Ackison v. Detroit Edison Co.

Citations: 751 F. Supp. 1245; 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18354Docket: 2:90-cv-71503

Court: District Court, E.D. Michigan; October 31, 1990; Federal District Court

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Plaintiffs Gary and Carolyn Ackison filed a motion to remand their case against The Detroit Edison Company to state court after the defendant removed it, claiming federal pre-emption under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. The plaintiffs argue that their complaint only presents state law claims, specifically a violation of Michigan's Whistleblowers' Protection Act. The court, led by District Judge Duggan, noted that the case originated in Wayne County Circuit Court and highlighted the procedural background, including the plaintiff's employment history and subsequent discharge after raising concerns to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission about safety violations. The plaintiff's complaint to the Department of Labor regarding his discharge was dismissed as untimely, and an appeal is pending.

The court outlined the legal standards governing removal based on federal question jurisdiction, referencing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and (b) and the well-pleaded complaint rule. This rule asserts that federal jurisdiction arises only from federal questions explicitly presented in the plaintiff's complaint. The court emphasized that federal defenses, such as pre-emption, cannot serve as grounds for removal. Thus, if the federal court lacks original jurisdiction, it must remand the case to state court.

Defendant asserts that the removal of the case to federal court is justified because the plaintiff's claim under the Whistleblowers' Act is pre-empted by § 5851, granting the court original federal question jurisdiction. In contrast, the plaintiff argues that his claims are solely based on state law, thus not pre-empted and warranting remand to state court. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution allows federal law to pre-empt state law under three circumstances: explicit pre-emption by Congress, field pre-emption when federal regulation is so comprehensive that it leaves no room for state regulation, and conflict pre-emption where compliance with both federal and state laws is impossible or where state law obstructs federal objectives. The court categorizes these as explicit, field, and conflict pre-emption. There is a division among federal courts regarding whether § 5851 pre-empts state whistleblower claims related to its provisions. However, the court concludes, based on the Supreme Court's ruling in English, that there is no pre-emption in this case. The defendant claims field pre-emption, arguing that the plaintiff's whistleblower claim pertains to nuclear safety regulation, which is exclusively federally regulated. Citing Pacific Gas, the court notes that the Supreme Court previously determined that the federal government occupies the entire field of nuclear safety, except for limited state powers. In English, the Court confirmed that federal regulation encompasses the radiological safety aspects of nuclear plant operations.

The Court in English addressed whether a discharged employee's state law claim based on conduct covered by § 5851 was pre-empted under field pre-emption. The Court determined that § 5851 does not pre-empt all state law claims, specifically finding pre-emption applies only if: (1) the state law's purpose is nuclear safety, or (2) the state law directly and substantially affects decisions related to radiological safety at nuclear facilities. In the case at hand, the claim of intentional infliction of mental distress was not motivated by safety concerns, nor did it have a direct and substantial effect on nuclear safety, thus not falling within the pre-empted field.

In the current matter, the plaintiff claims wrongful discharge under Michigan's Whistleblowers' Act, which prohibits retaliatory actions against employees reporting legal violations. The Court analyzed this claim against the standards set in English, concluding it is not pre-empted by § 5851. The Whistleblowers' Act aims to protect employees reporting various legal violations, not specifically related to safety, thus failing the first pre-emption standard. Additionally, while the claim could indirectly influence safety decisions, this effect is not deemed direct or substantial enough to meet the second pre-emption standard. Consequently, the Court ruled that the plaintiff's Whistleblowers' Act claim does not fall under the pre-empted field defined by § 5851, granting the plaintiff's Motion to Remand. 

The document also notes that there are two plaintiffs, Gary and Carolyn Ackison, with the Court referring to them in the singular for clarity, and lists additional claims made by the plaintiff.

§ 5851(b)(1) mandates that a complaint regarding retaliatory action must be filed within thirty days. Relevant case law supports this requirement, including *The Fair v. Kohler Die Specialty Co.*, which emphasizes the plaintiff's discretion in selecting legal bases for their suit, as noted by Justice Holmes in *Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson*. Jurisdiction cannot be established on a theory not presented by the plaintiff, per *Great North R. Co. v. Alexander*. Furthermore, the plaintiff’s allegations shape the case's removability status. The Constitution (Art. VI, cl. 2) establishes federal law as the supreme law, overriding any state laws to the contrary. Certain courts have determined that § 5851 pre-empts state law whistleblower claims, as seen in *Masters v. Daniel Int'l Corp.* and *Snow v. Bechtel Constr. Inc.*, while other cases, including *Norris v. Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co.* and *Gaballah v. PG&E*, have found no such preemption.