MacDonald v. General Motors Corp.

Citations: 784 F. Supp. 486; 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1503; 1992 WL 25061Docket: 3:88-0993, 3:89-0045, 3:89-0458 and 3:89-0562

Court: District Court, M.D. Tennessee; February 13, 1992; Federal District Court

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In the case of Alexander MacDonald et al. v. General Motors Corporation, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee is addressing a products liability claim stemming from a 1987 car crash involving a 1985 General Motors van. The incident resulted in the death of David MacDonald and serious injuries to three other passengers: Peter Cannistra, Ofray Hall, and Susan Stanfield. The van rolled over after the driver swerved to avoid a deer, leading to ejections and various injuries among the occupants, with three passengers not wearing safety belts at the time.

Plaintiffs allege that the van was defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous, specifically citing issues with the braking system, including a defective right rear axle seal which they claim impaired brake function and contributed to the crash. Although General Motors asserts that the van met federal safety standards for passenger restraints, the plaintiffs highlight the absence of shoulder harnesses for rear-seat passengers.

The court is currently considering the Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike General Motors' affirmative defenses. The motion has been granted in part and denied in part. Additionally, General Motors had previously sought to amend its answer to include more defenses, which was approved by the court in January 1990. The cases of the four plaintiffs, initially filed in state court, were consolidated in federal court following their removal.

The car manufacturer argues that the Plaintiffs' failure to wear seat belts is pertinent to defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and failure to mitigate damages, claiming it relates to the proximate causation of their injuries. General Motors contends that evidence of seat belt use should be considered, as it may have prevented or reduced the Plaintiffs' injuries, thus impacting their potential recovery, a theory known as the "seat belt defense." In response, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike these defenses, asserting that Tennessee Code Annotated (T.C.A.) § 55-9-604 prohibits the consideration of seat belt non-use in civil actions, stating it cannot be viewed as contributory negligence nor admissible as evidence. General Motors has countered this motion, and the Tennessee Attorney General has intervened to defend the constitutionality of § 604. The case raises five legal issues: (1) the validity of T.C.A. §§ 55-9-603 to 610; (2) the applicability of § 604 to the vehicle involved; (3) whether § 604 is preempted by federal law; (4) the appropriate rules for admissibility of seat belt use; and (5) the scope of § 604 if applicable. The case is governed by Tennessee substantive law under the Erie doctrine, which dictates that the law of the forum state applies in diversity jurisdiction cases. The tort at issue occurred elsewhere, but harm was suffered in Tennessee, thereby invoking Tennessee law. Additionally, the evolution of § 604 is outlined, detailing its origins in 1963 and subsequent amendments, culminating in the 1986 enactment that broadly prohibits the admission of seat belt non-use in civil trials.

The legislative history of the statutory revision 604 reveals a significant debate regarding the admissibility of seat belt evidence in Tennessee. Initially, the House of Representatives attempted to amend the original statute, 214, by allowing non-compliance with seat belt laws to mitigate damages in motor vehicle accident cases, adopting language that mirrored a federal regulation on safety belt usage. However, this amendment was ultimately rejected. Instead, Senate Bill 790, introduced by Sen. William Richardson, replaced the House's proposed language with the current language of 604, which preserved and expanded the admissibility rules regarding seat belt evidence. The Senate's version was adopted without discussion on April 25, 1985, and subsequently signed into law, marking a departure from the House's proposed changes and maintaining Tennessee's long-standing approach since 1963. Additionally, the document notes a specific issue regarding the validity of 604 in light of T.C.A. 55-9-609(b), which stipulated that sections 603-610 would become void if certain federal conditions were not met regarding safety belt laws and air bag requirements, emphasizing the interplay between state and federal regulatory frameworks.

The Secretary of Transportation did not make a determination regarding state safety belt laws, nor was there a requirement for such a determination under S4.1.5. Section 608(a) of the relevant Act mandated a review of certain Tennessee statutes related to safety belts by July 1, 1989, with findings to be presented to the Senate and House Government Operations Committee, which would then recommend whether to repeal these provisions by June 30, 1990. On March 22, 1989, the Tennessee legislature amended T.C.A. 55-9-610 to repeal the provisions of 55-9-608 and 55-9-609 effective July 1, 1989, without amending other sections of the 1986 statute. General Motors argues that 604 became null and void due to the lack of a determination by the Department of Transportation regarding the specified population by April 1, 1989, and that the March 22 repeal was unconstitutional because the statute it aimed to amend was already repealed. However, the court finds General Motors' arguments flawed, stating that since the Secretary never calculated the compliance percentage, Tennessee was not included or excluded, making the nullification provision moot. The court also notes that the Act does not reference the April 1, 1989 deadline and that the Tennessee legislature intended to extend enforcement of the statute beyond July 1, 1989. Thus, T.C.A. 55-9-604 remains valid. Additionally, General Motors contends that the Act does not apply to the van in question because it exceeds the weight limit defined for "passenger vehicles," which is set at 8,500 pounds. The van weighs 8,600 pounds, thus falling outside the statutory definition.

The Defendant's interpretation of the Act is flawed, as a court must interpret statutes using their ordinary meanings. The definitions of "passenger car" and "passenger motor vehicle" found in sections 601, 602, and 603 are limited to those sections and do not apply to section 604, which does not mention these terms and addresses legal evidence in civil actions, irrespective of sections 601-603. Section 604 explicitly states that failure to wear a safety belt cannot be considered contributory negligence, indicating that the admissibility of safety belt usage does not depend on the vehicle's weight class, leading to the rejection of the Defendant's argument.

General Motors claims that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Safety Act) preempts section 604. Federal law can preempt state law in three ways: explicit congressional definitions of preemption, occupation of an entire regulatory field, or conflicts between state and federal laws. The Safety Act establishes the supremacy of federal motor vehicle safety standards over state standards, prohibiting states from enacting conflicting safety standards.

Additionally, federal regulations outline minimum criteria for state mandatory safety belt usage laws, requiring a minimum penalty for violations, provisions for using violations to mitigate damages in related lawsuits, and programs to encourage compliance with belt usage.

Federal regulations mandate safety belt use exclusively for front seat occupants (49 C.F.R. 571.208, S4.1.5.2(a)), and Tennessee law similarly does not require rear seat passengers to wear them (T.C.A. 603(b)(1)). General Motors contends that federal preemption applies under 1392(d), claiming that seat belt usage evidence should be admissible for damage mitigation, while 604 seemingly prohibits such evidence. However, the court finds that 604 is not preempted in this case since neither federal nor state law requires rear seat passengers to wear safety belts. Federal regulations allow the consideration of safety belt nonuse for damage mitigation only if it constitutes a violation of the usage requirement, which does not apply to rear seat passengers in Tennessee.

Sections 401-403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence address the admissibility of evidence based on relevance and potential prejudice. Although evidence of nonuse of seat belts is not explicitly excluded, General Motors argues that such evidence is crucial for defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and failure to mitigate damages, claiming plaintiffs' injuries could have been lessened had they worn their seat belts. Plaintiffs counter that 604 bars this evidence. No Tennessee court has ruled on whether 604 precludes such evidence, and the court notes that an affirmative defense cannot succeed as a matter of law if it lacks merit under any circumstances.

In this evidentiary dispute, the court contemplates whether to apply the Federal Rules of Evidence or Tennessee's seat belt statute, concluding that procedural rules are not subject to Erie principles, thus federal law governs.

Evidence rules are generally considered non-substantive for Erie purposes, although privileges can reflect state substantive law. Courts have often refrained from applying state exclusionary rules intended to support substantive policies, yet some cases have adopted these rules without thorough justification. Federal courts may implement state exclusionary rules that represent substantive state policies, as illustrated by cases like Ricciardi v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center and In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago. The distinction between substance and procedure is vital in determining if federal evidence rules infringe upon state substantive policies.

Despite the federal court's perspective that seat belt usage evidence is procedural, the Sixth Circuit treated it as substantive law. In Sours v. General Motors Corp., the court emphasized the need to consult state courts for precedents on seat belt evidence admissibility, recognizing the intricate balance of policy interests involved. Since Tennessee courts had not interpreted the relevant statute (604), the federal court was required to predict the state’s highest court's ruling on this issue.

Previous Tennessee cases have ruled against the admissibility of seat belt evidence regarding contributory negligence and damages mitigation. Cheatham v. Thurston Motor Lines confirmed that such evidence is irrelevant to negligence claims, while Stallcup v. Taylor reinforced the statute prohibiting seat belt non-use evidence in relation to contributory negligence and jury instructions.

The Tennessee Supreme Court's ruling in Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Company reaffirmed the exclusionary language of former 930 in the context of strict liability claims following a car crash. In this case, Ford argued that the plaintiff's failure to wear a shoulder harness constituted misuse of the product, despite her wearing a lap belt. The court established the "crashworthiness" doctrine, asserting that manufacturers have a duty to design products that minimize harm from foreseeable accidents. It ruled that the defense of abnormal use does not apply, as manufacturers can expect consumers may not always wear safety belts.

The court found that while former 604 excludes certain evidence regarding seat belt usage, it is not universally applicable. The court must analyze the statute's implications against the evidentiary arguments presented by General Motors (GM). Key findings include: 

1. Contributory negligence is not a viable defense against strict liability claims in Tennessee, as established in Abbott v. American Honda Motor Co. Inc.
2. Assumption of risk can be a defense in strict liability cases, but it is distinct from contributory negligence, as clarified in previous cases like Gann v. International Harvester Co. of Canada, Ltd.
3. Evidence regarding seat belt usage cannot be used to mitigate damages.
4. 604 does not prevent evidence that could establish whether the failure to wear seat belts was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries.

The court emphasized the differentiation between assumption of risk and contributory negligence, noting their distinct legal and policy foundations.

Assumption of the risk involves a claimant’s voluntary acceptance of a known risk, while contributory negligence relates to the plaintiff's unreasonable behavior causing their injuries. The Tennessee Supreme Court outlines the elements of assumption of risk, which require: 1) the plaintiff's discovery of a defect, 2) full awareness of the associated danger, and 3) voluntary exposure to that danger. In this context, General Motors' argument that the plaintiffs accepted additional risk by not wearing seat belts conflicts with Tennessee law and specific case facts. Generally, evidence of assumption of risk can be presented in strict liability cases; however, Tennessee law does not grant defendants an automatic right to introduce such evidence. The relevant statute (604) explicitly states that failure to wear a seat belt cannot be used as evidence in civil trials, creating an exception to the typical admissibility rules. Furthermore, the assumption of risk doctrine does not apply to rear seat passengers, who may not be able to assess the danger of not wearing a seat belt. The Tennessee legislature acknowledges that rear seat passengers, especially in vehicles with only lap belts, cannot be blamed for not buckling up, as doing so may increase injury risk. Plaintiff Ofray Hall noted a preference against using lap belts due to perceived greater risk. Additionally, statute 604 prevents the use of seat belt non-use evidence to argue mitigation of damages, as the legislature did not intend for such evidence to influence this defense. Allowing such evidence would contradict the intent behind the mandatory safety belt law and imply a general duty to wear seat belts for all passengers, which the legislature has explicitly disavowed for rear seat occupants.

Statutory construction of Tennessee Code Annotated 604 indicates a clear intent against admitting seat belt evidence for mitigating damages. The new language of 604 is broader than the previous statute, allowing for the inclusion of mitigation doctrines; however, the rejection of a House amendment that would have permitted non-use of seat belt evidence signifies the legislature's intent to exclude such provisions. Furthermore, T.C.A. 55-9-605 emphasizes that manufacturers are not relieved from liability due to seat belt non-use prior to April 21, 1986, maintaining the substantive elements of the former statute that barred manufacturers from using a plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt as a defense against liability. The Stallcup case reaffirmed that evidence of seat belt non-use cannot establish failure to mitigate damages. While 604 does not explicitly address proximate cause related to seat belt use, the court permits evidence regarding causation, allowing defendants to argue that injuries resulted from a plaintiff’s failure to wear safety belts rather than a design defect, as establishing causation is a necessary component of a plaintiff's case.

A products liability claim, similar to a negligence action, requires the element of proximate causation related to the plaintiff's injuries, typically determined by the finder of fact. To establish proximate causation in negligence, it must be shown that the tortfeasor's conduct was a "substantial factor" in the harm caused, meaning it need not be the sole or last cause of the injury. The Tennessee Act does not alter the definition of strict liability for manufacturers, maintaining that they are not subject to absolute liability. Courts must interpret statutes holistically, considering their general purpose. 

In cases where a plaintiff's failure to wear a safety belt may affect causation, the exclusion of such evidence is qualified by the Act's clarification that it does not impose strict liability. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the allegedly defective axle caused their injuries. Tennessee courts recognize that an omission, like a missing adequate axle, can effectively cause injury. Allowing evidence of a plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt is crucial to prevent imposing absolute liability on manufacturers. Prior cases, including Sours, support the notion that defendants should be able to challenge the causation theory presented by plaintiffs. Several post-1986 Act cases have admitted evidence regarding seat belt usage in determining causation.

A Tennessee court has previously interpreted the predecessor to T.C.A. § 55-9-604 to allow some evidence regarding seat belt usage, indicating that such evidence is not entirely inadmissible under state law. The appellate court noted that the trial court permitted evidence showing the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt, focusing on the substantive implications of this omission for the plaintiff's recovery rights, rather than its admissibility. The court did not examine the relevance of seat belt nonuse in relation to proximate cause.

General Motors (GM) argues that the introduction of seat belt evidence is essential for its causation defense, intertwined with contributory negligence and assumption of risk doctrines. While admitting such evidence could complicate jury deliberations, courts routinely allow evidence for specific purposes, with appropriate jury instructions to limit consideration.

The court ruled against the plaintiffs' motion to strike GM's affirmative defenses in part, affirming that T.C.A. § 55-9-604 applies to the case and is not preempted by federal law. It determined that evidence of the plaintiffs' nonuse of seat belts related to contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and mitigation of damages would be excluded from trial. However, GM may introduce evidence regarding seat belt nonuse specifically for the element of proximate causation. The court did not find it necessary to address claims under the due process or equal protection clauses, as the admissibility of seat belt evidence for causation was already established.

Passenger cars manufactured under S4.1.3 must meet the requirements specified in S4.1.2.1, S4.1.2.2, or S4.1.2.3. Remote contributory negligence, an atypical tort doctrine in Tennessee, refers to negligence that is too distant in time, location, or causative impact to be considered a direct or proximate cause of an accident, as established in Arnold v. Hayslett. If a plaintiff is found to have engaged in remote contributory negligence, any awarded damages will be reduced based on the plaintiff's share of the injury, contrasting with proximate contributory negligence, which completely bars recovery. The crashworthiness doctrine holds parties liable for injuries caused by negligent actions that are separate from the initial accident. Generally, a plaintiff is not deemed to assume risks associated with activities or conditions they are unaware of, and they must not only know the facts creating the danger but also understand and appreciate the nature of that danger.