Purdon v. Locke

Citations: 807 So. 2d 373; 2001 WL 1198973Docket: 1999-CA-01952-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; October 11, 2001; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

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On August 17, 1993, Larry and Rita Locke filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against J.S. Purdon, M.D., J.S. Purdon, M.D. P.A., Baptist Memorial Hospital-North Mississippi, and C.R. Bard, Inc. The complaint, later amended to include Devices for Vascular Intervention (DVI), alleged that Larry Locke sustained injuries from a guide wire manufactured by Bard that broke during a coronary procedure performed by Purdon, with DVI accused of negligently manufacturing the athrocath used in the procedure. Rita Locke also sought damages for loss of consortium.

On April 29, 1994, DVI removed the case to federal court, but the Lockes' motion to remand to state court was denied. The Lockes settled with Bard and DVI, leading to their dismissal from the case. Subsequently, the Lockes settled their claims against Baptist. The case was remanded back to state court on December 28, 1998, and a trial commenced on June 14, 1999. The jury ultimately ruled in favor of the Lockes, awarding $650,000 in damages ($500,000 to Larry and $150,000 to Rita).

Purdon filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or alternatively for a new trial or remittitur, claiming the jury's verdict was excessively biased. He also raised several objections related to evidentiary rulings and jury instructions. Initially, Larry Locke sought treatment from Dr. Timothy Wright for chest pain, and subsequent tests indicated significant arterial blockage, culminating in the emergency visit that led to the malpractice claims.

Dr. Wright, alongside his partner Purdon and cardiac surgeon Dr. Robert Derveloy, recommended coronary artery bypass graft surgery for Mr. Locke. However, Mr. Locke opted for a percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA) and directional coronary atherectomy (DCA), consenting to the procedures which included the potential for an emergency bypass. During the procedure on June 11, 1992, a guide wire fragment broke off in Locke's artery. Purdon's accounts varied regarding the cause of the breakage, initially claiming it broke, then stating he cut it, and finally attributing it to a malfunction. After the incident, Locke was immediately transferred for surgery, where Dr. Derveloy removed the wire fragment and performed a bypass; however, the wire was never recovered. Locke experienced pain and emotional issues post-surgery, which affected his relationship with his wife. He incurred approximately $47,000 in medical bills, which were later adjusted. A jury awarded the Lockes $650,000, prompting Purdon to appeal, arguing the damages were excessive and reflective of bias, passion, and prejudice. The legal standard for assessing excessive jury awards requires that damages must appear flagrantly outrageous and have no reasonable basis in comparison to the actual damages incurred. The court emphasized the necessity of viewing evidence favorably towards the jury's verdict and only intervening if the damages are shocking to the conscience.

In James v. Jackson, 514 So.2d 1224 (Miss. 1987), the elements of damages relevant to bias were identified as past and future pain and suffering, past and future medical expenses, lost wages, and future disability. Purdon contends that Locke only presented evidence for one year of current physical pain and none for future pain, arguing that a subsequent bypass surgery limits Locke's emotional distress claim. However, Locke asserts that sufficient evidence supports both physical pain and emotional distress claims. Locke introduced medical bills totaling $45,721.29, which Purdon objected to but will be addressed separately. There were no claims for lost wages or future disability.

Purdon argues against the $500,000 award, claiming bias and prejudice in trial statements, including a juror's comment and inflammatory remarks by Locke's counsel. However, the court notes that Purdon did not object during trial and had opportunities to address these issues, which undermines his claims. The propriety of closing arguments is at the trial judge's discretion, and Purdon failed to demonstrate that any comments led to a prejudiced verdict.

Purdon also compares his case to prior rulings, specifically citing Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp. v. Turner, 543 So.2d 154 (Miss. 1989), where a significant jury award was reduced. Purdon argues that the damages in his case are less severe than those in Wells Fargo, suggesting that if remittitur was warranted there, it should apply to the current award. The court emphasizes that jury awards are evaluated individually, noting that approximately $450,000 of the current award pertains to pain and suffering, which does not appear excessive on its face.

Purdon references Rawson v. Midsouth Rail Corp., where a remittitur was affirmed, highlighting that an abuse of discretion standard applies when evaluating a trial judge's rulings. This principle supports the trial judge's decision to deny Purdon's motions, as they are better positioned to assess the jury award's evidentiary support. Purdon argues the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude Larry Locke's medical bills, claiming the bills were not appropriate damages since Locke had not paid them and a portion was written off. He also contends that the cost of a necessary procedure should be deducted as it was not causally linked to the injury, arguing that allowing uncollected bills undermines the concept of compensatory damages.

Locke counters by citing Mississippi law that classifies incurred medical bills as prima facie evidence of necessity and reasonableness. Since demands for payment were made to Locke, the jury could rightfully hear the bills. The burden was on Purdon to demonstrate the bills' unreasonableness, a burden he failed to meet as he did not present evidence to rebut their reasonableness. Additionally, the trial court correctly ruled the testimony of Ms. Pulliam, regarding the "written off" bills, as inadmissible hearsay. Thus, Purdon's claims regarding the exclusion of evidence lack merit, affirming that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying the motion in limine. The document also hints at further arguments related to Mrs. Locke's claim and jury instruction P-7, which are yet to be addressed.

Purdon argues that his motion for a directed verdict should have been granted due to a lack of evidence proving that Rita Locke suffered a loss of consortium as a result of her husband's injuries. He contends that the evidence did not support jury instruction P-7 regarding loss of consortium. However, testimony from both Larry and Rita Locke indicated a significant decline in their relationship post-injury, with Larry experiencing physical and emotional difficulties that affected his interactions with Rita. Rita described her husband as previously outgoing but noted his emotional and physical changes post-surgery, which adversely impacted their relationship. The jury was justified in inferring from this testimony that Rita suffered a loss of consortium, making the trial judge’s denial of the directed verdict appropriate.

Regarding jury instruction P-5, Purdon claims there was insufficient evidence to support damages for present and future pain, suffering, and emotional distress. The court found ample evidence to support the jury's award and noted that Purdon failed to object to the instruction, which constituted a waiver of the issue.

In addressing Purdon's motion for a directed verdict concerning Mr. Locke's medical negligence claim, the court emphasized that the jury and trial judge were better positioned to evaluate the evidence. Purdon introduced new factual points that had not previously been raised, but the court maintained that the jury's findings were justified and that no abuse of discretion occurred. Consequently, the court dismissed Purdon's claims as without merit.

Purdon contests the jury award, asserting it was excessive and lacked evidentiary support, and claims the trial judge abused discretion by allowing the verdict to stand. However, Purdon did not meet the burden of proof on any issues presented. Consequently, the Quitman County Circuit Court's judgment is affirmed. 

Judge Smith concurs in part but dissents regarding the recovery of medical bills written off by the hospital, arguing that since no one is liable for these amounts, they do not constitute actual expenses incurred by the plaintiff, Locke. He emphasizes that allowing recovery of written-off amounts would result in a windfall rather than fair compensation for actual losses.

Judge Waller concurs with the majority on affirming the trial court’s decisions regarding Larry Locke but dissents on Rita Locke's claim for loss of consortium. The trial court had allowed jury instructions for this claim based on losses related to companionship, services, and shared home responsibilities, yet Purdon argued there was insufficient evidence of damages to Rita’s relationship.

Rita Locke's testimony during direct examination highlighted her husband's emotional struggles following his injury, noting his frustration, loudness, and tendency to isolate himself, which impacted their relationship. However, the majority opinion claims this reflects a significant decline in their relationship due to his injury. The dissent argues that while Rita described her husband's emotional state, she failed to demonstrate the specific damages she personally suffered, such as mental anguish or changes in their intimate relationship, which are necessary for a loss of consortium claim. Citing precedent, it emphasizes that damages must be distinct from the spouse's injury. Rita did not provide specific examples of how her conjugal rights were affected, and her statements indicated that her husband's emotional issues existed prior to the injury. The dissent concludes that, due to insufficient evidence of personal damages, the claim for loss of consortium should be reversed in favor of Purdon. The dissenting opinion is joined by Judges Mills and Cobb, with Judge Smith concurring in part.