Selective Group, Inc v. City of Farmington Hills

Citations: 447 N.W.2d 817; 180 Mich. App. 595; 1989 Mich. App. LEXIS 535Docket: Docket 106855

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals; October 16, 1989; Michigan; State Appellate Court

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Selective Group, Inc. appeals a judgment from the Michigan Court of Appeals, which upheld the City of Farmington Hills' denial of a rezoning request for a five-acre parcel from single family residential to local business. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, addressing two key issues raised by the plaintiff: whether the trial court's ruling was against the great weight of the evidence and whether it failed to specify the factual basis for its conclusions.

The case, initiated in July 1985 and decided in October 1987, involved a rapidly changing area, necessitating a focus on the evidence presented at the trial rather than on subsequent developments. The appellate review was conducted de novo, assessing whether the trial court or zoning board would have reached a different conclusion.

The court referred to established standards from prior cases, particularly Kropf v Sterling Heights, to evaluate the validity of municipal zoning determinations. For a zoning ordinance to be challenged, the plaintiff must demonstrate either a lack of reasonable governmental interest in the existing zoning classification or that the ordinance is arbitrary, capricious, or unfounded in excluding other legitimate land uses. The court outlined four principles for applying these standards, emphasizing that the ordinance is presumed valid, the burden of proof lies with the challenger, and that substantial evidence supported the existing residential classification of the property as aligned with the city's comprehensive plan. The findings of the trial judge are given considerable weight in equity cases, and a plaintiff can prevail under either the reasonableness or confiscation arguments without needing to succeed on both. In this case, the evidence substantiated that the RA-1 residential classification was consistent with the city's comprehensive development plans.

The plaintiff's assertion that the nonresidential uses of nearby properties indicate the unreasonableness of current zoning and support the reasonableness of their proposed commercial use is unsubstantiated. The adjacent properties are classified as 'office' uses, which serve as a buffer between residential and commercial areas, as outlined in the Farmington Hills zoning ordinance and the Commercial Areas Plan. The claim that Twelve Mile Road is a 'commercial corridor' is incorrect; evidence shows that residential zoning predominates on the north side, while the south side is primarily office use. Past cases cited by the plaintiff—Frendo v Southfield Twp, White v Southfield Twp, and Troy Campus v Troy—are distinguishable; each involved different contexts that do not apply here. Notably, the current case involves a request to rezone from residential and office to commercial, contrary to Troy Campus, where the property was isolated among office buildings. Furthermore, the office size in this case is smaller than the high-rises in Troy Campus, which do not favor adjacent single-family homes. Unlike the White case, no testimony regarding significant traffic disturbances was presented. In Frendo, a high percentage of surrounding lots were zoned for industrial or commercial use, and the plaintiffs had not anticipated rezoning when purchasing their property. Additionally, the plaintiff in this case is not the current landowner but is contingent upon rezoning for a prospective purchase. The defendant highlights that the Frendo case lacked evidence to dispute the plaintiff's claim of unreasonableness. Lastly, while the plaintiff argues that the parcel's value would increase significantly with commercial development, this valuation focuses on potential developer profits rather than the landowner's potential under the existing zoning, which is crucial for assessing zoning reasonableness.

Plaintiff has not proven that the RA-1 zoning classification is unreasonable for the specific property in question. The plaintiff also asserts that the RA-1 zoning is confiscatory, but to succeed in this claim, the property owner must demonstrate that the zoning restrictions prevent the property from being used for any reasonable purpose. The plaintiff does not need to show that the land cannot be adapted to all permitted uses but must provide evidence of reasonable adaptability. RA-1 zoning allows for single-family detached dwellings, agricultural uses, and public facilities, as well as certain developments like townhouses and golf courses, contingent upon planning commission approval. The plaintiff's evidence focused on single-family developments, which is not inherently flawed but limited. The plaintiff's valuation of the property is based on a $400,000 purchase price contingent on rezoning, rather than the original $23,000 price paid by current owners, which would have indicated significant potential profits under RA-1 development. It is noted that while plaintiffs can challenge zoning restrictions even after purchasing with knowledge of them, reliance on a preliminary sales agreement for standing is viewed unfavorably. The trial court's decision to affirm that confiscation was not proven is supported by expert testimony indicating the property’s value could increase under existing zoning. The principle that mere reduction in value does not equate to confiscation is reiterated, and while diminution of value is a relevant factor in assessing zoning reasonableness, it does not alone justify a claim of confiscation. Lastly, the plaintiff’s argument that RA-1 zoning is inconsistent with a comprehensive plan is rejected, affirming that valid zoning must align with such a plan.

The exhibits and testimony demonstrate the existence and consistent implementation of a comprehensive plan under MCL 125.581; MSA 5.2931. The plaintiff contends that the trial court did not adequately specify the subsidiary facts supporting its conclusion, but this view is rejected. The rationale behind the trial court's decision is clear, based on the factual context from 1987 and earlier. The real property involved is situated in a rapidly evolving area, suggesting that future developments may warrant a reevaluation of its zoning status. The decision of the trial court is affirmed.