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Benjamin v. Union Carbide Corp.
Citations: 873 A.2d 463; 162 Md. App. 173; 2005 Md. App. LEXIS 48Docket: 959, September Term, 2004
Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland; May 3, 2005; Maryland; State Appellate Court
Elsie L. Benjamin, as the surviving spouse and personal representative of Robert L. Benjamin Sr.'s estate, filed a wrongful death and survival action against several defendants, including Georgia Pacific Corporation and Union Carbide Corporation, claiming that the decedent died from mesothelioma caused by asbestos exposure. The defendants sought summary judgment, arguing the suit was time-barred due to the statute of limitations. Benjamin contended that neither she nor the decedent had actual knowledge of the disease's cause until late 2001 or early 2002, asserting that actual knowledge of the disease, asbestos exposure, and a causal connection was required for the claims to accrue. Conversely, the defendants argued that the diagnosis of mesothelioma provided sufficient inquiry notice as of spring 1997. The Circuit Court ruled in favor of the defendants, stating that the knowledge of mesothelioma and asbestos exposure was enough to trigger the statute of limitations, although it failed to differentiate clearly between the survival and wrongful death claims. On appeal, the court affirmed the decision regarding the survival action, agreeing that the decedent's knowledge of mesothelioma constituted inquiry notice. However, it reversed the decision concerning the wrongful death action, concluding that the knowledge of mesothelioma alone did not fulfill the legal requirement for inquiry notice regarding the causal connection. The decedent was diagnosed with mesothelioma in early 1997, shortly before his death on May 25, 1997, after having been exposed to asbestos during his employment at various companies. A medical report from January 27, 1997, indicated the decedent had abnormal chest x-rays but had previously normal results. In November 1996, the decedent underwent various medical tests following a fall, including abnormal chest X-rays and a CAT scan. He reported a history of asbestos exposure to his physician, Dr. Jesada, who suspected mesothelioma and recommended a biopsy. The decedent was admitted for this biopsy on February 7, 1997, and an oncology report from February 28, 1997, by Dr. Promila Suri, diagnosed him with probable mesothelioma, noting his asbestos exposure in the workplace. A subsequent report on March 4, 1997, from Dr. Viroon Donavanik confirmed the diagnosis of mesothelioma and recommended radiation and chemotherapy treatment, reiterating the decedent's history of asbestos exposure while working in a machine shop and the roofing and siding business. The appellant, the decedent's spouse, stated in her affidavit that she attended medical appointments in the spring of 1997, but neither she nor the decedent was informed about the link between asbestos exposure and mesothelioma until she learned about it in 2002 from her daughter. During her deposition on December 23, 2003, she could not recall specific instances of her husband mentioning asbestos exposure to his doctors or whether she was present during certain appointments. The court denied a motion for summary judgment, indicating the necessity of further depositions before making a decision. The witness confirmed that neither she nor her husband inquired about the cause of his lung cancer during consultations with Dr. Jesada or Dr. Suri. While Dr. Suri mentioned having only one other similar cancer case, no further discussions occurred regarding the cancer's cause. The witness became aware of the cancer's name upon seeing the death certificate and had no discussions with family members about potential causes. She did not request her husband’s medical records before contacting the law firm and only possessed X-rays that a neighbor advised her to destroy. Significantly, there is no evidence that the appellant had prior knowledge of a causal link between mesothelioma and asbestos exposure, nor did she know of her husband's exposure to asbestos before 2002. Robert L. Benjamin, II, testified he was unaware of this connection until late 2001, and Carol Jeffers only learned of the exposure and its potential causal relationship with cancer around the same time. The litigation began after Carol read an article about mesothelioma in late 2001 or early 2002. An affidavit from Dr. John E. Newhagen indicated that the average consumer likely lacked knowledge of the asbestos-mesothelioma link before 1997. An archive search revealed 72 stories in the Baltimore Sun discussing mesothelioma and its association with asbestos. However, the appellant does not dispute that this relationship was knowable prior to May 1997 with reasonable investigation. Appellant contends that neither she, the other beneficiaries, nor the decedent possessed sufficient actual knowledge to trigger inquiry notice, which would impose a duty to investigate further. The standard of review for summary judgment is de novo, where summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine dispute exists regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court’s role in summary judgment is to determine if any material facts are in dispute, construing facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. If material facts are disputed, summary judgment is inappropriate. The document further explores the definition of "wrongful act" within the context of wrongful death statutes. Historically, under common law, negligence claims ceased at the death of the injured party, prompting legislative changes in England and various states, including Maryland. Maryland's first statute in 1888 not only prevented such claims from abating but also allowed the decedent's representative to initiate action post-death for damages due to wrongful acts. The evolution of these statutes reflects a legislative shift from the common law principle that personal actions die with the individual, culminating in the 1852 enactment that granted certain relatives the right to sue for deaths caused by wrongful acts or negligence. Maryland's wrongful death statute, established from the Acts of 1852, requires a 'wrongful act' for a beneficiary to pursue a wrongful death claim. A 'wrongful act' is defined as an act, neglect, or default that would have allowed the injured party to seek damages had they not died. It is interpreted that the decedent must have had a viable compensable action at the time of death for the act to be deemed wrongful. The statute does not clarify how post-death defenses to the decedent's potential action impact a wrongful death claim. The interpretation is supported by the statute's language and historical context, emphasizing compensation following death rather than creating nonviable actions. The survival statute aims to prevent viable actions from ceasing upon death. Prior case law indicates that defenses applicable to the decedent before death remain valid against the decedent's personal representative. Cases show that defenses like contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and family immunity can bar wrongful death actions if they would have barred the decedent's action had they survived. Additionally, it is noted that a wrongful death action does not accrue until death occurs, and defenses that arise after death do not negate the wrongful death claim. In summary, a wrongful death action is contingent upon the decedent's ability to pursue a claim at the time of death, with the focus on defenses that existed prior to death. In Mills v. International Harvester Co., the court determined that a family's wrongful death claim does not arise if the decedent's cause of action is time-barred at the time of death due to the absence of a wrongful act. The court emphasized that for a limitations defense to affect a survival action and preclude a wrongful death claim, the limitations period must expire before the decedent's death. In this case, the decedent could have pursued a personal injury action within three years after discovering his cause of action in early 1997, just prior to his death in May 1997, as the statute of limitations had not yet run. Consequently, the wrongful death claim by the beneficiaries is valid. The applicable statutes concerning limitations are highlighted, with the decedent’s mesothelioma classified as an occupational disease. Under Maryland law, an action related to an occupational disease must be initiated within three years of discovery or within ten years from the date of death. The wrongful death action must be filed within ten years of death or three years from the discovery of the cause of death, whichever is shorter. The excerpt also addresses the discovery rule, which determines when a cause of action accrues, typically at the time of the wrongful act. The discovery rule, originating from a medical malpractice case, allows for a cause of action to accrue only when the injury is discoverable. This rule was extended to all torts by 1981, requiring the court to consider the nature of knowledge necessary for a cause of action to accrue, distinguishing between actual and constructive notice. Express notice encompasses both direct knowledge and information communicated through oral or written means from those aware of the relevant facts. Implied notice, also termed actual notice, occurs when a party has knowledge of facts and circumstances that would prompt a diligent individual to discover the principal fact, relying on circumstantial evidence for inference. This differs from constructive notice, which is based on legal presumptions and cannot be contested, while implied notice arises from factual inference. The discovery rule mandates that actual knowledge must consist of express cognition or awareness inferred from circumstances that should prompt a reasonable person to inquire further. A purchaser must act on circumstances that suggest an investigation, and failure to do so can be deemed bad faith. Thus, constructive knowledge from legal presumptions is insufficient; actual knowledge can be express or implied. Application of the discovery rule involves two questions: 1) whether actual knowledge is sufficient to place the claimant on inquiry notice, and 2) if inquiry notice exists, whether the information resulting from a reasonable investigation would be adequate. In product liability actions, particularly those not involving latent diseases, case law indicates that a diligent inquiry should reveal probable manufacturing misconduct or product defects related to the injury. In the current case, the focus is on the nature and extent of actual knowledge required to trigger an inquiry, acknowledging that if such knowledge existed, a diligent inquiry would likely uncover a link between mesothelioma and asbestos exposure, meeting the second prong of the discovery rule. The court determined that the plaintiff was on inquiry notice regarding her potential tort claim when informed that her ankle was 'messed up,' necessitating an investigation into her treating physician's actions. This ruling was supported by the precedent set in Baysinger v. Schmid Prod. Co., where the plaintiff, after experiencing issues with an intrauterine device, sought medical opinions but was told there was no connection to her problems. The court in Baysinger found that reasonable inquiry was a factual question, noting that the plaintiff did not suspect wrongdoing based on the information available to her at the time. In the context of medical product liability, the court clarified in Pennwalt that a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff is aware of potential wrongdoing or product defects that likely caused an injury, necessitating actual knowledge as part of the second prong of the discovery rule. The first prong requires that a reasonable person investigate upon awareness of sufficient facts but does not define the threshold for such knowledge. In latent disease cases, the court in Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. ruled that a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the nature and cause of their injury. However, it did not specify the knowledge level required for inquiry notice. Similarly, in Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., the court ruled that the cause of action for lung cancer only accrued once the plaintiff was aware of his lung cancer diagnosis, without addressing whether mere knowledge of the disease was sufficient for inquiry notice. In Smith v. Bethlehem Steel, the plaintiff was diagnosed with colon cancer after asbestosis, illustrating a case of latent disease. Trimper v. Porter-Hayden established that the wrongful death statute's limitations do not apply the discovery rule, while the general statute of limitations for survival actions does. The court ruled that the cause of action accrues when the injured party is aware or should be aware of the injury's nature and cause or at the time of death. Trimper clarified that wrongful death claims are governed by specific limitations while survival actions follow general statutes. The court noted that mere knowledge of injury is insufficient for inquiry notice; a reasonable investigation must reveal a potential cause of action. Subsequent to Trimper, Maryland's legislature amended laws in 1986 and 1987, adjusting the statutory period for claims related to occupational diseases. The court recognized that the discovery rule is incorporated into both wrongful death and occupational disease statutes, although the specific wording differs. It also referenced the inquiry notice rule in relation to Workers' Compensation claims and established that medical malpractice claims are subject to distinct limitations timelines. Application of the statute hinges on the concept of "injury," differentiating it from "death," yet both statutes share the phrase "was discovered." The discovery rule, critical in medical malpractice claims, suggests that the statute of limitations begins when a claimant is aware of circumstances warranting investigation. In the case of Jacobs v. Flynn, it was established that a claimant is charged with notice when they possess knowledge that should prompt an inquiry into the facts, thus triggering the limitations period. This rule is applicable not only in medical malpractice but also in negligence suits. The interpretation of section 5-109(a)(2) affirms that a plaintiff has three years from when a wrong was discovered or should have been discovered. The court's ruling on June 17, 2004, indicated that a plaintiff’s disclosure of asbestos exposure during a mesothelioma diagnosis serves as prima facie evidence for inquiry notice, suggesting that such information is deemed significant and requires investigation. The plaintiffs were aware of Mr. Benjamin’s diagnosis and exposure yet did not act on this knowledge. The court's stance on whether the decedent's knowledge was imputed to the plaintiffs remains ambiguous. When assessing claims, the distinction between wrongful death actions and survival actions is crucial, as each involves different plaintiffs and knowledge requirements. Although the statutes do not specify who must discover the cause of action, Maryland case law generally refers to the "claimant" or "plaintiff," indicating that the claimant's knowledge is determinative in satisfying the inquiry notice requirement, regardless of the decedent's knowledge. Plaintiff argues that she only became aware of her causes of action upon reading a newspaper article about malpractice claims against the defendant, asserting that discovery is essential for her survival claim to accrue. Under Maryland law, particularly in cases involving latent diseases, a cause of action arises when a plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the nature and cause of their injury. In wrongful death cases, the action is personal to the claimant, and the injured plaintiff is the primary determinant. If the decedent dies, the personal representative and the decedent’s knowledge become critical for a survival action, which is brought on behalf of the decedent. If the decedent lacks sufficient knowledge to trigger the discovery rule, the personal representative must have inquiry notice for the action to accrue. In wrongful death actions, the beneficiaries’ knowledge is pivotal; if the decedent lacked sufficient knowledge, the cause of action accrues only when the beneficiaries are on inquiry notice, as knowledge is not imputed from the decedent to the beneficiaries. The distinction between survival actions and wrongful death actions is emphasized, where survival actions seek recovery for the victim's injuries, and wrongful death actions seek recovery for losses suffered by the victim's relatives due to the death. The personal representative acts as the posthumous agent for the decedent in a survival action, whereas surviving relatives act on their own behalf in wrongful death actions. In survival actions, the decedent's cause of action can exist independently of their death, meaning the death does not need to result from the tortious injury. The decedent remains the claimant, and a survival action may accrue before death, originating from personal injuries sustained during their lifetime. The decedent's knowledge governs inquiry notice; if the decedent is unaware of the cause of injury before death, the cause of action accrues when the personal representative becomes aware. The Trimper case establishes that a cause of action accrues upon the decedent's knowledge of their injury or at death, whichever occurs first. In contrast, wrongful death actions arise solely from the death of the injured party, with beneficiaries as claimants whose knowledge triggers inquiry notice. In the present case, the decedent's awareness of a mesothelioma diagnosis and workplace asbestos exposure was sufficient to establish inquiry notice during his lifetime, without needing to demonstrate awareness of a causal link between the exposure and the illness. A reasonable person, aware of the general knowledge regarding occupational diseases and asbestos exposure in 1997, would have conducted an inquiry that would reveal a causal connection and potential causes of action for mesothelioma. The necessary facts to make a claim existed at the time of the mesothelioma diagnosis, leading to the conclusion that the personal representative's survival action is barred by limitations. Regarding the wrongful death claim, the court noted that while Mrs. Benjamin accompanied her husband to medical appointments, this alone does not imply legal knowledge that he was exposed to asbestos. Although the decedent was aware of his exposure and had mesothelioma, this awareness did not automatically extend to the beneficiaries as inquiry notice for wrongful death. The beneficiaries had express knowledge of the cause of death (mesothelioma) by 1997, but lacked knowledge about the asbestos exposure until late 2001. The court ruled that knowledge of the disease alone is insufficient for inquiry notice unless it prompts a reasonable person to investigate further into causative factors. The beneficiaries’ lack of express knowledge regarding asbestos exposure prior to late 2001 means that summary judgment cannot be granted based solely on their relationship with the decedent. Thus, the question of whether the beneficiaries had knowledge of asbestos exposure is a factual issue for the fact finder, which would determine if the cause of action accrued before 2001 based on reasonable inferences or credibility determinations. Knowledge of mesothelioma alone does not suffice for establishing inquiry notice regarding a wrongful death claim related to asbestos exposure. The determination of when the appellant became aware of the decedent's asbestos exposure raises a factual question that precludes summary disposition of the claim. The wrongful death action represents three beneficiaries, but only one claim exists for wrongful death, which is then divided among them. All potential plaintiffs entitled to damages must be named, regardless of their participation in the action. Evidence indicates that the decedent’s children were not on inquiry notice any earlier than the appellant. However, the fact finder at trial may reach different conclusions about the notice for each claimant. Each claimant's knowledge is crucial and is not imputed to others. The court's judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding the case for further proceedings in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, with costs split equally between the appellant and appellees. Relevant legal provisions and historical context regarding wrongful death claims and asbestos exposure are noted.