Blackmon v. Payne

Citation: 510 So. 2d 483Docket: 56684

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; May 13, 1987; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

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An appeal was made to the Supreme Court of Mississippi regarding a case involving Mary Pearl Blackmon and her minor children, who were injured in a collision with a tractor-trailer driven by Julius Payne, an employee of Highland Trucking Co. Inc., on June 15, 1983. The plaintiffs, Blackmon and Thomas Jefferson O'Quinn IV, had their separate actions consolidated for trial. Highland Trucking was granted summary judgment prior to trial, while a jury ultimately found in favor of Payne. The plaintiffs appealed, citing eleven errors, which they condensed to eight for the appellate court. The court reversed the judgments for both defendants, focusing on two key issues relevant to the case.

The collision occurred after Blackmon had stopped at the intersection of Stanton Road and U.S. Highway 61, where visibility was notably poor. After stopping, Blackmon turned left onto U.S. 61 without seeing Payne's truck approaching in the northbound lane. The impact occurred as she attempted to turn into her destination's driveway, resulting in significant injuries, including a fractured skull for one of the children, Samuel Blackmon. The case highlighted the circumstances of the accident, including the weight of the truck's load and the speed limits at the intersection.

Payne testified that he switched to the northbound lane to avoid a collision with the Blackmon vehicle as he approached the Stanton Road-U.S. 61 intersection, which is situated at a low point between two hills. He observed the Blackmon vehicle at the intersection while descending the hill and noted that it was moving slowly. Believing the Blackmon vehicle would move out of his way, he crossed into the northbound lane but the vehicle turned in front of him, leading to the collision. Payne estimated his speed at 43 miles per hour as he reached the hilltop and about 25 miles per hour at the moment of impact, continuously braking as he approached the Blackmon vehicle.

Witness Dennis Felder, who was positioned five or six car lengths behind a tractor-trailer, saw the collision but his testimony did not clarify whether he witnessed any lane change by the tractor-trailer. Highway Patrolman Ernest Eichelberger interviewed Mrs. Blackmon post-accident; she expressed distress and indicated she turned to avoid the approaching truck, although she later clarified her statement to refer to a second turn. She claimed to have signaled before entering U.S. 61, a point contested by Payne.

Expert witness B.C. Jordan testified that a driver at the intersection could see a tractor-trailer from 789.5 feet away, but a tractor-trailer driver could only see the intersection from 500 feet. Jordan could not estimate the stopping distance of a loaded tractor-trailer traveling at 43 miles per hour due to various influencing factors. The jury viewed evidence of tire conditions post-accident and ultimately ruled in favor of the defendant, determining that Mrs. Blackmon's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. The trial judge instructed the jury on the definition of negligence, clarifying that negligence must directly cause the injuries incurred.

An independent and voluntary act that intervenes and leads to an injury can shift the proximate cause of that injury away from the original negligent party, relegating their negligence to a remote cause. In this case, if evidence shows that defendant Julius Payne was negligent but that Mrs. Mary Pearl Blackmon's independent actions directly caused the plaintiff's injuries, then her negligence would be deemed the proximate cause, absolving Payne of liability. However, the court found that the jury instruction given was misleading and not warranted, as it could confuse the jury about the assignment of proximate cause. Mississippi operates under comparative negligence, allowing a plaintiff to recover damages even if they were negligent, provided the defendant's negligence contributed to the injury. The court noted that there can be multiple proximate causes in accidents. The instruction wrongly suggested that Mrs. Blackmon's involvement could singularly define proximate cause, despite potential negligence on Payne's part, such as speeding or failing to control his vehicle. The court emphasized that the last act contributing to the accident is not solely determinative of proximate cause, reaffirming that negligence can exist on both sides. Thus, the instruction's application warranted a reversal for a new trial.

In Hoke v. Holcombe and Mississippi City Lines, Inc. v. Bullock, the court addresses the complexities of proximate cause in negligence cases, emphasizing that an antecedent negligent act can initiate an ongoing agency leading to injury, which should be viewed as a proximate cause rather than a remote one. The court asserts that both parties in an automobile collision often share some degree of negligence, and this does not preclude recovery for either. It criticizes jury instructions suggesting that only the last negligent act establishes proximate cause, arguing that such instructions mislead juries and undermine comparative negligence principles. The court points out that the jury should evaluate if the negligence of each party is interconnected in a manner that constitutes a "natural whole" and whether any intervening causes were reasonably foreseeable. Instruction D-9 is deemed inadequate for failing to guide the jury appropriately. Additionally, the plaintiffs' request for a negligence per se instruction regarding Payne's actions while attempting to pass another vehicle should be revisited, given the circumstances of the case. The court reverses the trial court's judgment against Payne and instructs that the claims against Highland Trucking Co. should not be dismissed, as they relate to Payne's employment status at the time of the incident. The amendment to the complaint naming Highland as a co-defendant reflects the plaintiffs' assertion that Payne was acting within the scope of his employment during the accident.

Highland's motion for summary judgment was based on affidavits from its president, Samuel Cauthen, and Julius Payne, which asserted that Payne was an independent contractor rather than an employee. The plaintiffs contested this at a hearing, citing contradictions between Payne's deposition and his affidavit. The trial court ruled that the evidence did not create a genuine issue of material fact and granted summary judgment. However, upon appeal, it was determined that Payne's deposition directly conflicted with his affidavit regarding his employment with Highland, as he claimed exclusive work for Highland while his affidavit suggested otherwise. The court noted that if Payne were found to be an agent rather than an independent contractor, Highland could be liable for his actions under the principal-agent doctrine. The appellate court emphasized that the determination of whether Payne was an independent contractor or an employee should be made at trial, not via summary judgment, as the purpose of summary judgment is to identify issues for trial, not to resolve them. Highland's argument that the plaintiffs did not respond adequately to its affidavits was rejected, reinforcing that the burden rests with the movant to demonstrate no material fact issues exist.

Plaintiffs complied with M.R.C.P. 56(c) by citing passages from Payne's deposition that highlighted unresolved factual issues, thereby presenting "significant probative evidence" of a triable issue, as established in Smith v. Sanders and Brown v. Credit Center. Highland's argument regarding the consistency of Payne's deposition with his affidavit is a matter for trial consideration. The court acknowledged that respondeat superior issues often involve factual determinations reserved for the trier of fact, referencing Royal Oil Co. v. Wells. The depositions and affidavits indicated a genuine issue of material fact that should not have led to summary judgment. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Highland Trucking Co., ruled that the jury was misinformed regarding intervening causes, and ordered a new trial. Additionally, the court reversed the summary judgment granted to Highland Trucking Co., instructing the reinstatement of Highland as a defendant. The decision was reversed and remanded, with concurrence from several justices.