Town of Bennington v. HANSON-WALBRIDGE, ETC.

Citations: 427 A.2d 365; 139 Vt. 288; 1981 Vt. LEXIS 447Docket: 319-79

Court: Supreme Court of Vermont; February 3, 1981; Vermont; State Supreme Court

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The Town of Bennington filed a lawsuit against Hanson-Walbridge Funeral Home, Inc. seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing that the operation of a crematory for human bodies on the funeral home’s premises violated local zoning ordinances as an unauthorized extension of a pre-existing nonconforming use in an office-residential zone. The defendant claimed that the town's zoning administrator had ruled that no zoning permit was required and had issued a building permit. The trial court employed unusual procedural tactics, taking an advisory verdict on three questions and, after a seven-month delay, dismissing the case with prejudice based on the presence of estoppel without providing a notice of decision or findings of fact.

The Supreme Court of Vermont chose to resolve the appeal by treating the trial court's unusual procedures as resulting in a judgment for the defendant, implying adoption of the jury's findings. The advisory jury determined that Hanson did not misrepresent the purpose of the ‘pathological incinerator’ to the zoning administrator as solely for waste disposal, that the administrator failed to conduct a thorough investigation, and that Hanson did not intentionally mislead the administrator regarding the cremation activities. The case highlighted the complexities of zoning regulations, the importance of accurate communication with zoning authorities, and the implications of procedural irregularities in administrative and judicial processes.

Determinations made by the trial court absolve Hanson of misrepresentation, placing responsibility on the administrator for failing to investigate the application. However, the record indicates there was no actual disclosure regarding the intent to perform human cremations nor any knowledge of such intent by the administrator. The ruling that no zoning permit was required was made without awareness of the intended use, and the same applies to the building permit for a pathological incinerator. The defendant argues for dismissal of the appeal based on the preclusive effect of 24 V.S.A. 4472, asserting that the Town did not appeal the building permit or the zoning administrator's decision within the prescribed timeframes, which would bind all interested parties. The Town concedes the building permit is valid but claims the allowed use has been exceeded, clarifying that 4472 does not pertain to building permits but only to appeals regarding zoning decisions. The ruling that no zoning permit was necessary does not have a preclusive effect either, as the Town does not challenge it as an 'act' or 'decision' but maintains it only permits a pathological incinerator, not human cremation. The court agrees that without knowledge of the crematory operation, the administrator's decision was limited to zoning bylaw compliance. Previous case law does not apply due to differing circumstances regarding knowledge of intended use. The relief sought is not barred by 24 V.S.A. 4472, and the zoning permit's usage remains unchallenged, while the extension to include cremation services is subject to judicial review. The defendant's argument for estoppel against the Town is deemed inapplicable, referencing a reluctance in legal precedent to bind municipalities in governmental functions by unauthorized acts of their officials.

The absence of any municipal benefit from the acts in question undermines the possibility of establishing a general rule or exceptions to equitable estoppel in this case. The essential elements of equitable estoppel—knowledge of relevant facts by the party to be estopped, intent for the conduct to be acted upon, ignorance of the true facts by the asserting party, and reliance resulting in injury—are not met. The plaintiff did not have substantial knowledge of the facility's intended use for human cremation, and the defendant's assertion that the plaintiff had a duty to inquire further is incorrect. The responsibility to disclose the intended use accurately rests with the applicant. Additionally, an estoppel claim is invalid without such disclosure. Although the defendant acted in good faith, its failure to fully disclose the incinerator's intended use contributed to the current situation, negating the possibility of estoppel. The defendant's misleading representations about alteration costs and ambiguous terminology regarding the incinerator exacerbated the misunderstanding. The administrator's assumption that the facility was solely for waste disposal was consistent with the terms used. Notably, the use of the trade name "Vermont Cremation Service" indicated the true intended use, which should have been disclosed to the zoning administrator. This lack of transparency led to justified deception, preventing the establishment of estoppel. The court's reversal is warranted unless the defendant can support its claim of comparative injury, which it has not effectively done.

An adjoining landowner was previously limited to monetary relief regarding a motel built too close to a boundary line, as seen in Thompson v. Smith, but that case involved private parties where hardships could be compared. In contrast, the current case involves the municipality, making the evaluation of community interests more complex. Despite the defendant’s significant expenditures, these do not outweigh the municipality's interest in curtailing unauthorized operations, which can undermine zoning objectives aimed at orderly community development. Allowing expansion of nonconforming uses could cause serious harm to the town's overall development, which cannot be measured against the defendant's financial losses. The defendant's cited cases do not support a different outcome here; Villalon involved private landowners and ceased illegal use, while Town of Marblehead raised issues of town actions affecting property location. The court rejects the application of comparative injury in municipal actions and does not determine if such a doctrine could apply given mandatory provisions for addressing illegal uses. Ultimately, the lower court’s decision is reversed, affirming that the defendant's use constitutes an unauthorized extension of nonconforming use. The Town of Bennington is granted the requested relief, restraining the defendant from using its premises for cremation without the necessary permit under local zoning laws.