Keller v. Friendly Ford, Inc.

Citations: 782 S.W.2d 170; 1990 Mo. App. LEXIS 43; 1990 WL 1144Docket: 16309

Court: Missouri Court of Appeals; January 10, 1990; Missouri; State Appellate Court

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Richard D. Keller filed a lawsuit against Friendly Ford, Inc. for $591.13, initially winning a judgment in small claims court. Friendly Ford subsequently requested a trial de novo, which resulted in a judgment in their favor. Keller's case involved purchasing a new Taurus station wagon in late 1986, which frequently experienced engine failures. Despite multiple attempts by Ford agencies to repair the vehicle, the issues persisted. In summer 1987, while the car was with Friendly Ford for repairs, Keller requested a loaner vehicle for a trip to Tulsa to retrieve his daughter from college. Dan Wise, a sales manager at Friendly Ford, initially agreed to provide a loaner free of charge. However, when Keller arrived on the scheduled date, he was informed by Earl Wise, the company's president, that no loaner would be provided despite prior assurances. Instead, he was offered a rental vehicle, which he declined. As a result, Keller was forced to travel to Colorado in his defective Taurus, facing the risk of breakdown during the trip.

During rush-hour traffic in Mission, Kansas, the plaintiff's Taurus malfunctioned, causing significant delays. After being towed to a Ford agency, the car started without issue, but it broke down again shortly after the journey resumed. The plaintiff rented a small car while the Taurus was at the agency, which was unable to identify the problem for several days. On August 28, 1987, the plaintiff rented a van for his trip to Colorado. Upon returning the van on September 2, he learned the agency had identified a distributor cap issue with the Taurus, which was subsequently fixed. The plaintiff sought reimbursement of $591.13 for the rental costs, which was denied, leading to litigation. 

The small claims judge ruled in favor of the plaintiff, citing a promise of a free vehicle from Dan Wise, though acknowledging it lacked consideration and was generally unenforceable. However, the judge applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel, noting that the plaintiff relied on this promise to his detriment, as he had no alternative transportation arrangements. At the trial de novo, the plaintiff did not assert any contractual obligation for a free vehicle. The de novo judge issued a judgment for the defendant without findings or conclusions. The plaintiff appealed, claiming the court misapplied the law regarding promissory estoppel, arguing that his reliance on the defendant's promise was clearly established, especially since he had received a similar promise in June 1987 under comparable circumstances.

Uncontradicted evidence indicated that the plaintiff relied on a prior oral contract, expecting a free loaner car from the defendant for a trip. When this promise was denied, the plaintiff experienced delays, anxiety, and expenses. The plaintiff cited two Missouri Supreme Court cases, arguing that the absence of findings of fact by a de novo judge warranted a reversal of the judgment. However, current rules state that in judge-tried cases without specific findings, all factual issues are presumed to be found in accordance with the judgment reached.

During the trial, the plaintiff's claim of a promised free automobile was disputed by witnesses Dan Wise and Jay Loveland, with the trial court having the discretion to assess credibility. The court's determination that no promise was made would suffice to deny the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff contended his account was more credible, but the appellate court cannot reassess credibility determinations made by the trial court.

The plaintiff's sole basis for recovery was promissory estoppel, which requires that the promise be made with the intent for it to be relied upon and that such reliance leads to injustice if not enforced. However, even if the de novo judge believed the plaintiff's claim of a promise, all parties acknowledged that no free car was provided when the plaintiff arrived at the defendant's business. Therefore, the judgment was upheld.

Plaintiff was aware that he would not receive a free automobile from the defendant when he traveled from Springfield to Colorado. Although he could reasonably argue reliance on the promise of a free car for his journey from Eureka Springs to Springfield, this reliance did not extend to the subsequent trip to Colorado. If the de novo judge had found that the promise of the free automobile was indeed made, the plaintiff might have been entitled to recover expenses incurred traveling to Springfield and possibly for returning home upon learning the promise was broken. However, it is clear that continuing the journey to Colorado in the Taurus was not done in reliance on that promise, as it had been violated upon the plaintiff's arrival in Springfield. Had the plaintiff been informed a week prior that no car would be provided and still chosen to proceed with the trip in the Taurus, he would not have been entitled to recover costs for rental vehicles due to the Taurus's failure, unless a specific warranty or contractual obligation was proven, which was not demonstrated at trial. The court does not address the defendant's business practices or the plaintiff's frustrations but focuses solely on whether the de novo judge's decision was legally sound. The judgment is affirmed, with concurrence from Greene and Prewitt, JJ.