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Alabama State Bar Ass'n v. RW Lynch Co.
Citations: 655 So. 2d 982; 1995 Ala. LEXIS 65; 1995 WL 52995Docket: 1931408
Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; February 9, 1995; Alabama; State Supreme Court
R.W. Lynch Company, Inc. and attorney Robert H. Ford initiated a declaratory judgment action in Montgomery Circuit Court to assess the compliance of their television advertisement with Rule 7.2(c) of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct. The Alabama State Bar Association (the Bar) had previously deemed an earlier version of the advertisement as violating the rule, which prohibits lawyers from giving anything of value for recommending their services, except for the costs of permitted advertising and non-profit referral service fees. The Bar appealed a trial court ruling that found the advertisement compliant. The advertisement, created by Lynch, a California attorney advertising agency, is part of the "Injury Helpline" program, designed for personal injury claims. It explicitly states that it is funded by sponsoring attorneys and clarifies it is not a lawyer referral service. Interested callers provide limited information, which is forwarded to the attorney corresponding to their geographical area based on their Zip Code. In 1989, the Bar had previously ruled a similar "Injury Helpline" advertisement as a "for-profit referral service," which violated older regulations. After making minor adjustments, Lynch sought a new review in 1992, which the Bar denied, prompting the current legal action. The trial court focused on whether the advertisement constituted permissible group advertising or an impermissible lawyer referral service, with the Bar arguing that the use of an answering service rendered it a referral service beyond their jurisdiction. Lawyer advertising, while potentially distasteful, does not apply negatively to the 'Injury Helpline,' as no allegations have been made against it. Evidence indicates that 'Injury Helpline' serves as a permissible group advertising program rather than a lawyer referral service, despite the Bar's claims. The Bar's lack of jurisdiction over an out-of-state answering service does not alter this conclusion. The Montgomery Circuit Court has the authority to review Bar actions, and interested parties can seek declaratory judgments on Bar rules. The Bar's assertion that 'Injury Helpline' operates as a for-profit referral service in violation of Rule 7.2 is unfounded. The commercial reviewed by the court is compliant with the rule, as it clearly identifies itself as a paid advertisement for attorneys, does not screen calls or assess callers' legal needs, and forwards calls solely based on geographical location. This aligns with the American Bar Association's definition of lawyer referral services, which focus on unbiased attorney referrals based on client needs. Attorneys who fund the 'Injury Helpline' advertisement are the sole contacts for callers regarding their legal issues. These attorneys pay a flat fee for advertising, independent of call volume or types of calls received. The 'Injury Helpline' serves as a cost-effective collective advertising strategy enabling lawyers to enhance their visibility. The trial court's judgment is upheld, with all judges concurring except for Justice Maddox, who dissents. Justice Houston, while concurring, expresses concerns about the appropriateness of selecting legal representation during brief advertising breaks but acknowledges the Supreme Court's recognition of lawyer advertising as protected commercial speech under the First Amendment. He emphasizes that the State Bar has not proven the advertisement to be inaccurate or unlawful, and argues that any restrictions must be justified by a substantial state interest. Houston points out that the burden of proof lies with the party advocating for the restriction. Justice Maddox, dissenting, notes the evolving landscape of lawyer advertising since the Bates decision and highlights the Supreme Court's pending review of a related case, suggesting that the outcome may impact the regulation of attorney advertising. He advocates for postponing a decision in this case until the Supreme Court rules on the Florida Bar case.