Gray v. Hafer

Citations: 651 A.2d 221; 168 Pa. Commw. 613; 10 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 938; 1994 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 640; 1994 WL 666385

Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania; November 29, 1994; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

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Chester J. Gray, Jr. filed a petition for review against Barbara Hafer, the Auditor General of Pennsylvania, and other respondents, following his employment as an Investigator with the Department of Auditor General from May 1991 to September 22, 1993. Gray conducted an investigation into the Center for Research and Human Development in Education at Temple University, where he documented instances of wrongdoing in a report submitted in May 1993. Following a request from a Temple University employee, R. Timm Vogelsberg, for access to this report and to participate in an administrative hearing as a witness, Gray informed Vogelsberg to seek permission from the Auditor General.

On September 22, 1993, Gray alleges that he was coerced into resigning under threat of immediate termination by Hafer and her associates, without being given an explanation for the demand. He claims he signed the resignation letter under duress, enabling him to remain employed until November 12, 1993, and receive income during that period. Gray contends that his forced resignation was retaliatory, linked to his report on the CRHDE, and violated the Whistleblower Law, which protects public employees from discharge for reporting wrongdoing. He seeks reinstatement to his former position, back wages, litigation costs, and damages of $30,000 from each defendant. The Auditor General responded with preliminary objections, requesting the dismissal of Gray's complaint.

Gray's complaint is challenged on multiple grounds. The Auditor General asserts that it fails to state a valid cause of action under the Whistleblower Law, as it lacks allegations of "waste" or "wrongdoing" as defined by the law. The complaint does not support claims of First Amendment rights infringement, nor does it indicate any actions by the Auditor General that would restrict Gray's speech. Additionally, Gray is identified as an at-will employee without any reasonable expectation of continued employment or statutory protection, and he has not demonstrated any deprivation of property rights or breach of contract upon his resignation.

The Whistleblower Law prohibits employer retaliation against employees who report wrongdoing or waste. "Waste" is defined as significant abuse or loss of public resources, while "wrongdoing" involves serious violations of laws or regulations meant to protect public or employer interests. The Auditor General argues that "wrongdoing" must be attributed solely to the employer, and Gray's claims about Temple University's employees do not qualify for protection under the law, as they do not relate to state funds managed by the Auditor General.

Gray contends that the definition of "wrongdoing" is ambiguous, suggesting that reports of violations by third parties could still be protected if they lead to retaliation by the employer. However, the definition requires that violations be relevant to the public interest or the employer's duties. If Gray's allegations pertain to matters unrelated to the Auditor General’s responsibilities, such as issues at Temple University, they would not constitute a valid claim under the Whistleblower Law.

Gray's complaint asserts that he was terminated by the Auditor General for reporting alleged criminal acts committed by the CRHDE of Temple University. However, he fails to establish a cause of action under the Whistleblower Law, as he does not demonstrate that the reported violations pertain to a statute the Auditor General is required to enforce. Although Gray claims he filed the report in May 1993 and connects its timing to his termination in September 1993, his allegations lack the necessary specificity. To establish a valid claim under the Whistleblower Law, an employee must clearly show how their employer engaged in wrongdoing and provide concrete evidence linking the report to their dismissal, such as specific instructions against filing or warnings of negative consequences. Since Gray's allegations are insufficient, the court sustains the Auditor General's preliminary objections and dismisses Gray's petition for review but allows him 30 days to amend his complaint for a potential cause of action. A dissenting opinion notes skepticism about Gray's ability to amend his complaint in line with the required legal standards for the Whistleblower Act.

Chester J. Gray, Jr. has not sufficiently stated a cause of action in his original complaint. Allowing him to amend would extend the statute of limitations beyond the 180 days mandated by the applicable Act. Therefore, dissent is expressed against the majority's decision to permit the amendment. In legal proceedings regarding preliminary objections, all well-pleaded facts and reasonable inferences are accepted as true. The central issue is whether the facts presented allow for any recovery under the law. A lack of clarity regarding the demurrer should favor overruling it. The excerpt notes an absence of cases regarding the Federal Whistleblower statute or similar state statutes that address anything beyond internal misconduct. Gray's assertion that the Auditor General was harmed by a report due to her political affiliations is deemed too vague to support a Whistleblower claim. Additionally, since the case hinges on whether Gray's complaint presents adequate facts for a cause of action, the absence of his report is not necessary for this determination.