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Arlington Lumber & Trim Co. v. Vaughn

Citations: 548 So. 2d 727; 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1914; 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 4565; 1989 WL 90483Docket: 88-3251

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; August 15, 1989; Florida; State Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this case, the appellant, a lumber and trim company, sought to foreclose a lien against the appellee for unpaid materials supplied for home improvements contracted by a third party. The primary legal issue centered around compliance with Florida's lien statutes, specifically sections 713.06(2)(a) and 713.14. The appellant provided materials starting on November 16, 1987, but did not send a 'notice to owner' until December 23, 1987, after the contractor had received substantial payments. The trial court determined that the 45-day notice period began with the initial purchase date of November 3, 1987, rendering the notice untimely and a complete defense against the lien. Furthermore, the appellant did not fulfill the statutory requirement to demand a designation of account for payments, which further invalidated the lien claim. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, upholding the appellee's defenses and barring the appellant's claim to foreclose the lien, due to non-compliance with the statutory requirements.

Legal Issues Addressed

Designation of Account Requirement under Florida Statute Section 713.14

Application: The appellant failed to demand a designation of account for subsequent payments, which was a necessary condition to pursue a lien foreclosure.

Reasoning: Additionally, the court upheld Vaughn's defense regarding the lack of a proper designation demand.

Lien Foreclosure Requirements under Florida Statute Section 713.06(2)(a)

Application: The appellant's lien claim was barred because the notice to the owner was not served within the statutory 45-day period starting from the initial material purchase.

Reasoning: The trial court denied appellant's complaint, confirming that the 45-day period commenced with the initial material purchase on November 3, 1987, not the delivery date.