United States v. Headman

Citations: 594 F.3d 1179; 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 2382; 2010 WL 381622Docket: 09-1033

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; February 4, 2010; Federal Appellate Court

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Isaac Headman was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, and kidnapping. He appeals, arguing that double jeopardy precludes his convictions for both felony murder and the lesser-included offense of kidnapping, that the government failed to disclose a cell-sharing arrangement between two witnesses in violation of Brady v. Maryland, and that the district court did not inform the jury that the intoxication instruction applied to aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder. 

The appellate court, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, affirms in part and reverses in part, agreeing with Headman on the double jeopardy issue and stating that either the felony murder or kidnapping conviction must be vacated on remand. However, the court rejects Headman's other claims, finding that he did not demonstrate the cell-sharing arrangement was material evidence, nor did he show that the lack of clarity regarding the intoxication instruction constituted plain error.

The murder occurred on August 23, 2007, when Clifton Joseph Greany was killed after a night of drinking with Headman and others. Following an argument, Headman and others attacked Greany, ultimately leading to his death from multiple stab wounds and blunt-force injuries. Witnesses later provided statements implicating Headman and others, with some agreeing to plea deals in exchange for reduced sentences and cooperation with the prosecution.

The defendant, an Indian, faced charges of premeditated murder, felony murder based on kidnapping, and kidnapping, all occurring within Indian territory. The trial commenced on September 15, 2008. Prior to opening statements, the court invoked Fed. R. Evid. 615, requiring most witnesses to leave the courtroom to prevent testimony discussion, although the defendant and certain exempt witnesses could remain. Unbeknownst to the defense, key government witnesses, Watts and Williams, had been sharing a cell since September 4, continuing until after their testimonies. Williams testified on September 16, claiming the defendant handed her a knife, which she used to stab the victim, Greany, in the neck, but did not confirm if others also participated in the stabbing. On cross-examination, she stated she only discussed her testimony with her attorney, the prosecutor, and law enforcement. Watts followed with differing details, claiming she held the knife to Greany’s throat while Williams attempted to stab him. Watts added that the defendant had expressed concern about Greany reporting the incident and mentioned having to kill him. During cross-examination, Watts identified another individual involved in the discussion about killing Greany. The defense counsel questioned Watts about her preparation for testimony, to which she responded negatively. The defendant proposed an intoxication defense instruction, which the court accepted, despite government objections. On September 22, the defendant was convicted of all charges. After the testimonies of Williams and Watts, the defense was informed that the witnesses had shared a cell, leading to a motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, claiming a violation of the sequestration order. The defense argued that the witnesses likely conferred about their testimonies, despite their denials during cross-examination.

The government refuted claims that witnesses Williams and Watts improperly conferred prior to their testimonies, submitting affidavits from both stating they were instructed by their attorneys and the prosecutor not to discuss their testimonies with one another. Williams affirmed she did not discuss her testimony or the associated questions with Watts post-testimony, while Watts similarly confirmed she had no knowledge of Williams's testimony before her own. The district court evaluated these affidavits alongside cross-examination testimonies, concluding that there was no evidence of collusion affecting their trial testimonies. The court noted the defense failed to provide specific facts regarding any violations of the sequestration order or any dishonesty in their testimonies, leading to a denial of the Defendant’s motion without an evidentiary hearing.

On appeal, two issues were contested: whether the government's failure to disclose the cell-sharing arrangement of witnesses constituted a Brady violation, and whether the district court erred in its jury instructions regarding the intoxication defense. Under the Brady doctrine, the prosecution must not suppress evidence favorable to the defense, which includes both impeachment and exculpatory evidence. The Defendant claimed that the undisclosed cell-sharing arrangement could have undermined the credibility of Williams and Watts, suggesting potential collusion. However, he had not previously raised a Brady claim in district court, focusing instead on a Rule 615 violation. Consequently, the appellate review will assess for plain error, requiring the Defendant to demonstrate the existence of an error that is clear, affects substantial rights, and undermines the integrity of judicial proceedings.

The claim of a Brady violation is rejected due to the failure to demonstrate that undisclosed information was material. The district court found no evidence that witnesses Williams and Watts discussed the case or that their testimony was influenced by any improper conversations. Without such evidence, there is no reasonable probability that revealing their cell-sharing arrangement would have altered the trial's outcome. Although the defense suggested that the witnesses might have coordinated their testimonies, their affidavits state they were instructed not to discuss their testimonies and both denied having done so. The defense's argument regarding potential "cleanup" of testimony is unsupported by the trial record, which shows consistency in Watts’ statements attributing remarks to Taylor rather than the Defendant. While disclosure of the cell-sharing arrangement would have been preferable, it did not constitute a due process violation.

On the issue of jury instructions, the Defendant, convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, claims a potential wrongful conviction as an aider and abettor due to the absence of specific instructions about intoxication as a defense to aiding and abetting. Although he acknowledges failing to raise this issue at trial, he requests plain error review. The government argues that he waived the issue since he submitted the intoxication instruction used by the court. However, the court finds it unnecessary to resolve this dispute, as the Defendant has not demonstrated plain error, which requires showing that an error occurred, was plain, affected substantial rights, and undermined the fairness of judicial proceedings.

Defendant argues on appeal that jurors were not informed that intoxication could serve as a defense to aiding and abetting, potentially leading to his conviction for aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder despite reasonable doubt regarding his sobriety and intent. The review includes jury instructions related to first-degree premeditated murder, aiding and abetting, and intoxication. The instruction for first-degree murder outlines that to convict, the jury must find four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant caused the victim's death; (2) the killing was done with malice aforethought; (3) the killing was premeditated; and (4) it occurred within U.S. jurisdiction. Malice aforethought can be established without proof of hatred or ill will, focusing instead on the defendant's intentionality or disregard for human life. Premeditation is defined as requiring sufficient time for the defendant to be fully conscious of the intent to kill, with all surrounding circumstances considered. 

The aiding and abetting instruction states that under 18 U.S.C. § 2, a person can be criminally liable for aiding or abetting another in committing a crime if two elements are proven: (1) another person committed the charged crime, and (2) the defendant intentionally associated with and participated in the crime. Aiding and abetting does not require the defendant to perform the crime, be present during its commission, or know all details; however, mere suspicion or passive presence is inadequate to establish liability.

The intoxication-defense instruction indicates that while intoxication alone cannot excuse a crime, it may negate specific intent, which is necessary for first-degree murder. If the jury doubts that the defendant could form specific intent due to intoxication, they must acquit him of first-degree murder. The defendant argues that the instructions did not adequately connect the intoxication defense to the aiding and abetting charge, asserting that the jury would have to make a significant inferential leap to understand that intoxication could negate the intent required for aiding and abetting first-degree murder. The court disagrees, holding that when reading all instructions together, the defendant failed to demonstrate that any potential error was "plain." The aiding and abetting instruction requires the jury to find that the defendant intentionally participated in the crime, implying that he acted with premeditation. Additionally, the intoxication instruction emphasizes that premeditation is necessary for first-degree murder, which includes aiding and abetting. Therefore, the court concludes that premeditation is required for both committing and aiding and abetting first-degree murder under the indictment.

The intoxication instruction indicates that being intoxicated at the time of a crime can negate the specific intent required for first-degree murder, which includes premeditation. This means that the intent necessary for aiding and abetting first-degree murder can also be negated by intoxication. However, the instruction clarifies that intoxication does not negate the intent for second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. While the instruction does not explicitly mention aiding and abetting, it implies that the intoxication defense applies equally to both principals and aiders and abettors. There is no error in the instructions regarding the applicability of intoxication to aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder, despite the suggestion that clearer language could have been used. The case cited by the Defendant, United States v. Sayetsitty, is distinguishable as it dealt with a failure to instruct on the intoxication defense for aiding and abetting second-degree murder, highlighting a difference in the treatment of principals and aiders and abettors. The court affirms the Defendant's conviction for first-degree premeditated murder and remands the case for the district court to vacate either the felony murder or kidnapping conviction.