Pfeiffer v. State

Citations: 407 A.2d 354; 44 Md. App. 49; 1979 Md. App. LEXIS 420Docket: 119, September Term, 1979

Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland; November 7, 1979; Maryland; State Appellate Court

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On December 12, 1977, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Trooper Greg Presbury of the Maryland State Police stopped David Albert Pfeiffer on Maryland Route 3 in Anne Arundel County. Shortly after, Presbury was shot and later died from his injuries, while Pfeiffer was also wounded. Communications officers Julianna Snyder and Rita Jones received a transmission from Presbury at around 11:20 p.m., indicating a suspicious situation after discovering discrepancies in the driver's license and vehicle registration checks. Presbury requested backup, noting that "something looked weird." 

Witnesses observed the scene: James Lane reported hearing multiple gunshots and seeing someone run from the police car before collapsing, while Gene Fogle saw the trooper on the ground and noted an individual fleeing the area. Another witness, Joseph Malone, Jr., saw a police car and a dark vehicle, with the latter's hood raised. Evidence collected included six .45 caliber shell casings and a bullet at the crime scene. 

The day after the incident, a dark green car without license plates was found near the Edison Electric Company, linked to Pfeiffer's former employer, John Raap. This car contained blood on the driver's side. Raap testified that he was with Pfeiffer earlier that evening and described Pfeiffer as stable, but later encountered him wounded and agitated, seeking help and threatening Raap. Afterward, Raap accompanied Pfeiffer in search of another individual, John Hayslip, who attempted to assist Pfeiffer with his injuries.

Appellant confessed to Hayslip about shooting a police officer and expressed a fear of returning to prison due to his parole status, which led him to dislike driving a car with stolen tags. He claimed he was armed because of threats from former inmates. During an encounter with Officer Presbury, appellant stated he presented his identification and explained his lack of a driver’s license due to recently being released from prison. He recounted a moment of confusion when the officer reached for his weapon, leading to a confrontation where appellant was shot. Although he was armed with a .45 automatic, he did not display his weapon.

Expert testimonies were provided regarding appellant's mental capacity. Medical records indicated a history of mental health issues, including two institutionalizations as a teenager. Experts from Clifton T. Perkins Hospital found him sane at the time of the crime and fit for trial. Psychologist Edmond Rozecki diagnosed appellant as sociopathic with significant antisocial tendencies, describing him as emotionally immature, possessing poor judgment, and acting impulsively without considering the consequences. Rozecki noted that appellant lacked insight into his behavior and treated others as objects rather than people, exhibiting aggressive tendencies.

The individual described exhibits sociopathic traits, acting without regard for the consequences of his actions on others and failing to learn from past experiences. Punishment does not improve his behavior; instead, it reinforces his negative worldview. Dr. Michael Spodak, a psychiatrist, provided testimony regarding Mr. Pfeiffer's personality profile, indicating a consistent history of rebellious and aggressive behavior documented over the past twenty years in various hospital reports. This history suggests that Mr. Pfeiffer struggles to control his aggressive impulses, leading to legal troubles and commitments to state hospitals. In high-stress situations, he is prone to overreact due to his personality traits.

Judge E. Mackall Childs, presiding without a jury, found Mr. Pfeiffer guilty of first-degree murder, imposing a life sentence. The judge noted that even a brief interval for intent formation suffices for a first-degree murder charge. Evidence, including testimony from Mr. Thomas Mathias, indicated that Mr. Pfeiffer had expressed a desire to engage in a violent confrontation with law enforcement if stopped, demonstrating premeditated intent leading up to the incident on December 12, 1977. The court established that this intent was articulated well in advance and was not specifically directed at Trooper Presbury, but rather at any officer. Testimonies from witnesses Mr. Hayslip and Mr. Raap indicated that Mr. Pfeiffer attempted to fabricate a story following the event, demonstrating further evidence of his lack of accountability.

Mr. Pfeiffer testified that he shot a policeman to avoid arrest for prior offenses, believing he would be returned to prison. The trial judge ruled that the testimony of two experts and medical records presented by the defense were irrelevant, stating that mental evidence could not influence the determination of intent. The judge favored the direct observations of witnesses who interacted with Pfeiffer shortly before and after the crime over theoretical medical evidence. Consequently, the medical records were excluded, and the expert testimony disregarded, based on the Maryland legal standard that the doctrine of diminished intention is not applicable. The court affirmed that Pfeiffer had a calculated intent to kill, as evidenced by his prior statements about confronting police. The appellant's argument that the evidence was insufficient for a murder conviction was rejected, as the judge was not obligated to accept his self-defense claim. The judgment was upheld, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs. The excerpt notes that the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was withdrawn, and mentions the evolving acceptance of psychiatric testimony in determining intent in murder cases.

The Court suggests that it might reach a different conclusion today compared to past cases regarding the doctrine of diminished responsibility. A comprehensive list of cases from various jurisdictions highlights both the recognition and refusal of this doctrine. Specifically, while several jurisdictions accept diminished responsibility, others, such as Arizona, D.C., Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Virginia, and West Virginia, do not recognize it. Additionally, some jurisdictions present ambiguous positions on the matter. The excerpt also references scholarly articles discussing diminished capacity and responsibility defenses and outlines a motion for reconsideration by David Albert Pfeiffer. The Court agrees to reconsider its previous affirmation based on the precedent set in Brown v. State, which established that failing to allege malice in a murder indictment is a reversible error, emphasizing the importance of malice as an essential element of the crime. The present case's indictment closely resembles that in Brown, necessitating a consistent ruling, with the Court noting that jurisdictional issues can be raised at any time, regardless of prior omission.