Furlough v. Union Pacific RR Co.

Citations: 766 So. 2d 751; 2000 WL 1230592Docket: 33,658-CA

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; August 31, 2000; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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On January 6, 1995, Andrew Furlough's vehicle collided with a Union Pacific Railroad Company locomotive at the S. 24th Street railroad crossing in Monroe, Louisiana, resulting in Furlough's death. His wife and four children initiated a lawsuit against the railroad, the train's engineer John Doyle Watson, the City of Monroe, and several insurance companies. The trial court dismissed the City of Monroe from the case after the plaintiffs rested, and a jury subsequently ruled in favor of Union Pacific and Watson following a nine-day trial. The plaintiffs appealed, citing ten alleged errors.

The accident occurred around 8:00 a.m. while Furlough was traveling at 20 miles per hour on a familiar route. The train, consisting of two engines and 74 grain cars, was traveling at 28 miles per hour, under the federal limit of 40 mph. Weather conditions were poor, with light rain and low visibility. Watson and the conductor reported they only saw Furlough's vehicle moments before the impact, which did not allow time to apply the train’s brakes until just before the collision. Watson explained that he chose to apply the general brakes first to avoid derailing the train and complicating the situation further.

The collision raised questions about adherence to safety protocols regarding horn usage and the operation of ditch lights, which were not functional at the time. Witnesses provided conflicting accounts regarding whether the train's horn was sounded in compliance with legal requirements. Despite the circumstances, the crossing was deemed properly marked according to the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). The appellate court affirmed the jury's verdict in favor of the defendants.

Plaintiffs identified multiple hazards at a railroad crossing, including parallel roadways, uneven pavement, and sight obstructions from nearby buildings and vegetation. Mr. Furlough, at a distance of 180 feet from the crossing, could only see 24 feet down the track in the direction of the approaching train. Between 1976 and 1995, there were six prior accidents at this crossing, the latest occurring in 1987.

In October 1997, the trial court set deadlines for dispositive motions, with a filing date of March 16, 1998, and a hearing on March 31, 1998, leading up to a trial scheduled for August 24, 1998. On March 16, UP filed a motion for partial summary judgment and an alternative motion in limine regarding federal preemption of Plaintiffs' claims about inadequate warning devices and excessive train speed. In contrast, Plaintiffs sought partial summary judgment claiming UP had breached its duty of ordinary care by failing to provide safety measures at the hazardous crossing. On August 10, 1998, the court denied all summary judgment motions without addressing UP's prior motion in limine.

On August 20, 1998, UP submitted additional motions in limine to exclude 21 categories of evidence, including claims of federal preemption related to obstructive vegetation and defective equipment. The City of Monroe and Plaintiffs also filed motions in limine around the same time. The trial court granted UP's motions concerning warning devices, excessive speed, and inoperative ditch lights based on federal preemption, but denied the motions on obstructive vegetation and train whistle audibility.

Plaintiffs challenged the trial court's consideration of UP's motions, arguing that federal preemption should have been pled in UP's answer and that the motion was untimely. The appellate court planned to address the procedural and substantive issues related to UP's motions, with particular attention to the appropriateness of the federal preemption defense and the rulings on the motions. Discussion of a motion for involuntary dismissal in favor of the City of Monroe was reserved for later consideration.

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in considering UP's motions in limine regarding federal preemption since UP's answer only addressed the adequacy of warning devices. The court finds no merit in this argument. Federal preemption is an affirmative defense that must be pled in the answer according to Louisiana law (La. C.C.P. arts. 1003 and 1005), but failure to do so does not preclude its application if the plaintiff has adequate notice. UP raised the issue of federal preemption over five months before the trial, and Plaintiffs did not object to this method of raising the defense. Consequently, their lack of objection is considered a waiver.

Regarding UP's motion in limine filed shortly before trial, the court affirms that it was not error for the trial court to consider it, as motions in limine allow for the pre-trial resolution of evidentiary issues without strict timing rules. Both parties had filed motions in limine close to the trial's start, and the trial court retains discretion over these motions, which it did not abuse.

The substantive matter of federal preemption concerning the adequacy of warning devices is discussed, specifically referencing federal regulations (23 C.F.R. 646.214(b)(3) and (4)) that dictate the installation of adequate warning devices at railroad crossings where federal funds are involved. These regulations require the installation of automatic gates with flashing lights under specific conditions, such as multiple railroad tracks or high-speed trains.

A combination of high speeds and moderate traffic volumes, substantial use by school buses or trucks carrying hazardous materials, or recommendations from a diagnostic team can influence the installation of warning devices at railroad crossings. Section (b)(4) stipulates that for crossings not meeting the criteria of 646.214(b)(3), the installation type is subject to FHWA approval. The preemptive effect of these regulations is highlighted by the Supreme Court's ruling in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, which determined that state tort law is preempted where federal requirements for warning device installation apply. The plaintiffs argue that the warning signs at the S. 24th Street crossing fall under the 'minimum protection' program, not the 'hazard program,' asserting that this distinction eliminates preemption due to the absence of a diagnostic team review. They also claim that since the crossing exhibited factors from 646.214(b)(3) but lacked flashing lights or gates, their claim remains valid. However, the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Shanklin clarified that preemption is not contingent on the program type but rather on the comprehensive scope of 646.214(b)(3) and (4), which applies to federally funded installations regardless of their classification. The federal standard for adequacy thus preempts state law, affirming that improvements made with federal funds displace state tort claims on the same subject.

Federal regulations dictate the installation and selection of warning devices at railroad crossings, displacing state law regarding their adequacy. The State's decision on which devices to install, such as not using automatic gates and flashing lights, is subject to Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) approval. Once the FHWA approved the project and the warning devices were installed with federal funds, Louisiana law concerning the same subject is preempted, leading to the proper dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim regarding inadequate warning devices.

In terms of train speed, federal regulation 49 C.F.R. 213.9(a) establishes maximum allowable speeds for freight and passenger trains based on track class, with the S. 24th Street crossing classified as a class three track, allowing a maximum speed of 40 miles per hour. The train involved was operating within this limit. The Supreme Court's decision in Easterwood confirms that federal regulations preempt state tort claims based on excessive train speed unless a state adopts more stringent regulations to address local safety hazards. The federal regulations govern train speed in relation to track conditions, including grade crossings, fully preempting any state law claims in this context. Plaintiffs' argument that a lack of analysis by a diagnostic team means federal regulation does not preempt state law is also addressed, reaffirming the supremacy of federal regulations.

The argument presented by Plaintiffs regarding the preemption of their state law claim by federal regulations is deemed without merit. Plaintiffs argue that the S. 24th Street crossing represented an "essentially local hazard" or "specific, individual hazard," which would not be preempted. They cite multiple hazards present on January 6, 1995, including obstructed sight lines and inoperative ditch lights. However, the court disagrees, stating that the conditions at the crossing do not meet the legal definition of a "specific, individual hazard." Citing precedent, the court explains that such hazards cannot be generalized statewide issues and must involve unforeseen objects not contemplated by federal regulators.

Negligence claims attempting to impose additional regulations on train speed are preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act. The court clarifies that while the speed of the train cannot be used as a basis for negligence claims, it may be discussed for illustrative purposes concerning other issues. Prior case law allows speed to inform discussions about the adequacy of warning signs at crossings, but not as a standalone claim of negligence.

The court reaffirms that most of the hazards alleged by Plaintiffs relate to conditions already considered by federal regulators when setting maximum train speeds. Additionally, previous rulings have established that common sight obstructions and inclement weather do not constitute a "specific, individual hazard." Consequently, the trial court's decision to grant Union Pacific's motion in limine, thus preempting the claims related to excessive train speed and inoperative ditch lights, is upheld.

The trial court's ruling is upheld, confirming that federal regulation under the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act (LBIA), 49 U.S.C. 20701 et seq., fully preempts state and local regulation of locomotive equipment. The Fifth Circuit previously established in United Transportation Union v. Foster that the LBIA is intended to comprehensively regulate railroad locomotive parts and appurtenances. The Supreme Court, in Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., reinforced this view, affirming that Congress aimed for the LBIA to occupy the entire field of locomotive equipment regulation. Further, the Ninth Circuit in Marshall v. Burlington Northern, Inc. acknowledged that the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) preserves the preemptive effect of the Boiler Inspection Act, leading to the conclusion that issues related to locomotive equipment, including operational aspects of ditch lights, are completely preempted.

The trial court’s finding regarding the preemption of inoperative ditch lights was deemed appropriate. While plaintiffs contended that the issue was the propriety of the train's continued operation after the ditch lights failed, it was determined that this matter still fell under federal preemption. Despite this, the court allowed plaintiffs to present evidence related to the ditch lights' purpose, their failure at the time of the accident, and UP's operational policies regarding such failures. The jury was instructed that non-functional ditch lights did not constitute a federal law violation but could consider this evidence in relation to UP's liability.

Regarding the plaintiffs' appeal on the denial of their summary judgment motion and the grant of preemption concerning inadequate warning devices, the court noted that such an appeal is not permissible under Louisiana law, as per La. C.C.P. Article 968. The appropriate recourse would have been to seek supervisory writs, which the plaintiffs failed to do.

In Smith v. Brooks, the court upheld the trial court's decisions regarding federal preemption, finding no merit in the related assignment of error. The plaintiffs challenged the jury instructions for the first time on appeal, arguing they were confusing and erroneous. However, the court noted that under La. C.C.P. art. 1793(C), a party must object to jury instructions either before the jury deliberates or immediately after deliberation begins to preserve the issue for appeal. The plaintiffs failed to timely object, thereby waiving the issue.

Despite this waiver, the plaintiffs contended that insufficient time to review the instructions warranted consideration of their assignment. La. C.C.P. art. 1793(B) mandates that parties be informed of the proposed jury instructions reasonably before closing arguments. The record indicated that all parties received preliminary instructions a day prior and final instructions hours before the required objections, which the court deemed reasonable.

Examining the specific jury instructions challenged, the court found they correctly reflected the trial court's prior rulings and applicable law, particularly regarding the railroad's obligations concerning signage and train speed set by federal regulations. The court concluded there was no error in the instructions, as they conveyed the legal principles adequately and did not mislead the jury. The trial court has discretion in jury instruction language, and absent an abuse of that discretion, the appellate court will not overturn the decision. In this case, no such abuse was found.

The court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial, as articulated in assignment of error number eight. Plaintiffs contended that the verdict contradicted the law and evidence, invoking Louisiana Civil Code of Procedure (La. C.C.P.) article 1971, which allows for a new trial under specific circumstances, including when the judgment is clearly contrary to the law and evidence or when newly discovered evidence arises. The court referenced previous case law, asserting that a trial court's denial of a new trial should only be overturned for an abuse of discretion. The court upheld the trial court's conclusions regarding preemption and found no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a new trial on those grounds.

Regarding the claim of newly discovered evidence, Plaintiffs argued that evidence about the funding for warning signs at a specific crossing indicated a mere compliance effort with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). The trial court deemed this evidence not genuinely new and irrelevant to the preemption ruling. Additionally, the court cited a recent decision affirming federal preemption, rendering this argument moot.

During the trial, a media campaign, Operation Lifesaver, aimed at promoting railroad crossing safety, raised concerns about potential bias in favor of railroads. The campaign's messaging, perceived as portraying train crews as victims while blaming motorists for accidents, was noted by the trial court and counsel for both parties. Plaintiffs' counsel requested a hearing to determine if jurors were aware of the campaign's messaging and whether it influenced them, suggesting that a juror's exposure to such materials could warrant striking the jury.

The trial court subpoenaed and reviewed videotapes of media coverage regarding the case, conducting a voir dire to assess whether jurors were influenced by the coverage. After determining the jury remained impartial, the trial proceeded with the Plaintiffs' counsel's agreement. Subsequent media exposure prompted additional voir dires, with jurors questioned by counsel, yet the trial court found no juror was tainted by the media. The Plaintiffs did not move for a mistrial but sought to strike the jury and have a judge serve as the trier of fact. The court's thorough examination of jurors and its conclusion of no juror taint were upheld, demonstrating no abuse of discretion. 

The Plaintiffs argued that new evidence indicated a stronger connection between UP and the Operation Lifesaver campaign, which they claimed was orchestrated to coincide with the trial. However, the trial court found this connection coincidental and determined that it did not warrant a new trial. The court maintained that the jury was not prejudiced by the media coverage, affirming its decision to deny the Plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or a new trial.

Additionally, the Plaintiffs challenged the involuntary dismissal of their claims against the City of Monroe, which argued it met its duty by providing appropriate warning signs and additional pavement markings. The trial court granted the dismissal with prejudice but did not provide reasons for its ruling.

The trial court possesses considerable discretion in deciding on motions for involuntary dismissal, requiring an assessment of all evidence based on the preponderance of the evidence. An appellate court will not reverse such a dismissal unless there is manifest error. To determine this, the appellate court assesses whether a reasonable factual basis exists for the trial court's findings and whether those findings are manifestly erroneous. In the case concerning the City of Monroe, the court found no manifest error in granting involuntary dismissal. The City acknowledged its responsibility regarding roadway safety and conditions but did not breach any duties related to the S. 24th Street crossing. The court noted that adequate warning devices were present, including non-mandatory pavement markings, and that an expert testified to an unobstructed view of the tracks from a distance of 24 feet. Although there had been six prior accidents at the crossing, the last occurred in 1987, well before the incident in question. Despite conflicting evidence, the appellate review confirmed a reasonable basis for the trial court's decision, leading to the affirmation of the judgment and the imposition of costs on the plaintiffs. A rehearing application was subsequently denied.

One of the train cars was removed before departure from McGehee, Arkansas, due to an unknown defect. The train was headed to Alexandria, Louisiana. Ditch lights, akin to headlights, are installed on train engines to enhance track visibility, particularly in poor weather conditions. The Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to preempt state laws. In United Transportation Union v. Foster, the Fifth Circuit outlined criteria for federal preemption, including explicit Congressional intent, actual conflict between laws, impossibility of compliance, barriers to state regulation, comprehensive federal legislation, and state laws obstructing federal objectives. Preemption can also arise from federal agency actions within their delegated authority. A critical consideration is whether Congress intended for federal regulations to supersede state law, which requires clear evidence of intent, particularly in the statute's text and structure.

The Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) aims to enhance railroad safety and reduce accidents, allowing the Secretary of Transportation to establish regulations and orders for safety. The FRSA specifies that safety laws must be nationally uniform where feasible, permitting states to maintain or adopt laws until federal regulations are issued, provided they address local safety hazards, do not conflict with federal laws, and do not unreasonably impede interstate commerce. In response to UP's motion in limine, the plaintiffs claimed that their case differed from Easterwood due to conflicting evidence regarding track classification at the S. 24th Street crossing. However, this argument was not pursued on appeal. The Third Circuit, in a related case (Cart), upheld that state classifications on tracks subject to the FRSA are precluded by federal regulations, supporting the classification of the track in question as class three with a speed limit of 40 miles per hour.

Plaintiffs argue that the classification of the track should differ, but this does not affect federal preemption regarding the train's excessive speed. They acknowledge that most relevant cases have rejected exceptions to preemption based solely on an "essentially local hazard." Consequently, the focus shifts to Plaintiffs' primary appeal argument regarding a "specific, individual hazard." Evidence of the train's speed was presented for illustrative purposes rather than to establish negligence. At the time of the accident, there was an interim rule permitting locomotives to be equipped with additional external lights for better visibility. Plaintiffs also challenged the trial court's jury instructions, which will be addressed later. Furthermore, the trial court's handling of a motion for mistrial related to Plaintiffs' mention of Operation Lifesaver was deemed not erroneous, despite procedural missteps, as the denial of the mistrial request was justified.