Lowe v. Broward County

Citations: 766 So. 2d 1199; 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 11893; 2000 WL 1345513Docket: 4D99-1664

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; September 20, 2000; Florida; State Appellate Court

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The case of Lawrence Lowe v. Broward County addresses the constitutionality of the Broward County Domestic Partnership Act under the Florida Constitution. The ordinance, enacted in January 1999 and effective April 27, 1999, aims to recognize domestic partnerships and extend employment benefits to domestic partners. The Board of County Commissioners found that many individuals form significant personal relationships that are often unrecognized in terms of benefits, leading to discrimination against domestic partners in employment contexts. 

The Act defines "domestic partners" as two adults who meet specific requirements, including being at least 18 years old, not currently married or in another domestic partnership, not related by blood, and consenting to the partnership without coercion. Additionally, partners must agree to share responsibility for basic necessities. A domestic partner is considered a "dependent" for benefits purposes if they are supported by the county employee's earnings. The court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance, declaring it valid except for one severable section.

A "valid domestic partnership relationship" can be established by filing a declaration with the Broward County Records Division, adhering to the Act's requirements. Termination of the partnership can occur via a notarized declaration filed with the same division, or automatically upon one partner marrying or dying. The Act extends benefits to domestic partners and their dependents similar to those afforded to spouses, including insurance coverage and leave options for county employees. Domestic partners also have visitation rights in various facilities and can be designated as health care surrogates or preneed guardians. 

Lawrence Lowe filed a declaratory judgment action in February 1999, claiming the Domestic Partnership Act (DPA) violated Article VIII, Section 1(g) of the Florida Constitution. The county argued that Lowe lacked standing, but the circuit judge determined he had standing, a decision unchallenged by the county. The trial court later dismissed Lowe's constitutional challenge and denied his requests for relief. Lowe argues that the DPA oversteps state authority and conflicts with existing Florida law. The appellate court reviews the constitutionality of statutes de novo, presuming ordinances valid unless proven otherwise. Counties derive powers from the state and, as a charter county, Broward County's powers are defined under Article VIII, Section 1(g), which has been broadly interpreted by the supreme court.

Counties in Florida have been granted extensive self-governing powers under Section 125.01 of the Florida Statutes (1999), which allows them to manage their own governance and implies authority to employ personnel. The statute is intended to be broadly interpreted to enhance counties' home rule powers as authorized by the State Constitution. Lowe's constitutional argument references City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, asserting that the Act is invalid since it intrudes into areas of statewide concern, particularly domestic relations. The Fleetwood Hotel case established that local governments cannot legislate on matters inherently reserved for the state, such as landlord-tenant relationships. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the rent control ordinance was unconstitutional for overstepping municipal powers. Lowe contends that any county ordinance affecting domestic relations constitutes a constitutional violation, advocating for a minimal threshold for such violations. However, the argument suggests a more appropriate standard would invalidate local ordinances only if they significantly concern state matters. The Act in question does not encroach upon existing marital rights or alter the legal recognition of marriage in Florida. This contrasts with the Fleetwood Hotel case, where the ordinance imposed restrictions on landlord-tenant contracts. Courts have recognized the state's strong interests in domestic relations law, emphasizing the duty to support families and the public policy favoring the natural family unit.

Domestic relations law establishes state interests in family units, imposing rights and obligations irrespective of individual preferences, often prioritizing state interests over privacy rights within marriage. The Act does not provide the extensive statutory rights granted to traditional marriages, such as joint adoption, property rights, alimony, and certain tax benefits. It fails to endorse non-traditional relationships to the same extent as marriage under Florida Statutes Chapter 741, and does not create a "new marriage-like relationship," as claimed by Lowe. The Act is based on mutual agreement, making it contractual rather than a legal relationship with lasting obligations. The conclusion is that the Act does not significantly intrude on state matters and aligns with similar legislative challenges that found no constitutional violations. It primarily extends employment benefits and visitation rights, enabling county competition with private sectors in providing benefits to cohabiting same-sex couples. The court asserts that the appropriateness of the Act as a political decision should be evaluated through democratic processes rather than judicial review. Lowe's argument regarding inconsistency with Article VIII, Section 1(g) is addressed by outlining two ways an ordinance may conflict with state law: direct conflict and legislative preemption in specific subject areas.

Lowe asserts that section 741.212 of the Florida Statutes (1999) preempts the Domestic Partnership Act (DPA). This statute explicitly states: 1) Same-sex marriages and relationships recognized as marriages in any jurisdiction are not recognized in Florida; 2) Florida and its subdivisions will not recognize any public act or judicial proceeding related to such marriages or relationships; 3) "Marriage" is defined solely as a union between one man and one woman, and "spouse" refers only to a member of such a union. The statute specifically targets same-sex marriages and does not allow for a "marriage-like relationship" under the DPA, which extends limited employment benefits and is not exclusive to same-sex couples. The DPA does not confer the full rights and obligations of traditional marriage. The motivation behind section 741.212 was a concern that the federal full faith and credit clause would compel Florida to acknowledge same-sex marriages recognized by other states, reinforcing the traditional definition of marriage. Consequently, the DPA's domestic partnership does not equate to a "marriage" or "relationship treated as a marriage" as per section 741.212, indicating no direct conflict or express preemption. Additionally, Lowe claims that the DPA's provision of health insurance benefits for domestic partners is preempted by section 112.08(2)(a), which permits local governments to provide insurance for employees and their dependents, arguing that the statute’s language implies the exclusion of domestic partners as unmentioned categories.

The principle of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, does not apply in this case due to the ambiguous nature of the term "dependents," which lacks a precise definition. Lowe's reliance on Farmer v. Broward County is misplaced, as the language in Farmer was more specific than that in section 112.08(2)(a), where "dependents" is vague. Lowe also contends that domestic partners under the Domestic Partnership Act (DPA) do not qualify as "dependents" under section 112.08(2)(a), which is not explicitly defined in that statute. Other Florida statutes illustrate that the legislature can define "dependent" when desired, indicating an intent to allow flexibility for local governments in developing insurance plans. The plain meaning of "dependent" includes reliance on another for support, which the DPA incorporates when defining domestic partners. This definition aligns with the term's ordinary meaning in section 112.08 and is not expressly preempted by it.

Lowe cites Connors v. City of Boston, where a domestic partnership law conflicted with a statute defining "dependents." However, this case is distinguishable because section 112.08 does not impose similar limitations on the County's ability to extend benefits to domestic partners. Additionally, Lowe argues that section 16½-158(c) of the DPA conflicts with section 765.401, which establishes a priority order for health care decision-makers. Section 16½-158(c) grants domestic partners equal rights with spouses in making health care decisions, which contradicts the established order in section 765.401. The DPA includes a severability provision, allowing the court to conclude that section 16½-158(c) can be severed from the rest of the DPA without invalidating the entire Act.

Severability is a judicial doctrine that allows courts to uphold the constitutionality of legislative acts by removing only unconstitutional parts, thereby respecting the separation of powers and legislative authority. In this case, the court found that the Domestic Partnership Act (DPA) maintains its primary intent—promoting employee recruitment, retention, and loyalty—despite any unconstitutional provisions. The court rejected Lowe's argument that the DPA violates Florida Statutes section 741.211, which prohibits recognition of common law marriages. It clarified that a common law marriage requires cohabitation and mutual intent to be married, whereas the DPA does not create a traditional marital relationship. 

Additionally, the court upheld the legality of section 798.02, which criminalizes cohabitation without marriage, stating no conflict exists between this statute and the DPA's benefits since these do not hinge on sexual relationships. Lowe's claim that Title XLIII of the Florida Statutes preempts the DPA was also dismissed; the DPA does not establish a new marital relationship, thus not infringing on state jurisdiction. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment but deemed section 16½-158(c) unconstitutional as it conflicts with section 765.401. It certified the question of whether the DPA violates Florida constitutional provisions regarding state concerns and statutory consistency for supreme court review. The ruling was affirmed in part and reversed in part, with concurrence from Judges Dell and Polen.

Individuals in domestic partnerships often face challenges in accessing public and private sector benefits due to the lack of a formal registration system for these relationships. Consequently, domestic partners frequently do not receive certain employment benefits available to other employees. The Broward County Board of County Commissioners recognizes that employment benefits are a crucial component of employee compensation, with over 30% of total compensation attributed to benefits, as noted by the U.S. Census Bureau. A 1994 survey highlighted that 67% of employees would sacrifice part of their salary in exchange for maintaining their benefits. 

In 1994, over 3 million Americans identified as being in domestic partnerships, prompting an increase in employers offering domestic partner benefits. The Board asserts that providing these benefits enhances employee recruitment, retention, and loyalty while promoting fairness and addressing discrimination based on marital status. 

The Act is designed to support public safety, health, and welfare in Broward County, and its provisions should align with existing federal, state, and county laws. Definitions included in the Act clarify key terms: "Business" encompasses various private entities, "Contractor" refers to businesses with contracts from Broward County, and "County employee" includes active or retired employees eligible for benefits. A "Declaration of Domestic Partnership" is a sworn form certifying eligibility for such partnerships, while "Domestic Partners" are defined as two adults in a valid partnership. The term "Dependent" relates to the domestic partner of a County employee, determined by financial support from the employee.

Dependency regarding domestic partnership benefits is not contingent upon the dependent's ability to support themselves independently or their employment status. A "dependent of an employee" refers to individuals eligible for coverage under the County's insurance plans. "Jointly Responsible" indicates that domestic partners agree to provide each other with basic food and shelter during the partnership, without the requirement for equal contributions.

To establish a valid domestic partnership in Broward County, two individuals must file a declaration with the County Records Division, meeting specific criteria: both must be at least 18 years old, not married or in another partnership, not blood relatives, and consenting without coercion. Additionally, both partners must agree to be jointly responsible for each other's basic needs. Amendments to the partnership certificate for name changes are permitted, but a new partnership cannot be entered into until 30 days after terminating a previous one.

Termination of a registered domestic partnership can occur through a notarized declaration filed with the County Records Division, which requires payment of a fee and becomes effective 30 days after issuance. The partnership automatically terminates if either partner marries or upon the death of either partner.

The Broward County Records Division is responsible for establishing the forms for declarations, amendments, and certificates related to registered domestic partnerships, and it will maintain a record of these documents. The County Administrator can set filing fees for these documents, subject to County Commission approval, and the fees must cover the administrative costs. 

County employees in registered domestic partnerships are entitled to elect insurance coverage for their domestic partners or dependents on the same basis as for spouses, with coverage decisions limited to twice per plan year. They can also use various types of leave to care for their domestic partners or dependents, following applicable county rules. Furthermore, all benefits available to spouses and dependents must also be accessible to domestic partners unless restricted by state or federal law. 

The County Administrator must implement these provisions by January 1, 2000. Additionally, when procuring goods or services, a 1% preference may be granted to contractors who provide nondiscriminatory benefits to domestic partners, except where contrary to federal or state law.

In public works contracts, a one percent preference may be given to contractors who provide nondiscriminatory benefits for domestic partners, unless overridden by federal or state law. For purchases of personal property and services evaluated through competitive selection, a ten percent preference can be similarly granted to contractors supporting nondiscrimination for domestic partners. These preferences do not restrict the Board of County Commissioners' authority to assess the quality of materials or qualifications of bidders and do not limit other legally permissible preferences.

In licensed health care or residential facilities, if visitor restrictions are in place, patients or residents can designate individuals, including domestic partners and their family members, to visit them, unless no visitors are allowed or the facility deems a visitor a safety risk. If no designation is made, domestic partners and their family members are still permitted to visit under the same conditions. Domestic partners have visitation rights equal to those of spouses and can make health care decisions for the patient or resident unless a valid power of attorney exists.

Individuals in a registered domestic partnership have the same rights as others to be designated as health care surrogates for their partners, allowing them to make health care decisions, manage consent for treatment, apply for public benefits, and authorize admissions or transfers in health care facilities. Such designation cannot be denied based solely on the individual's status as a domestic partner.

Individuals in a registered domestic partnership have equal rights to designate and serve as preneed guardians for their incapacitated partner, as outlined in Florida Statutes. A domestic partner cannot be denied the role of plenary guardian solely based on their relationship status if the incapacitated partner has not designated a valid preneed guardian. Additionally, domestic partners are entitled to visitation rights at county correctional and juvenile detention facilities under the same conditions as spouses and close family members. This right extends to the children of the domestic partners and the domestic partners of the inmate's family. Furthermore, in situations requiring notification of family members, such as emergencies, the term "family" includes domestic partners. Notes clarify that the Domestic Partnership Act's relevant sections are in the case appendix, define "dependent" in relation to domestic partnership benefits, and address procedural aspects regarding standing in the lawsuit, including references to prior case law and statutes that discuss dependents and insurance coverage eligibility.