Dunaway v. Busbin

Citation: 498 So. 2d 1218Docket: 56109

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; November 25, 1986; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

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A civil contempt proceeding arose between adjoining homeowners M. Mikal Dunaway and Patricia Diane Dunaway, and Marilyn R. Busbin and Oliver C. Rushing, regarding an obstruction of an 18-foot right-of-way on the Dunaway property. The Chancery Court had previously ruled that the Dunaways were to keep this right-of-way clear, but they constructed an eight-foot fence that obstructed access, leading to this contempt case. The court found substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the Dunaways knowingly violated the injunction. The Dunaways had been informed of their obligations under the court's August 7, 1984 judgment, which affirmed Busbin's legal rights to use the right-of-way for access. Following that judgment, the Dunaways built a fence along their property line, which impeded direct access to the right-of-way, despite leaving a gate that allowed some access. The court upheld the prior ruling, affirming that the Dunaways had wrongfully obstructed the right-of-way and were in contempt of the injunction.

On August 20, 1984, Busbin filed a motion in the Chancery Court to hold the Dunaways in contempt for violating a final judgment issued on August 7, 1984. During a hearing on September 6, 1984, the court determined that the Dunaways, aware of the previous judgment, obstructed the right-of-way by constructing a wooden fence and gates, which was deemed wilful and contemptuous. The court ordered them to remove the obstructions within ten days. The current proceedings involve an appeal concerning the contempt ruling, while the Dunaways’ arguments primarily address their rights regarding the right-of-way, issues previously resolved in the final judgment from August 7, 1984, which they did not appeal. The appeal focuses solely on whether the Dunaways are guilty of contempt, referencing established legal standards on unreasonable interference related to right-of-way rights. The document cites multiple cases illustrating instances of unreasonable interference with right-of-way access. Additionally, it mentions the Berry v. Harvill case, which involved similar issues of property rights and contempt.

The Court determined that Berry was not in contempt of the original injunction, which only prohibited him from entering the Harvills' land without their consent, a provision he did not violate. However, the Court acknowledged that the chancellor was justified in expanding the injunction against Berry due to his expressed rebellious attitude. The Court clarified that future interference by Berry could be subject to contempt if it obstructed the Harvills' activities. In a related case, the Busbins secured an injunction against the Dunaways, requiring them to clear obstructions from a right-of-way. The Dunaways' act of erecting a fence violated this injunction, similar to how interference by Berry would breach the broader injunction noted in his case. The Court emphasized its limited review scope regarding factual determinations made by the chancery court, upholding findings unless manifest error is shown. The Dunaways were aware of the injunction's terms, and the fence they built was found to unreasonably obstruct the Busbins’ access to the right-of-way. The Court concluded that the fence prevented the Busbins from entering the right-of-way without significant effort, thus violating the injunction. Lastly, the Court found that the Dunaways knowingly disregarded the injunction, negating any defense against a contempt finding based on unintentional conduct.

The construction of the fence by the Dunaways intentionally obstructed the Busbins' reasonable access to the north 88 feet of the right-of-way, a fact recognized by the Chancery Court, which found the Dunaways' actions to be willful and in violation of a prior court order. The Dunaways raised an issue regarding a second contempt citation that arose after the Busbins partially dismantled the fence, prompting the Dunaways to rebuild it. This led to a subsequent contempt proceeding initiated by the Busbins in January 1985, but the only appeal currently under consideration is from the September 1984 contempt ruling. The decision does not affect any future proceedings related to the enforcement of the August 7, 1984, final judgment. The court affirmed the earlier ruling, with concurrence from several justices. Additionally, the Dunaways' opportunity to request a rehearing of the August 7 judgment had expired, although they could still appeal, which they ultimately did not do.