Monlyn v. State

Citations: 894 So. 2d 832; 2004 WL 2797191Docket: SC02-1729, SC03-1757

Court: Supreme Court of Florida; December 1, 2004; Florida; State Supreme Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Broderick W. Monlyn appeals the circuit court's denial of his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and simultaneously petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court of Florida affirms the lower court's order and denies the habeas petition. 

In October 1992, Monlyn escaped from prison, assaulted his neighbor Alton Watson, stole his wallet, and fled, leaving Watson to die from his injuries. Monlyn was convicted in November 1993 of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and armed kidnapping, receiving a death sentence based on five aggravating factors and no statutory mitigation. The previous appeal was affirmed by this Court, which denied relief on all issues raised.

Monlyn subsequently filed motions for postconviction relief, which led to an evidentiary hearing. His appeal focuses on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically: (1) failure to preserve the admissibility of habit testimony, (2) failure to elicit testimony regarding the robbery, (3) failure to inform him of his right to testify at the penalty phase, and (4) the cumulative effect of these errors. Additionally, he argues the trial court erred by not ruling on two of his postconviction claims.

In evaluating the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Court applies the two-pronged standard established in Strickland v. Washington, requiring Monlyn to demonstrate specific acts of counsel's ineffectiveness and resulting prejudice affecting the trial's outcome. The Court independently reviews legal conclusions while deferring to the trial court's factual findings. Monlyn particularly claims that counsel's failure to object to inadmissible habit testimony prejudiced the trial's outcome, arguing that such an error likely impacted his conviction and sentence.

Monlyn asserted that the victim's wallet contained no cash, but the court determined that even if the widow's testimony regarding the wallet's contents was improperly admitted, Monlyn was not prejudiced by it. The court confirmed that sufficient evidence supported the robbery conviction, as defined under Florida Statutes § 812.13(1), which includes taking property with the intent to deprive the owner through force or fear. Evidence showed Monlyn physically assaulted the victim, took the wallet intending to find cash, and subsequently discarded it. Witnesses indicated Monlyn had planned to rob the victim, and he admitted to having money shortly after the incident. Despite Monlyn's claim of ineffective counsel for not presenting evidence of a hidden $100 bill found in the wallet, the court found that the robbery was established through other evidence, including Monlyn's intent to steal both cash and the victim's truck. Monlyn's argument regarding the validity of the robbery conviction based on the vehicle theft was rejected, as there was substantial evidence of premeditated robbery. Additionally, his concern about the general verdict form's ambiguity was dismissed by the court. All convictions were upheld based on competent evidence.

The felony murder conviction against Monlyn is supported by either the robbery of a wallet or a truck. His reliance on Fitzpatrick v. State is incorrect; in that case, a general verdict was deemed invalid due to one legally inadequate basis, leading to a new trial. Monlyn's argument differs as he claims factual or evidentiary insufficiency, which does not necessitate reversal. Even if evidence lacked support for the wallet robbery, substantial evidence exists for the truck robbery. Furthermore, even without support for either robbery, the kidnapping conviction independently substantiates the felony murder charge, as established in Morrison v. State.

Monlyn also asserts ineffective assistance of counsel for not advising him of his right to testify during the penalty phase, despite having testified in the guilt phase. He expressed a desire to convey remorse, stating he was 'sorry' and 'in the wrong place at the wrong time.' However, trial counsel, with extensive experience, testified he routinely discusses this right with clients, affirming he did so in Monlyn's case. The lower court found that Monlyn was indeed advised of his right to testify and determined that his proposed testimony would not have led to a life sentence recommendation. To succeed in an ineffectiveness claim, Monlyn must demonstrate both prongs of the Strickland test, which he failed to do. The court's credibility findings, supported by substantial evidence, remain intact, and Monlyn did not demonstrate any prejudice, as his guilt phase testimony did not convey genuine remorse but rather seemed to diminish his responsibility.

Monlyn's testimony contradicts evidence presented at trial indicating he planned to rob or kill the victim, as well as his own admission of hiding in the victim's barn after escaping from prison. The evidence revealed he inflicted over thirty blunt force injuries on the victim, who died after being tied up, gagged, and left without help. The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty, supported by five aggravating factors, including the heinous nature of the crime and its premeditated, calculated execution. The trial court found no statutory mitigating factors and only three nonstatutory ones, concluding that there was no reasonable probability that Monlyn's testimony would have altered the outcome of the penalty phase.

Monlyn's claim of cumulative error fails because he did not meet the Strickland standard for any individual claims, which were either procedurally barred or meritless. Specifically, he argued that the trial court's failure to rule on two claims necessitated remand; however, both claims were found to be legally barred. One claim pertained to improper jury instructions regarding the pecuniary gain aggravator, which should have been raised on direct appeal. The other involved similar issues about jury instructions on the CCP aggravator, already addressed and denied in a prior appeal.

In his habeas corpus petition, Monlyn contended that Florida's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona and argued for retroactive application of the Ring decision. He was convicted in 1993 for first-degree murder, armed robbery, and armed kidnapping, with a unanimous jury recommendation for the death penalty. Previous rulings have rejected his claims, confirming that the prior violent felony aggravator is exempt from the Ring requirements.

An aggravating factor in the case was that the murder occurred during a robbery or kidnapping, leading to Monlyn's conviction for both crimes. The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty, and the court referenced the precedent in Fennie v. State, which upheld a similar situation where the murder was linked to kidnapping. It was established that the jury does not need to unanimously specify each aggravator found, as seen in Duest v. State. Because of the unanimous death penalty recommendation, Monlyn lacks standing to contest any perceived errors related to jury unanimity. The conclusion affirms the lower court's denial of postconviction relief and denies Monlyn's habeas corpus petition.

Additionally, Justice Cantero concurred but pointed out that Monlyn's argument regarding the retroactivity of Ring v. Arizona does not hold, referencing Schriro v. Summerlin, which determined that the rule in Ring is procedural and not retroactive. The Supreme Court concluded that Ring does not affect the fundamental fairness of death penalty proceedings. While this Court is not bound by the Supreme Court's nonretroactivity ruling, it acknowledges that states control their postconviction processes.

In Daniels v. State, the court addressed the retroactivity of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Ring v. Arizona, determining that it does not apply retroactively in Florida postconviction cases. The court considered whether to continue using the retroactivity analysis established in Witt v. State or adopt the federal Teague analysis. The State argued against Ring's retroactivity and advocated for the adoption of the Teague standard. The author of the opinion, having analyzed the matters under both standards in a prior case (Windom), concluded that Ring is not retroactive under either framework. 

Chief Justice Pariente concurred, emphasizing that following the Supreme Court's decision in Schriro v. Summerlin, the holding in Ring does not retroactively apply during postconviction review under Witt. Although Ring fulfills the first two criteria for retroactive application, it lacks 'fundamental significance' necessary for retroactivity as defined by Witt. The court distinguished between major constitutional changes and minor procedural refinements, asserting that Ring pertains to procedural rights rather than substantive law and does not alter the elements of capital murder offenses. Consequently, it was concluded that the decision in Ring does not enhance the fairness or accuracy of death penalty proceedings significantly.

Florida law mandates that aggravating factors in death penalty cases must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In analyzing the Supreme Court's ruling in Summerlin through the lens of Witt's retroactivity test, it is determined that the Ring decision does not constitute a significant change in fundamental and constitutional law that undermines the integrity of original trial proceedings. Ring merely refines the procedural framework for assessing death penalty eligibility without modifying the required burden of proof or enhancing the fairness of the process. Consequently, there is no necessity to consider adopting the Teague standard for assessing the retroactivity of Supreme Court decisions, as suggested by Justice Cantero. 

Monlyn's case involved five aggravating factors related to the murder's heinous nature, premeditation, a prior violent felony, and financial motives, as well as nonstatutory mitigating factors that highlighted his familial affection and behavior in prison. Twelve grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel were raised, including failures to challenge witness competence, object to certain testimonies, and provide adequate defense during the penalty phase. Additionally, claims were made regarding errors in jury instructions and the denial of rights to adversarial testing. The court noted that a hearing is required to evaluate the merits of postconviction claims, and previous challenges regarding habit testimony were not addressed due to preservation issues. The Teague decision, while a plurality opinion, has been recognized in later cases regarding retroactivity.