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Harris v. Roderick

Citations: 933 F. Supp. 977; 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15503; 1996 WL 354160Docket: Civ. 94-0359-S-BLW

Court: District Court, D. Idaho; May 28, 1996; Federal District Court

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In the case of Kevin L. Harris v. Arthur Roderick et al., the plaintiff, Kevin Harris, has accused multiple defendants, including Deputy U.S. Marshals, of wrongful actions during an encounter on August 21, 1992, at Ruby Ridge, Idaho. The defendants filed Motions to Dismiss, which are currently under consideration by the United States District Court for the District of Idaho. The court, led by District Judge Winmill, is reviewing both the legal standards for such motions and the allegations in Harris's Second Amended Complaint.

Key legal standards dictate that a Motion to Dismiss should only be granted if it is evident that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts supporting his claims. The court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them favorably toward the plaintiff. The court will not consider materials beyond the pleadings unless the motion is converted to a Motion for Summary Judgment.

In his Second Amended Complaint, Harris recounts events leading to a violent confrontation involving U.S. Marshals and the Weaver family. The confrontation began when the Marshals approached the Weaver property to execute an arrest warrant. During this encounter, Harris claims that defendant Roderick shot and killed the family dog, Striker, leading to a chaotic exchange of gunfire in which Sammy Weaver was killed by a shot from Cooper after firing at Roderick. Harris admits to firing shots in self-defense and acknowledges the possibility that he may have fired the shot that killed William Degan, another deputy involved in the incident.

Cooper and Roderick conspired to falsely portray Kevin Harris as the aggressor in a shooting incident, leading to a murder warrant for him. The FBI's Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) was deployed to Ruby Ridge on August 22, 1992, under Special Rules of Engagement that permitted the killing of any armed adult in the vicinity of the Weaver cabin without regard for threats posed. Randy Weaver, his daughter Sarah, and Kevin Harris were confronted by HRT sniper Lon Horiuchi. During this encounter, Weaver was shot in the back and later, as he and the others entered the cabin, Horiuchi fired again, resulting in the death of Vickie Weaver and severe injuries to Harris. Harris endured significant physical pain and emotional distress, later claiming permanent partial disability from his injuries. He faced multiple criminal charges but was acquitted after a lengthy trial. Subsequently, Harris filed a lawsuit against thirteen individuals, including FBI officials and the United States, alleging violations of constitutional rights under Bivens and asserting claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act for assault, battery, and negligence. A specific claim in Count One accuses DUSMs Cooper and Roderick of using excessive force against Harris, violating his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. For this claim, Harris must demonstrate that he was "seized" and that this seizure involved unreasonable force.

Defendants argue that Harris was not seized during the incident at the 'Y' because there was no physical detention, he was not struck by bullets, and he did not submit to the authority of the Deputy U.S. Marshals (DUSMs). A seizure requires either physical force or submission to authority, with physical force necessitating an intentional control of movement by an officer. The court notes that physical force does not constitute a seizure if the force is ineffective, and that brief hesitations or eye contact do not equate to submission.

Harris's complaint does not claim he was physically detained or submitted to authority. During oral arguments, Harris's counsel indicated an intent to amend the complaint to assert that he took cover and returned fire when the DUSMs began shooting. The court is inclined to consider this amendment as part of the complaint and will evaluate whether Harris experienced a seizure due to gunfire.

Defendants contended that the complaint did not adequately plead a seizure by physical force, as Harris was not shot. The court finds this argument unpersuasive, asserting that a seizure can occur even if there is no physical contact, as long as there is a restraint on movement. However, to establish a physical force seizure, there must be an intentional acquisition of control, which did not occur since Harris returned fire, indicating he was not under DUSMs' control. The DUSMs' attempts to detain Harris were ineffective; he shot back for ten minutes and then fled, meaning they never gained physical control over him.

As for a seizure by submission, while Harris may have had a case if he had merely sought cover, his act of returning fire indicates he was not submitting at that moment. The court acknowledges that even if Harris acted in self-defense, such actions do not demonstrate submissive behavior. Thus, the court concludes that the allegations in Harris's complaint do not establish a viable claim for either type of seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Harris admitted to resisting authority, which the Court interprets as not constituting submission under the Fourth Amendment, citing precedents Hodari D and Hernandez. The allegations in the Second Amended Complaint do not support a claim for seizure by submission. Regarding the Fifth Amendment claim in Count One, the Court references Graham v. Connor, establishing the Fourth Amendment as the sole remedy for excessive force. Although Harris argues that the Ninth Circuit allows Fifth Amendment claims in cases of abusive government actions, this argument was undermined by the overruling of Sinaloa in Armendariz v. Penman, which reaffirmed that the Fourth Amendment is the exclusive route for excessive force claims. Consequently, the Fifth Amendment claim is dismissed, with the Defendants entitled to qualified immunity as there was no clearly established right under the Fifth Amendment at the time of the incident. The Court concludes by dismissing both the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims in Count One.

In Count Two, Harris claims that DUSMs Roderick and Cooper conspired to violate his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights through false testimonies that affected the Special Rules of Engagement, leading to his shooting and subsequent legal troubles. He asserts that their lies resulted in illegal arrest, a prosecution lacking probable cause, and an unfair trial. However, Harris did not respond to the Defendants' motion to dismiss regarding the Sixth Amendment claim, leading the Court to deem it waived and dismiss that part of Count Two.

The Fifth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution must be dismissed, as established by the Supreme Court. Harris's remaining claim pertains to violations of his Fourth Amendment rights due to false statements from Roderick and Cooper that allegedly led to his arrest without probable cause. The Defendants argue for dismissal, asserting that Harris has not sufficiently connected the alleged lies to his arrest. However, the Ninth Circuit requires specific and concrete nonconclusory allegations for conspiracy claims, which Harris's Second Amended Complaint satisfies by detailing the conspiracy's formation, motivations, and actions of the participants. Thus, the challenge to Count Two is rejected. 

The Defendants further contend that regardless of Roderick and Cooper's reports, Harris's act of killing Degan provided an independent basis for probable cause. This argument is inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s approach, which necessitates a comprehensive examination of all circumstances surrounding probable cause, not just isolated facts. Hence, this argument is also rejected. 

Regarding qualified immunity, the Defendants claim immunity for the injuries Harris sustained from FBI sniper Lon Horiuchi's gunshot. The Court determines that it cannot conclude Horiuchi's actions were objectively reasonable at this preliminary stage. Additionally, the Defendants assert qualified immunity concerning Harris's arrest and detention, claiming the arresting officers had probable cause or a reasonable belief thereof. The Court reiterates that the determination of probable cause is a factual issue not suitable for resolution at this stage but notes that qualified immunity may apply if the officers reasonably believed probable cause existed, even if they were mistaken.

In the Motion to Dismiss proceeding, the Court presumes that Cooper and Roderick provided false statements regarding the events surrounding Harris's shooting and subsequent arrest on August 22, 1992. Other Defendants involved in these actions may claim a Hunter qualified immunity defense, as they believed Cooper and Roderick's lies. However, granting this immunity to Cooper and Roderick would be inconsistent since their falsehoods misled the arresting officers. The Court finds no legal precedent supporting the notion that a defendant's own false statements can justify a qualified immunity defense, leading to the denial of this argument.

The Defendants also contend that Count Two should be dismissed based on absolute immunity from claims of false testimony; however, this immunity does not apply if their false testimony initiated a prosecution. The Court interprets the Second Amended Complaint, particularly paragraphs 85(a) and (b), as indicating that the Defendants did initiate prosecution, thereby rejecting the absolute immunity claim. Consequently, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss for Count Two regarding Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations while denying dismissal for Fourth Amendment violations.

Count Three alleges that Roderick and Cooper violated Harris's Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights through their false statements at the 'Y.' Although this count is distinct from Count Two, the Court applies the same reasoning and rulings, dismissing the Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims while allowing the Fourth Amendment claims to proceed.

Count Four claims that Defendants, including DUSMs and FBI agents, conspired to deprive Harris of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by altering the Rules of Engagement to justify lethal force against armed adult males near the Weaver residence. Harris asserts that he was shot based on these new rules. The Defendants argue that they cannot be liable for conspiracy related to excessive force since the officer responsible for the shooting, Horiuchi, has qualified immunity. They assert that if Horiuchi's actions are immune, then the other Defendants cannot be held liable based on his conduct.

Defendants argue that Horiuchi's actions were reasonable, believing he had probable cause to think Harris had killed Degan and was fleeing to a secure cabin, which could pose a threat to officers. The Supreme Court permits the use of deadly force if a suspect poses an immediate threat or has committed serious crimes. However, the Second Amended Complaint suggests that Harris was retreating to a cabin surrounded by law enforcement and was not threatening them. Defendants concede that no case supports the justification of deadly force when the victim poses no immediate threat and is not escaping. They claim that even if Horiuchi's belief was mistaken, it was reasonable enough to grant him qualified immunity, citing Hegarty v. Somerset County, where officers were found to have acted reasonably under immediate threat. In that case, officers faced actual danger as Hegarty aimed a rifle at them. The court emphasized that Hegarty was decided on summary judgment, not dismissal, and noted a lack of evidence that Horiuchi was in a similarly dangerous position. Defendants also seek qualified immunity for their Special Rules of Engagement, which allowed deadly force without considering immediate danger or escape. However, they provide no legal precedent for analyzing such rules under the Garner standard. The validity of the presumption of constant immediate danger in the Special Rules is central to assessing the Defendants' claim of qualified immunity.

The Court is currently unable to rule on the issue of qualified immunity for the Defendants regarding the drafting of the Special Rules of Engagement due to insufficient factual development, thus denying their claim without prejudice to reassert it later. Harris has sufficiently alleged this matter in his Second Amended Complaint. The Court also rejects the Defendants’ argument that the conspiracy claim is inadequately pled, affirming that both Count Four and Count Two meet the Ninth Circuit’s heightened pleading standard. However, the Court dismisses the Fifth Amendment claim based on the precedent set in Graham. The motion to dismiss Count Five, which accuses Horiuchi and other Defendants of violating Harris's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, is partly resolved, with the Court rejecting the Defendants' claims of reasonableness and qualified immunity for Horiuchi's actions. The Fifth Amendment allegations in Count Five are dismissed, but the Fourth Amendment claims remain, as the Second Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that Horiuchi's superiors encouraged the shooting, which aligns with the Hamilton standard for supervisory liability. Count Six is dismissed at Harris's concession. Regarding the Motion to Preserve Evidence, Harris's request to prevent destruction of evidence is partially granted, allowing for routine handling of evidence but prohibiting its destruction. Lastly, the Court's resolution of the Motions to Dismiss restarts the deadlines established in a prior order from December 21, 1995.

The court's order grants in part and denies in part the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Cooper and Roderick (Docket No. 33). Specifically, it dismisses Count One and the Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims from Counts Two and Three, while denying the motion for all other claims. Additionally, the court grants in part and denies in part the Motion to Dismiss filed by other Defendants (Docket No. 36), dismissing the Fifth Amendment claims from Counts Four and Five and Count Six, while denying the motion regarding other claims. The court also addresses the Motion to Preserve Evidence (Docket No. 11), granting it in part to prohibit the destruction, alteration, or abandonment of original or non-duplicative evidence related to the case, but denying it in all other respects. The court notes that qualified immunity defenses for Defendants other than Cooper and Roderick will be addressed later in the decision.