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Alexander v. Alexander
Citations: 303 N.W.2d 202; 103 Mich. App. 263; 1981 Mich. App. LEXIS 2701Docket: Docket 48217
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals; January 23, 1981; Michigan; State Appellate Court
In *Alexander v. Alexander*, the Michigan Court of Appeals addressed the appeal of a defendant who sought to set aside a divorce judgment entered on October 25, 1976, after the parties waived the statutory 60-day waiting period mandated by MCL 552.9f; MSA 25.89(6). The court found the trial court erred by accepting the stipulation to waive this waiting period, emphasizing that the 60-day requirement is an absolute minimum imposed by the legislature. Despite this error, the judgment was not declared void ab initio, as the court maintained jurisdiction based on the parties' residence, and the error involved only timing. The defendant's claims of fraud concerning the property settlement were deemed untimely, as they were made over a year after the judgment. The court concluded that property settlements are modifiable only if fraud is established, referencing *Firnschild v. Firnschild* and *Edgar v. Edgar*. Thus, the appeal was denied, affirming the lower court's decision. In Dougherty v Dougherty, the Court identified various grounds for modifying final judgments regarding property settlements, including fraud, clarifications of ambiguities, and fairness to correct inequities. The Court referenced cases such as Lytle v Lytle and Greene v Greene for fraud, Igrison v Igrison and Mitchell v Mitchell for mistakes, and Paul v Paul and Ross v Ross for fairness. The ruling in Chisnell v Chisnell demonstrated that modifications can clarify ambiguous settlements without altering substantive rights. However, in this instance, the defendant failed to prove fraud and the facts did not warrant applying the exceptions for ambiguity or fairness. The proposed modification would change the substantive rights of both parties, and without valid grounds for modification, vacating the judgment would be ineffective, as it would not alter the existing property settlement. The decision was affirmed, noting that had the exceptions been applicable, they would not be restricted by the one-year modification limit in GCR 1963, 528.3.