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Matter of Will of Griffin

Citation: 411 So. 2d 766Docket: 53042

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; March 23, 1982; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

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In the case of *In the Matter of the Last Will and Testament of James H. Griffin*, the Supreme Court of Mississippi addressed a dispute regarding the distribution of the estate of the deceased, James H. Griffin. The petitioners, James I. Lowry and others, sought clarification on the will's language concerning the distribution of assets among the testator's nieces and nephews. The will stated that the property should be divided among the named nieces and nephews "in equal shares, per stirpes and not per capita." 

The central issue was whether the legatees should inherit in equal shares or through per stirpes representation based on their deceased parents, the testator’s siblings. At the time of Griffin's death, he had no children and all his siblings had predeceased him, leaving ten nieces and nephews. The petitioners argued that the will intended for them to inherit by representation, while the executor and other respondents contended that the legatees should share equally without regard to their parental lineage. 

The trial court interpreted the will to mean that the legatees should share equally, disregarding the phrase "per stirpes and not per capita." The appellants sought a reversal, asserting that the language of the will was clear, indicating that distribution should occur per stirpes. The court's role was to discern and implement the testator's intent by considering the entire will rather than isolated phrases. The case presents a novel legal question regarding the interpretation of the will's language concerning equal shares and per stirpes distribution.

The argument presented contends that reading the will without the phrase "per stirpes and not per capita" would misinterpret the testator's intent and violate legal principles that avoid striking language from a will unless necessary. Established cases emphasize that courts must ascertain the testator's intent from the will's language and the circumstances at execution. The appellants recognize that naming heirs generally implies a per capita intent but argue that a clear per stirpes intent can be inferred from the will's context. They assert that the phrase "in equal shares," when combined with "per stirpes and not per capita," indicates the testator's intention to distribute shares equally among groups (specifically, the heirs of deceased siblings). However, the counterargument highlights that the lack of specific mention of deceased siblings by name creates a presumption that the testator intended equal shares among the named nieces and nephews, rather than a division reflecting per stirpes representation. The term "per stirpes," defined as inheritance by representation, is typically assumed to be used in its legal sense unless explicitly contradicted in the will. Legal precedents suggest that when beneficiaries are categorized broadly, the presumption is for per stirpes distribution, which can be overridden only by clear language indicating otherwise.

Per capita refers to distribution "by the head," while per stirpes means distribution "by the roots" or by representation. Generally, a will's equal division suggests a per capita gift rather than per stirpes. The appellees argue that "per stirpes" applies only to substituted legatees and not to primary legatees named in the will, supporting their claim with In Re Ives' Estate, where the will specified that the property should be distributed to nephews and nieces "share and share alike per stirpes not per capita." The court found that the use of "share and share alike" indicated equal shares among the primary legatees, with "per stirpes" not relating back to their ancestors, meaning the nephews and nieces were to take as purchasers. Similarly, in Johnson v. Swann, the Maryland court ruled that "per stirpes" applies to substitutions for deceased primary legatees, not to the designated legatees themselves. This principle was echoed in St. Louis Union Trust Company v. Greenough, which confirmed that "per stirpes" describes the distribution method for substituted legatees, reinforcing that it is not appropriate for primary legatees.

The court concludes that the phrase "per stirpes and not per capita" in a will applies solely to substituted legatees, rather than to named devisees and their shares. The appellants argue for a retrospective application based on state case law, referencing several cases to support their position. However, the court finds these cases do not clearly support such an application. It notes that a general rule exists where a bequest to "heirs" implies a per stirpes distribution unless indicated otherwise. The court rejects the appellants' argument, stating that adopting a retrospective per stirpes application would contradict the testator's intention for his nephews and nieces to inherit equally. The will does not mention the deceased siblings of the testator, reinforcing the court's interpretation that the phrase ensures that if a named devisee predeceases the testator, their share would pass to their heirs per stirpes according to descent laws. This interpretation preserves the testator's intent and avoids potential issues with lapsed legacies. The trial court's decision is affirmed.