State v. Hathaway

Citation: 411 So. 2d 1074Docket: 80-KA-2516

Court: Supreme Court of Louisiana; March 11, 1982; Louisiana; State Supreme Court

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Defendant Anthony Hathaway was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon under La.R.S. 14:95.1. Initially pleading not guilty, he later changed his plea to guilty during jury selection while reserving the right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The plea was made following a Boykin Examination, confirming Hathaway's understanding and waiver of rights, including self-incrimination and trial by jury. He was sentenced to four years at hard labor without objection during the proceedings. 

On appeal, Hathaway raised two assignments of error: first, that the Bill of Information did not charge a crime as the statute allegedly exempted him from liability; second, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during what he claimed was an unlawful arrest. The suppression hearing revealed that police acted on information from a reliable informant about Joseph Woods, a known narcotics user, who would be delivering drugs and carrying a gun. Upon arrival, officers observed Woods and Hathaway with Vincent Vantress, and when approached, Hathaway and Vantress fled into a residence. Officer Bethay, after forcing entry, found Hathaway with a revolver, which he dropped upon command. Vantress was also found with a gun and a syringe was recovered from a toilet. Hathaway had a prior felony conviction for murder and attempted murder from 1964.

Defendant's first assignment of error claims that the Bill of Information is flawed because it charges him with a crime under R.S. 14:95.1, which he argues does not apply to him due to statutory exemptions. R.S. 14:95.1 prohibits firearm possession by individuals convicted of first or second degree murder, but also specifies that it does not apply to those who have not committed a felony for ten years post-sentence. The defendant argues that the statute's language is vague, preventing him from adequately understanding the charges against him, and he asserts that it requires evidence of an intervening felony within ten years to establish liability. This interpretation is countered by established case law, which indicates that only one prior felony is necessary for the statute to apply.

Additionally, the defendant contends that the Bill of Information lacks evidence showing when he was relieved of the ten-year liability stipulated by R.S. 14:95.1. His previous conviction for murder and attempted murder occurred in 1964, and while his counsel indicated a desire to plead guilty while reserving the right to appeal a motion to suppress, the defendant forfeited the right to contest non-jurisdictional defects by changing his plea. The state is required to prove not only that the defendant possessed a firearm but also the completion date of his previous sentence, a burden which was not met due to the guilty plea. During a preliminary hearing, there was a stipulation acknowledging prior felony convictions relevant to R.S. 14:95.1.

Defense attorneys stipulate that their clients have prior convictions relevant to statutory provisions but clarify that this stipulation does not imply guilt. The court acknowledges this stipulation and considers the entire record, including a preliminary hearing, to determine the merits of the defendants' contentions, ultimately finding assignment of error number one without merit.

In assignment of error number two, the defendant argues that the gun was seized following an unlawful arrest due to an improper stop, warrantless search, and arrest without probable cause. According to the Code of Criminal Procedure Article 213, police may arrest without a warrant if they have reasonable cause to believe a crime has been committed. The case notes that Officer Bethay witnessed Anthony Hathaway pointing a gun, constituting an assault and justifying a warrantless arrest if the preceding actions were lawful. 

The legality of the officer's entry into Hathaway's apartment is examined; warrantless entries are only permissible under narrow exceptions, such as 'hot pursuit' or 'exigent circumstances.' For these exceptions to apply, the officer must have probable cause to arrest before pursuing the suspect. The document concludes that if probable cause existed for either Hathaway or Vantress, the entry into the apartment was justified. The text references similar cases to clarify the standards for warrantless arrests and the necessity for reasonable cause based on trustworthy information. An informant's tip can establish reasonable cause for detaining and questioning a suspect.

In State v. Bolden, the court addressed the standards for reasonable cause in investigatory stops based on an informant's tip, emphasizing that both the informant's reliability and the information's credibility must be established, or corroboration from independent sources may suffice. According to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 215.1, officers can stop individuals they reasonably suspect of committing a crime and demand identification and explanations. Reasonable cause requires articulable facts suggesting criminal activity, which is less stringent than probable cause. In this case, the suspicious behavior of Joseph Woods, combined with a reliable informant's tip and his association with a known narcotic user, justified the stop and detention of Woods and Vincent Vantress.

When officers identified themselves, Vantress and co-defendant Hathaway fled, which, while not conclusive of guilt, could contribute to reasonable suspicion when considered with other information. The combination of their flight and the officers' prior knowledge elevated reasonable suspicion to probable cause for Vantress's arrest. However, probable cause alone does not authorize entry into areas protected by the Fourth Amendment unless exigent circumstances exist. Such circumstances may include the risk of escape, potential violence, or evidence destruction. The flight of Vantress and Hathaway created a situation necessitating prompt action to prevent escape and preserve evidence, justifying a warrantless entry into Hathaway's apartment.

Once inside, officers had probable cause to arrest Hathaway, particularly as he was brandishing a firearm. The gun was lawfully seized incident to the arrest. The court affirmed the decision, with Judge Dennis concurring. The judges noted that although Hathaway waived the right to appeal, he reserved the right to appeal the motion to suppress.