review. Defense counsel had previously indicated a desire not to include the flight instruction, and the trial justice stated that objections should be raised after the instructions were presented to the jury.

Defense counsel did not object to the trial justice's decision to give a flight instruction after it was issued. The only objections raised concerned specific language within the instruction, namely the terms 'concealment' and certain phrases related to hiding after a crime, as well as the omission of language from the case State v. Cooke pertaining to the timing of flight and its relevance. Despite being instructed to raise objections after the jury instructions were provided, defense counsel failed to object to the flight instruction itself, which is a requirement under Rule 30 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. This rule mandates that any objections must be made clearly and specifically before jury deliberations begin. The appellate court typically does not consider issues not properly raised at trial due to the 'raise-or-waive' rule. Consequently, the defendant's argument regarding the flight instruction is not entertained on appeal. Furthermore, the defendant contends that the flight instruction improperly suggested a consciousness of guilt, arguing that no such inference should apply since he remained in the Providence area post-robberies and was arrested later. The court, referencing Cooke, affirmed that evidence of flight can be relevant to guilt and adopted a four-part 'chain of inferences' approach, which establishes that flight may suggest guilt based on certain logical steps.

The court emphasizes the importance of the timing of a defendant's flight in establishing inferences related to guilt. The defendant contests the applicability of two key inferences from the Cooke case: (1) that the defendant's actions prompted his flight, and (2) that his flight indicates a consciousness of guilt. Despite remaining in the area after being warned about pending arrests, the court finds the defendant's attempts to evade law enforcement—such as running into yards and maneuvering his vehicle to avoid police—could reasonably be interpreted as flight indicative of guilt. Furthermore, the defendant's initial false statement about his identity could also suggest a consciousness of guilt, leaving it to the jury to draw conclusions based on the evidence presented.

Regarding jury instructions, the defendant argues that references to "concealment" in the flight instruction improperly conflated concealment with flight as indicators of guilt. The court clarifies that the jury was instructed to consider flight and concealment without presuming guilt, emphasizing that various motivations exist for such behavior. The jury was guided to analyze whether the defendant's actions were prompted by guilt, whether any consciousness of guilt was connected to the specific crime charged, and whether such consciousness reflected actual guilt. The court finds no error in the trial justice's flight instruction, affirming that it was appropriate for the jury's consideration.

The timing of the defendant's actions, specifically flight or concealment, is critical in assessing guilt. Evidence of flight or concealment should be weighed alongside all other evidence, and a jury may reasonably infer that such actions indicate a consciousness of guilt. The legal principle established in a respected treatise confirms that behaviors like flight or concealment are admissible as indicative of guilt. The trial justice did not err in including language about concealment in the jury instructions, nor was there a requirement to adopt specific wording requested by the defendant regarding the probative value of immediate flight post-crime. The trial justice's instructions sufficiently emphasized the importance of considering the elapsed time between the crime and the defendant's actions. Furthermore, the trial justice's instructions did not shift the burden of proof onto the state. 

Regarding jury selection, the prosecution exercised a peremptory challenge against Juror 159, the only juror of apparent Asian heritage, without any initial objection from the defendant, who is African American. The defendant raised a Batson challenge later, during an in-camera conference, asserting that the peremptory challenge was discriminatory.

The trial justice delayed ruling on the defendant's challenge to Juror 159 due to the lack of a contemporaneous objection and the need to review the Batson framework. Upon reviewing the case the next day, the trial justice denied the motion, concluding that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Key reasons included: Juror 159 not being part of the same racially cognizable group as the defendant; the prosecutor challenging four other Caucasian jurors; and the uniformity of questions posed to all jurors, indicating no differential treatment. Although the trial justice found no prima facie case, he noted that even if one had been established, the prosecution provided race-neutral reasons for Juror 159's exclusion. Thus, he determined it unnecessary to consider the subsequent steps of the Batson analysis. The trial justice's observations during jury selection supported his conclusions, and the appellate court found no error in his determination. Consequently, the court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment and ordered the record remanded.

A juror, who is an African American like the defendant, disclosed that her estranged younger sister had been incarcerated for drug-related offenses in the past five years, but asserted that this would not impair her ability to serve as a juror. The prosecutor did not exercise a peremptory challenge against her. The trial judge instructed that objections to jury instructions should be made post-instruction, in line with Rule 30 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, which does not explicitly require such timing. Although there is a narrow exception to the raise-or-waive rule concerning basic constitutional rights, this case does not qualify for that exception. Flight can be interpreted as an admission by conduct, as established by the Fifth Circuit, and a valid flight instruction does not need to detail every inference link. Evidence of flight and attempts to conceal identity can indicate a guilty mind if supported by factual basis. Prior to the defendant's arrest on July 26, 2003, he was actively sought by police for several armed robberies over three to four weeks. Furthermore, in Powers v. Ohio, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant can challenge peremptory strikes based on racial discrimination, irrespective of the racial similarity between the juror and the defendant.

The trial justice found that the defendant did not establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination despite an error in their reasoning. During an in camera conference, the prosecutor presented three race-neutral justifications for challenging Juror 159: the juror's unkempt appearance, lack of attentiveness (notably clock-watching), and failure to respond to group questions. The trial justice referenced these reasons in ruling on the Batson issue. Notably, the same trial justice and prosecutor were involved in both the first trial, which ended in a mistrial, and the second trial. During the first trial, the prosecutor did not challenge an African American juror, who disclosed her sister's criminal conviction, indicating no purposeful discrimination. This context bolstered the trial justice's conclusion regarding the prosecutor's challenge of Juror 159.