Perry v. Hazel Park Harness Raceway

Citations: 332 N.W.2d 601; 123 Mich. App. 542Docket: Docket 62314

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals; February 25, 1983; Michigan; State Appellate Court

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In Perry v. Hazel Park Harness Raceway, the Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed a slip and fall case that resulted in jury verdicts against the defendant, awarding Charles and Sarah Perry $183,544.88 and $39,600, respectively. The defendant appealed, raising six issues, primarily contesting the trial judge's failure to provide a specific jury instruction (SJI 66.01) regarding special verdict forms. The court noted that under GCR 1963, 516.1, requests for jury instructions must be made in writing, and since the defendant's requested instruction was a modified version of the standard, it did not meet the criteria established in Javis v. Ypsilanti Bd of Ed, which applies only to strictly compliant requests. The defendant failed to preserve its objection regarding the jury's function and did not request a separate verdict form for Mrs. Perry, rendering those claims unreviewable on appeal.

Additionally, the court addressed the defendant's challenge to the jury instruction concerning negligence related to slip-preventing devices. The instruction was based on precedent from McNabb v. Green Real Estate Co., which allows for jury instructions that are concise and understandable when no standard instruction exists. The court upheld the trial judge's decision, stating that the instruction was appropriate given the circumstances of the case.

The legal document emphasizes the necessity of jury instructions accurately reflecting the law, referencing GCR 1963, 516.6(2) and relevant case law. In McNabb, evidence showed the defendant's negligence regarding slip prevention, allowing for an appropriate jury instruction based on plaintiff's evidence. Similarly, in another case, the court upheld a jury instruction related to the absence of necessary safety devices. In the current case involving Mr. Perry, plaintiffs demonstrated through testimony and expert evidence that the racetrack's floor was hazardous due to inadequate safety measures, specifically regarding a paint mixture that increased slipperiness. 

The trial judge appropriately provided the McNabb instruction despite the defendant's claims of error regarding jury instructions on invitor-invitee liability. The court found that the provided instructions sufficiently covered the relevant issues. The jury was also instructed on general and comparative negligence, with the court’s instructions collectively addressing the defendant's concerns. 

Furthermore, the court reviewed the denial of a directed verdict for the defendant, determining that sufficient evidence existed for reasonable minds to differ on the issue of liability. Testimonies indicated a slick and dangerous environment at the racetrack, supporting the plaintiffs' claims.

Mr. Perry acknowledged the risk associated with a hazard and took precautions to avoid it, which raises a factual question regarding the invitor's duty to invitees, as established in Kroll v Katz and Conerly v Liptzen. A defendant remains liable even if an invitee is aware of the danger and tries to protect themselves, as noted in Quinlivan v The Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co. The key consideration is whether invitees can reasonably be expected to guard against the hazard, particularly in cases involving unavoidable dangers like icy steps. Therefore, Mr. Perry should not be deemed negligent for attempting to navigate a known hazard, and the trial judge correctly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict.

The defendant also contended that the trial judge should have granted a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict due to a lack of evidence of the defendant's control over the premises. However, the trial court's decisions were upheld, as a possessor of land is liable for invitee injuries. In this case, evidence was presented that the defendant possessed the property and had a contractual obligation to maintain it, including preventing water accumulation in the grandstand area.

Regarding the admission of floor surface samples and expert testimony from five years post-accident, the plaintiffs were required to prove the similarity of the samples to the floor at the time of the incident. The trial court has broad discretion in admitting evidence, and the evidence indicated that the samples were comparable to the original floor surface as remembered by a defense witness. Given these circumstances, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the evidence, and the judgment was affirmed, with costs awarded to the plaintiffs.