Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey; October 9, 1962; New Jersey; State Supreme Court
The case involves Vera Cureton, the administratrix of John Robinson's estate, appealing a decision regarding workers' compensation benefits following Robinson's death. Robinson suffered a compensable injury on May 30, 1959, and received temporary disability payments until he returned to work on June 29, 1959. He filed for permanent disability compensation on July 28, 1959, but died intestate from an unrelated cause on January 4, 1960, without statutory dependents.
Cureton, his sister, filed an affidavit claiming Robinson's estate included a workers' compensation claim valued at $400. The Workmen's Compensation Division dismissed her petition on the basis that Robinson's claim abated upon his death due to the lack of surviving dependents. This dismissal was affirmed by the Essex County Court. However, the Appellate Division ruled that while the claim for compensation payments abated, Cureton was entitled to a statutory funeral allowance of up to $400. The respondent conceded that Robinson's permanent disability was assessed at 2.5%, leading to a remand for judgment in the amount of the funeral expenses.
Cureton's appeal argues that she, as Robinson's personal representative, should also receive compensation for the period leading up to his death. The respondent does not dispute the funeral expenses but maintains that the claim for compensation payments lapsed with Robinson's death.
Respondent argues that the Workmen's Compensation Act is designed exclusively for the benefit of employees and their dependents, asserting that compensation to a deceased worker's personal representative is outside the act's purview. The Act's primary purpose is to provide employees with prompt remedies for wage loss and physical impairment due to work-related injuries, acknowledging that many workers lack the means to support themselves during temporary or permanent disabilities. Legislative intent emphasizes swift benefit issuance according to statutory schedules. After a seven-day waiting period, compensation is provided for temporary disabilities and subsequently for any permanent disabilities.
The right to compensation is viewed as an earned benefit rooted in the employment contract, which incorporates the Act's provisions. Upon sustaining a work-related injury post-waiting period, a worker is entitled to compensation, determinable by agreement with the employer or through the Workmen's Compensation Division. Compensation rights continue as long as the worker requires assistance, but upon death, the right to future payments ceases unless a specific statute exists to preserve it. However, any unpaid compensation that accrued prior to the worker's death is considered a vested right and thus an asset of the estate.
In a precedent case, Roney v. Griffith Piano Co., the court upheld that a deceased worker's personal representative is entitled to compensation accrued up to the date of death, countering the employer's claim that the absence of a party to receive it barred payment. This ruling aligns with established legal principles, affirming that accrued but unpaid compensation installments are assets of the worker's estate.
Next of kin and creditors of a decedent are not considered beneficiaries of workmen's compensation payments, which are intended solely for dependents as defined by statute. If the decedent, Robinson, had received payments during his lifetime, he could have allocated them as he wished, including to non-dependent relatives or creditors, allowing such payments to be part of his estate after death. The argument that R.S. 34:15-29's nonassignability of compensation claims prevents survival of such claims post-death is rejected; the nonassignability was meant to protect beneficiaries, not to negate the survival of claims. The Appellate Division determined that N.J.S.A. 34:15-12(e) does not allow the accrued but unpaid compensation to pass to Robinson's personal representative upon his death, as the statute specifies that remaining payments go to dependents or, if none exist, a maximum of $400 for funeral expenses. Since Robinson had no dependents, only the funeral allowance was recoverable. Historical context shows that the Workmen's Compensation Act originally lacked provisions for payments after a worker's unrelated death, which was later amended in 1913 to address this issue, but the core of the statute remains unchanged.
The amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act is clarified to indicate it does not affect the compensation rights of the workman or his estate for payments due before death. Instead, it establishes rights for dependents to receive benefits post-death, which were not available under the original act. The language suggests that references to 'remaining payments' pertain to amounts due after the workman's death, assuming he received all due payments while alive. The inability of the workman to collect compensation during his lifetime does not change this outcome, as the law aims to prevent employers from benefiting from a workman's death if they failed to fulfill their obligations. The court emphasizes that right to unpaid compensation survives to the estate upon the workman's death.
The petitioner is deemed to have standing to pursue the claim despite the respondent's argument that the authority under N.J.S. 3A:6-6 does not extend to litigation. The statute grants the petitioner rights equivalent to a duly appointed administrator, allowing her to litigate the claim. The respondent's assertion regarding the limitation of the petitioner's authority and the value of the claim is dismissed, as it lacks standing to challenge these points, focusing solely on the obligation to pay the award.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the case is remanded to determine the compensation amount due to Robinson's estate. The petitioner will receive a lump sum for accrued compensation up to the date of death, with any remaining amount for funeral expenses up to $400. The decision is supported by Chief Justice WEINTRAUB and Justices JACOBS, FRANCIS, PROCTOR, HALL, SCHETTINO, and HANEMAN, with no justices in favor of affirmance.
