Scariano v. JUSTICES OF S. CT. OF STATE OF IND.

Citations: 852 F. Supp. 708; 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6562; 1994 WL 192141Docket: IP 93-606 C

Court: District Court, S.D. Indiana; March 25, 1994; Federal District Court

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The case involves Anthony G. Scariano, who challenges an Indiana rule regarding bar admission after his conditional license was not renewed due to insufficient practice in Indiana. Scariano, who has been licensed in Illinois since 1975 and had conditional admission in Indiana since 1991, contests Rule 6(3) of the Indiana Supreme Court Rules for Admission to the Bar. He claims the rule violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause of Article I, as well as unreasonably restricts his ability to travel. The court emphasizes the state's significant interest in regulating bar admission, supported by Supreme Court precedents, and concludes that Scariano's case lacks merit, leading to the dismissal of his action. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983, with jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1343.

Indiana Supreme Court holds exclusive authority to admit attorneys to practice law. Admission requires passing the Indiana Bar Examination, but Rule 6 allows conditional admission for those licensed in other states, provided they submit an affidavit indicating intent to practice predominantly in Indiana. Conditional admission can be renewed annually for up to five years, contingent on demonstrating active and predominant engagement in Indiana legal practice. At the time of Scariano's admission, the Board had an imprecise interpretation of "predominant practice," which did not necessitate spending over 50% of time in Indiana or on Indiana matters. On April 23, 1992, the Board clarified that "in Indiana" pertains to dealing with Indiana law and clients, regardless of office location, and "predominantly" means practice in Indiana must be equal to or exceed practice in any other jurisdiction. These definitions rendered Scariano ineligible for renewal of his conditional license.

The court assumes the facts in the complaint are true when ruling on a motion to dismiss, favoring the plaintiff's reasonable inferences. Dismissal is only appropriate if the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts to support their claim. Additional facts submitted relate to subject matter jurisdiction and do not affect the standard for summary judgment under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff's challenge to Rule 6(3) is viewed as a direct appeal of a ruling from the Indiana Supreme Court regarding his application, which the district court lacks jurisdiction to review under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This doctrine prohibits federal courts from reviewing state court judgments disguised as federal civil rights claims when those claims are closely tied to the state court's decision. The court highlights that plaintiffs cannot reframe their claims in federal court if those claims are intertwined with state court judgments. 

Admission and Discipline Rule 14(3) allows an individual aggrieved by the Board's refusal to recommend admission to practice law in Indiana to petition the Indiana Supreme Court for a review within 20 days. The plaintiff attempted to appeal the non-renewal of his law license through a letter to the Indiana Supreme Court, which was ultimately denied. Defendants clarified that the appeal was not formally docketed, nor was there a briefing schedule established; the Supreme Court made its decision based on the Board's file and the plaintiff's correspondence. The November 24, 1992 letter marked the conclusion of the plaintiff's options under Rule 14(3).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine consists of a two-prong test to determine if a claim is barred by a state judicial proceeding. The first prong assesses whether the appeal concerning the non-renewal of Scariano's Indiana license was a judicial proceeding, which it was deemed to be. The second prong evaluates if Scariano's claims are inextricably intertwined with the judicial proceeding, which they are, as a decision regarding the application of the predominant practice requirement had been made by the Supreme Court. Review of this decision by the federal district court would infringe upon the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits lower federal courts from reviewing state supreme court judgments.

Scariano alleged economic damage due to the defendants' actions and challenged the application of the relevant Rule and its definitions. Despite not seeking an injunction for a conditional license, the specific allegations raised questions about the validity of the decision made on November 24, 1992, leading to a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction regarding this challenge. However, the court recognized that general constitutional challenges to state bar rules, not requiring review of specific state court judgments, do fall under federal jurisdiction. Consequently, the court proceeded to examine Scariano's broader challenges to Rule 6(3) and the predominant practice requirement.

The Admission Rules, enacted under the Indiana Supreme Court's authority, are classified as legislation for equal protection analysis. The applicable standard of scrutiny for these rules is rational basis review, which requires that the law be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Economic and social legislation typically falls under this scrutiny level. While Scariano argues for a higher standard, it is noted that the right to practice law without a bar examination is not considered fundamental for equal protection. The precedent set in Lowrie v. Goldenhersh confirms that rational basis is the appropriate standard for evaluating state bar admission rules.

In Goldfarb v. Supreme Court of Virginia, a similar challenge to a Virginia bar admission requirement was upheld on rational basis grounds, emphasizing the state's interest in ensuring attorney competence. The requirement for full-time practice was justified as a means to ensure familiarity with state law, reflecting a legitimate state purpose. Although Scariano raises concerns about potential inequalities resulting from the rules, such incidental disparities do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Indiana's rules do not mandate residency or office maintenance in the state for bar applicants. The judicial review does not extend to questioning the wisdom of the rules, and under rational basis review, it is irrelevant whether the rules are the least restrictive means to achieve permissible ends.

The document compares the presumptions of Virginia's Rule 1A:1(d) with the case of Martin v. Walton, where the Supreme Court upheld a Kansas rule requiring a part-time practitioner to affiliate with local counsel, despite the practitioner's qualifications. The Court ruled that the Kansas rule did not violate due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, emphasizing that state regulation is permissible. Similarly, it concludes that Virginia's approach to regulating attorney competence through Rule 6 is rational and aligns with maintaining the quality of legal practitioners, thus surviving an Equal Protection challenge. 

The document also addresses a claim regarding the "predominant practice requirement" and its impact on the constitutional right to travel. It clarifies that while the right to travel is constitutionally protected, the practice of law is not deemed a fundamental right, and a state law only implicates the right to travel if it actively deters travel or penalizes its exercise. The overall assessment is that Virginia's rule is rationally related to legitimate state interests without violating constitutional rights.

Scariano's argument that the predominant practice rule hinders his right to travel is rejected by the Court, which aligns with the precedent set in Lowrie, stating that requiring bar examination passage does not constitute a violation of fundamental rights. The Court finds no evidence that Rule 6 specifically aims to restrict travel or discriminates against it. Instead, Rule 6 provides an alternative pathway for attorneys like Scariano to practice in Indiana without taking the bar exam, suggesting he may choose to take the exam if he finds the alternative unsatisfactory.

Regarding the claim that the predominant practice requirement burdens interstate commerce, the Court references Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which allows Congress to regulate interstate commerce. A state law may be invalidated if it directly discriminates against interstate commerce or favors in-state interests. Citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., the Court notes that a law will be upheld if its burden on commerce is not clearly excessive compared to local benefits. The local benefit of Rule 6 is ensuring that attorneys familiar with Indiana law are admitted, a state interest that Scariano fails to show imposes an excessive burden on commerce.

Scariano concedes that if all attorneys were required to take the bar exam, the impact on interstate commerce would be indirect, weakening his argument. The Court concludes that if a state can constitutionally require all applicants to take the exam, it may also allow some out-of-state attorneys to be admitted without it. Scariano's assertion that Indiana's predominant practice requirement significantly interferes with interstate commerce is dismissed as inconsistent, given the less stringent nature of Indiana's rule compared to Virginia's requirements. The Court emphasizes that Indiana's choice of requirements should not be penalized.

States possess the authority to impose minimum requirements on individuals seeking to practice law to ensure public protection, not merely to safeguard the legal profession. This includes educational qualifications, experience, examination, and licensure, as emphasized in case law such as People v. Alfani and Crosetto v. State Bar of Wisconsin, which highlight the state's role in regulating the bar to protect the public. The court concluded that the conditional bar admission requirements in Indiana, while potentially having indirect effects, do not constitute violations of Equal Protection, the Interstate Commerce Clause, or the Right to Travel. As a result, the defendants' motion to dismiss was granted, and the complaint was dismissed with prejudice, indicating no possibility for amendment to salvage the claims. Additionally, any challenge to the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in the plaintiff's case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The judgment ordered that the plaintiff take nothing from the complaint, with the cause of action dismissed with prejudice, except for claims challenging the Supreme Court's decision, which were dismissed due to jurisdictional issues.

Documents attached to a complaint are integrated into the complaint itself as per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c). The challenged version of Rule 6, effective January 1, 1990, allows conditional admission to practice law in Indiana for individuals licensed in other states, contingent upon meeting specific criteria: active engagement in legal practice for five of the last seven years, regular legal service for the public, and submission of an affidavit affirming intent to practice predominantly in Indiana. This conditional admission lasts one year, renewable under the same conditions, and permanent after five consecutive renewals. The terms "predominately" and "predominantly" are defined by the Board to establish a "predominant practice requirement," though they are not interchangeable. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, derived from two Supreme Court cases, addresses the distinction between general state law challenges and specific applications of state law. In Virginia, the full-time practice requirement necessitates an applicant's intention to establish an office and regularly practice law there, although enforcement of this requirement is lacking, as noted in a subsequent case.