Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. City of New London

Citations: 925 A.2d 292; 282 Conn. 791; 37 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20155; 2007 Conn. LEXIS 266Docket: SC 17753

Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut; July 3, 2007; Connecticut; State Supreme Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The case involves Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC, appealing a trial court's dismissal of its complaint against the City of New London and related entities regarding the implementation of a municipal development plan in the Fort Trumbull area. The trial court found that the plaintiff lacked standing under the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act to pursue the action. However, the Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed this judgment, signaling that the plaintiff does have standing to seek relief under the relevant statutes. The background reveals that in 1998, the New London city council designated a nonprofit corporation as the development agency, which subsequently sought state financial support for a plan that included property condemnation and demolition. An environmental impact assessment indicated potential significant environmental consequences, prompting public review and a conditional approval of the plan by state authorities. The plaintiff, formed to protect the Fort Trumbull area's historic and environmental integrity, filed suit in July 2000, alleging violations of various laws related to the development plan's approval and implementation, and sought injunctive and declaratory relief.

Defendants filed motions to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, arguing that the plaintiff lacked standing to contest their development plan actions. They asserted that the plaintiff did not demonstrate statutory aggrievement under 22a-16, as the complaint failed to provide factual evidence of likely "unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction" of natural resources. They also claimed insufficient allegations of classical aggrievement due to a lack of direct and specific injury. The trial court granted the motions, leading to dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. 

On appeal, the plaintiff contended that its claims—concerning the defendants' failure to follow procedural requirements and the need for consideration of alternatives to demolition—were adequate to assert environmental harm under 22a-16. The appellate court found no clear connection between procedural failures and potential environmental harm, affirming the trial court's ruling on statutory standing. 

In May 2005, the plaintiff initiated a new action in New London, seeking a permanent injunction against the development plan, alleging procedural defects in the approval of the environmental impact evaluation. The two-count complaint included claims of "unreasonable likelihood of harm" and "per se" environmental harm, citing specific adverse impacts on local resources and violations of state laws. The defendants responded with motions to dismiss based on lack of standing, mootness due to prior procedural completions, and improper venue under 22a-16. The plaintiff opposed these motions, presenting an expert affidavit asserting a factual basis for its allegations of environmental harm. However, the trial court determined the plaintiff did not provide sufficient factual support to infer unreasonable pollution from the defendants' actions, noting a lack of specific allegations regarding pollutant deposition in local water bodies.

The court determined that the plaintiff's pollution allegations were speculative and lacked sufficient detail to establish a credible claim of harm to state natural resources, resulting in a lack of statutory standing under § 22a-16. Additionally, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate direct harm to its members, which precluded associational standing. Consequently, the court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss without considering their other arguments. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court incorrectly dismissed its complaint for not establishing a colorable claim of unreasonable pollution. The defendants counter this assertion, arguing that the case is moot due to significant implementation of environmental recommendations and that the venue was improper.

The appellate court found that the plaintiff does have statutory standing and that the case is not moot, although it acknowledged that the venue was incorrect and ordered a transfer to Hartford. The court emphasized the importance of standing as a means to ensure courts adjudicate legitimate controversies. It clarified that standing is not merely a technical rule but a practical measure to avoid nonjusticiable suits. A plaintiff must demonstrate a colorable claim of direct injury to ensure proper representation in court, and standing encompasses both classical and statutory forms of aggrievement. The court's review of the trial court's jurisdictional conclusions is plenary, assessing their legal correctness based on the factual record.

Classical aggrievement requires a party to demonstrate a specific, personal legal interest in the subject matter of the controversy, distinct from a general community interest, and to show that the conduct in question has specially harmed that interest. In contrast, statutory aggrievement arises from legislation that grants standing to individuals claiming injury to interests protected by that statute. Notably, Section 22a-16 permits any person or corporation to seek declaratory and equitable relief against various entities for the protection of the state's natural resources from unreasonable pollution or destruction. There are no restrictions on who can claim standing under this statute, but the interest being protected must fall within the statute's zone of interests.

To invoke the jurisdiction of the Superior Court under Section 22a-16, a plaintiff must present a colorable claim indicating that their interests are harmed by pollution or destruction of natural resources, without needing to prove the claim at this stage. A complaint must go beyond merely citing the statute and must provide factual support suggesting that unreasonable pollution is likely to result from the challenged activities. In this case, the plaintiff has made a sufficiently colorable claim of potential environmental harm linked to a development plan, including risks to the Thames River and surrounding wildlife, air quality, and undeveloped land. The corporation's argument that the plaintiff's claims are too generic is dismissed, as the plaintiff is not required to demonstrate the unreasonableness of the pollution at this point, only to assert a plausible claim of harm.

The corporation argues that the plaintiff has not demonstrated a viable claim that the defendants are responsible for or will cause unreasonable pollution, asserting that the development plan is only a proposal and not an actual action. It acknowledges that third-party developers will increase traffic at the site but contends that the plaintiff is improperly seeking to compel the defendants to do more to mitigate pollution from these third parties. The corporation cites a precedent from Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, asserting that the law does not allow injunctions against lawful, nonpolluting actions merely because they could lead to harmful conduct by others.

However, the court distinguishes this case from Alves, where the plaintiff's claims against a city building official were dismissed due to the absence of a legal duty to consider environmental impacts in issuing demolition permits. In contrast, the current plaintiff has alleged substantial involvement by the defendants in the development plan, asserting that they initiated, approved, and funded it, thereby bearing a legal duty to evaluate its environmental impact under relevant state laws. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants may control the properties involved in the development plan, suggesting a direct responsibility for potential environmental harm. Consequently, the court finds that the defendants are not analogous to the building official in Alves and holds that the plaintiff's claims can proceed, affirming that challenges to potentially harmful plans under environmental statutes are permissible before any actual harm occurs.

The corporation argues that the plaintiff lacks standing for count two of the complaint, asserting that the allegations constitute a claim of statutory violations rather than direct environmental harm. Citing Lewis v. Planning and Zoning Commission, the corporation asserts that mere allegations of non-compliance with procedural requirements do not establish unreasonable pollution claims under the Act. However, violations of substantive provisions may imply unreasonable pollution, as noted in Waterbury v. Washington, if a relevant regulatory scheme governs the conduct in question. The complaint is deemed unclear, particularly in its claims of 'per se' environmental harm, which seem to involve procedural violations. Instead of dismissing count two, it is suggested that the corporation should revise this count for clarity regarding substantive regulatory violations. The court rejects the corporation's standing argument. 

Additionally, the defendants, including state defendants, argue that the case is moot due to the implementation of 80 percent of the environmental impact evaluation recommendations and the expenditure of 98 percent of state funds. They claim that since their role in the development plan is almost complete, no relief can be granted. While they also argue that the plaintiff's claims regarding future implementation are not ripe, the court has previously rejected this ripeness claim. Ultimately, the court concludes that the plaintiff's claim is not moot, noting relevant procedural history, including affidavits from state department officials supporting the motions to dismiss.

Camarata's affidavit indicates that nearly 80% of the mitigation measures from the environmental impact evaluation have been completed, and future development plans will undergo a three-phase design review process to ensure compliance with engineering standards and environmental provisions. Lent's affidavit reveals that the department and the corporation have entered into five agreements totaling $73,050,000 in state grants for the development plan, with over 98% of the funds already transferred. 

The court must address mootness as it affects subject matter jurisdiction, emphasizing that an actual controversy is necessary for appellate jurisdiction and must persist throughout the appeal. The state defendants claim that their limited involvement in the nearly completed development plan renders the case moot. However, since 20% of the environmental evaluation recommendations remain unimplemented and $1.3 million in state funds is still pending, the case is not moot as the defendants will continue to engage in the design review process, potentially affecting the plaintiff's claim of environmental harm.

Additionally, the state defendants argue for dismissal based on improper venue, asserting that the action should have been filed in Hartford under statute 22a-16. The plaintiff contends that this requirement applies only when the state is the sole defendant and maintains that any venue defect is non-jurisdictional, allowing for transfer to Hartford. The court agrees that the case was improperly filed but determines that the issue does not affect the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and orders a transfer to Hartford.

The primary objective in construing a statute is to determine and effectuate the legislature's intent. According to General Statutes 1-2z, interpretation begins with the statute's text and its relationship to other laws. If the text is clear and unambiguous, extratextual evidence is not considered. Conversely, if ambiguity exists, interpretive guidance from legislative history, policy intentions, and relationships to existing laws and common law principles may be sought.

In the case of Section 22a-16, the statute allows a plaintiff to bring an action in the judicial district where the defendant is located, except when the state is the defendant, in which case the action must be brought in Hartford. The plaintiff argues that this language restricts the venue provision to cases with the state as the sole defendant. However, the court disagrees, noting that the statute's language does not address scenarios involving multiple defendants. Consequently, the court finds the language ambiguous and looks to the legislative policy behind the venue provision, which prioritizes the convenience of defendants. Specifically, the provision aims to facilitate the state's convenience due to its business operations throughout the state, designating Hartford as the most suitable venue for cases involving the state. The court concludes that the venue requirement applies regardless of whether the state is the sole defendant or one among several defendants.

The distinction between procedural and jurisdictional venue provisions for state defendants is analyzed, emphasizing that jurisdiction pertains to the court's authority to act, while venue concerns the appropriate location for adjudication. Venue is deemed procedural, focusing on convenience for litigants, and can be waived or altered by party consent, unlike jurisdiction, which cannot be waived. The court references *Lebron v. Commissioner of Correction* to illustrate that venue does not involve jurisdictional questions.

However, an exception is noted from the general rule regarding venue's procedural nature, as established in *Farricielli v. Personnel Appeal Board*. In that case, the plaintiff filed an appeal in the wrong county, leading to a dismissal based on the trial court's view that the venue provision in General Statutes § 4-183(b) was jurisdictional. The appellate majority concluded that statutory appeals must comply strictly with venue provisions, citing the mandatory language of "shall" as reinforcing this view. The dissent argued that this marked a deviation from established principles, asserting that venue requirements exist primarily for litigant convenience, and previous cases cited by the majority dealt with timing, not location. The dissent emphasized that venue should not be considered a jurisdictional defect.

Time limitations for appeals are deemed jurisdictional due to their public interest in the finality of legal proceedings, unlike venue provisions, which are for the convenience of the parties. Justice Shea noted that the court had previously ruled that the failure to file an administrative appeal in the correct court did not impact the trial court's jurisdiction, as issues of venue do not affect the court's authority. Additionally, the legislature enacted General Statutes 51-351, which states that cases cannot fail due to being returnable to an improper location, suggesting an intent to allow case transfers, particularly for administrative appeals. The state defendants, referencing the case of Farricielli, argued that because General Statutes 22a-16 creates a cause of action and waives sovereign immunity, its venue provisions must be strictly interpreted, asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over actions in an improper venue. However, it was concluded that statutory venue provisions should not be presumed jurisdictional without explicit legislative intent to the contrary. The court emphasized that every presumption should favor jurisdiction and that there is no evidence that the legislature intended to alter the understanding that venue is non-jurisdictional in enacting the venue provision of 4-183. Ultimately, it was determined that the venue provision in 22a-16 does not affect the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

The legislature's intent regarding jurisdiction in environmental cases is clarified by its removal of basic jurisdictional requirements such as personal aggrievement and exhaustion of administrative remedies, suggesting that the venue provision in General Statutes § 22a-16 is not meant to be jurisdictional. Instead, it is deemed a procedural matter. As a result, if a plaintiff fails to initiate an action in the correct venue, the appropriate remedy under General Statutes § 51-351 is to transfer the case to the judicial district of Hartford, as specified in § 51-347b and Practice Book § 12-1. The court's judgment has been reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The opinion has the concurrence of the other justices. The excerpt also notes that the plaintiff's appeal was previously transferred to this court under General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 65-1. The statute § 22a-16 allows various entities, including the Attorney General and state agencies, to maintain actions for environmental protection in the appropriate judicial district, with specific provisions when the state is the defendant. Additionally, § 22a-1b(b) mandates detailed environmental impact evaluations by responsible state agencies before undertaking actions that may significantly affect the environment.

Mitigation measures are required to minimize environmental impacts, alongside an analysis of both short-term and long-term economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of proposed actions. The evaluation must assess the impact on energy resource use and conservation, as well as effects on sacred and archaeological sites of state or national importance. For actions affecting existing housing, a detailed analysis of housing consequences is needed, including direct and indirect effects categorized by income group and race, and alignment with the state housing advisory plan. The terms "sacred sites" and "archaeological sites" are defined as per section 10-381. 

A public comment period was held from November 10, 1998, to December 28, 1998. Evaluations and summaries, including negative findings, must be submitted for review to relevant agencies and made available for public inspection. The evaluation in question was approved with conditions regarding civil preparedness and flood plain management. 

In the case of Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, the plaintiff alleged that the development plan would likely cause significant environmental harm, including the deposition of heavy metals and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons into the Thames River and adjacent water bodies, leading to ecological degradation and negative impacts on local ecosystems. Concerns included further contamination and adverse effects on the biological health of the river and surrounding environments.

The defendants' municipal development plan is criticized for failing to adequately protect biological diversity and habitat sustainability in the Thames River and adjacent water bodies. The plan is alleged to contaminate habitats for marine life, destroy green spaces for recreation, and negatively affect temperature moderation. Increased stormwater runoff from impervious surfaces is expected to exacerbate non-point source pollution, leading to significant contamination of soil, groundwater, and surface water. Heavy metals and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons from vehicular traffic are predicted to pollute the Thames River, causing unreasonable harm and detrimental effects on habitat quality and ecological function. Once contaminants enter the river, their impacts are deemed difficult or impossible to mitigate, resulting in irreversible damage. Additionally, pollutants from vehicle exhaust are projected to further degrade air quality around the property. The defendants initially argued that the action was barred by the prior pending action doctrine but later withdrew this argument. The trial court's decision to address associational standing remains unclear; however, establishing a colorable claim of unreasonable environmental harm would suffice for the plaintiff's statutory standing, independent of individual member standing.

An organization can initiate legal action under General Statutes § 22a-16 without meeting the criteria for associational standing, as any organization may act to protect the public trust in natural resources from unreasonable pollution. The court has recognized no limitations on who may have standing under this statute. While an organization typically must demonstrate specific injuries to its members to establish classical aggrievement, the court concludes that the plaintiff possesses statutory standing in this case. The plaintiff's assertion that developers must begin the permitting process before challenging the development plan appears unfair. In its claims of "per se" pollution, the plaintiff references a prior case where the court refrained from commenting on the municipality's waste disposal responsibilities under General Statutes § 22a-220. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants failed to make valid findings regarding the development plan's compatibility with the state’s conservation goals, suggesting both procedural and substantive violations. The court previously declined to address a similar claim due to inadequate briefing. Additionally, in a related case, it was concluded that General Statutes § 51-351 was not retroactive, and a dissenting opinion indicated that the majority's ruling implied that venue defects could undermine subject matter jurisdiction, thus rendering § 51-351 ineffective for appeals initiated in an incorrect venue after its effective date.

The Appellate Court determined in *Sprague v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities* that General Statutes § 51-351 applies to administrative appeals filed after its effective date, specifically regarding rulings by hearing officers in human rights cases, as well as appeals from decisions of the Department of Revenue Services. However, the court indicated that § 51-351 does not override prior rulings, such as in *Farricielli*, where the venue provision in § 4-183(b) affects the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that the venue provision of § 22a-16 is not jurisdictional, thus avoiding the need to evaluate § 51-351's applicability to it. In *Savage v. Aronson*, the court distinguished between objections to venue and jurisdiction, stating that claims about improper placement on the housing docket were about venue rather than jurisdictional authority. The court referenced Justice Shea's dissenting views, asserting that statutory venue requirements are privileges that do not impact subject matter jurisdiction. The court also highlighted that statutory timing provisions, unlike venue provisions, impact public interest and are generally considered jurisdictional.

The court has questioned the assumptions behind the Farricielli decision. General Statutes § 51-347b(a) allows for the transfer of any action or trial of issues by court order, upon motion by the court or parties, or by agreement of the parties, from one superior court location to another within the same district or to a different judicial district, with notice to the parties. Similarly, Practice Book § 12-1 permits transferring cases between judicial district court locations or geographical area court locations by order of a judicial authority or written agreement from the parties. Historically, the predecessor to § 51-347b referred to "any cause," prompting dissent from Justice Shea, who argued that "cause" was broad enough to encompass administrative appeals. In 1982, the statute was amended to refer specifically to "any action." Regardless of whether "any action" includes administrative appeals, it is clear that it encompasses actions under § 22a-16. The text supports Justice Shea's view that § 51-347b is the sole established mechanism for implementing the policy declaration in § 51-351.