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National Investors Life & Casualty Insurance v. Arrowood
Citations: 606 S.W.2d 97; 270 Ark. 617; 1980 Ark. App. LEXIS 1470Docket: CA 80-164
Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas; October 8, 1980; Arkansas; State Appellate Court
The case involves an appeal regarding the interpretation of two homeowner's insurance policies held by National Investors Life and Casualty Insurance Company and American National Property and Casualty Company. The central questions are whether bodily injury to Sandra Arrowood, caused by her former husband James Arrowood, is covered under the policies, and whether the residence where the incident occurred is covered. The insurance companies argue that Sandra's injury was intentional, thus excluding liability coverage, and claim that the home is not covered under one policy due to specific language. The trial court ruled that the insurance companies did not meet their burden of proving the applicability of the exclusions. The appellate court found this judgment to be against the preponderance of the evidence. On September 5, 1979, Sandra was shot in the thigh by James with a .38 caliber pistol at 2911 Pamela Drive, a home awarded to Sandra in their divorce decree. Their tumultuous marriage was marked by violence, including a severe beating in March 1979, leading Sandra to fear for her life and pursue a divorce. Despite the divorce, James occasionally stayed at Sandra's home, creating ongoing tensions related to jealousy and their attempts at reconciliation. The night before the shooting, Sandra returned home late from a date to find James outside her home. After a brief conversation about their relationship, James called his father to pick him up, but the reason for this behavior was unclear. The next morning, James returned to continue discussions with Sandra. Sandra Arrowood described an incident where James Arrowood, appearing calm and unagitated, accidentally shot her while they were in her bedroom. Initially unaware of her injury, she later realized she had been shot and requested a towel for the bleeding. James expressed surprise and remorse, claiming he did not mean to shoot her. They both sought medical assistance, with James calling his parents before leaving for the hospital. James, however, had no recollection of the events surrounding the shooting, attributing his memory loss to taking Valium. He mentioned owning the pistol for several years and that it required deliberate action to discharge. Following the incident, Sandra filed a damage suit against James, alongside pending criminal charges. James sought defense from two insurance companies under homeowner's policies. Both companies undertook the defense under a reservation of rights but subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing that their policies excluded liability for intentional acts and injuries occurring outside insured premises. The trial court ruled that the exclusions did not apply, asserting that the companies failed to prove their case. The court declared that liability coverage existed under the policies and mandated the insurance companies to defend James and cover any judgment against him. The insurance companies appealed, contending that the injury was intended or expected by James, thus falling under the exclusions. They argued that the facts strongly indicated an intentional act rather than an accident. The trial court's judgment was found to be unsupported by the evidence presented. There is a lack of legal precedent within the jurisdiction regarding the intent behind actions in insurance policy cases, although similar cases exist in other jurisdictions. Generally, coverage exists for unintended results of intentional acts but not for injuries that were intended to be inflicted. Several cases illustrate that if an intentional act results in an unintended injury, coverage may still apply, as seen in Lyons v. Hartford Insurance Group and Smith v. Moran, where unintended victims were covered despite the intentional nature of the acts. Conversely, coverage is denied when the injury caused by an intentional act was also intended, as established in various cases including Terito v. McAndrew. The critical issue in the present case is whether the act of firing the gun was intentional, which if affirmed, also confirms that the resulting injury was intentional. Importantly, an explicit acknowledgment of intent is not deemed necessary, and the determination hinges on examining the entire context of the incident. James Arrowood had a controlling demeanor towards Sandra, disapproving of her dating other men, which she actively did, including a date the night before a significant incident. James sought reconciliation, but Sandra was hesitant. The situation escalated when James brought a loaded pistol into Sandra's home to discuss their relationship. Sandra witnessed James holding the gun just before being shot. She favored pursuing criminal charges due to the incident. Notably, James had a history of violent behavior towards Sandra, with a severe incident occurring in March where he choked her, leading to her fear for her life. The case highlights James's established pattern of violence, which aligns with the events of September 5. Despite James's claims of not intending to harm Sandra and his inability to recall the incident, the evidence strongly suggests intentional harm rather than an accident. His lack of memory raises questions about his ability to assert his intentions. Although Sandra testified that James expressed immediate remorse after the shooting, the overall evidence favors an interpretation of intentionality over accidental harm. Therefore, the court concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly supports the notion that James intended to injure Sandra, rendering the previous ruling clearly erroneous. The case is reversed and remanded for judgment in line with this opinion, with Justice Howard dissenting.