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Colon v. Celotex Corp.
Citations: 465 So. 2d 1332; 10 Fla. L. Weekly 732Docket: 84-507
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; March 18, 1985; Florida; State Appellate Court
Louis Colon appeals a summary judgment favoring The Celotex Corporation and Fibreboard Corporation, asserting that his claim is barred by the Tennessee one-year statute of limitations. Colon worked for 23 years in Florida as an installer of asbestos products and was diagnosed with asbestosis by a Tennessee doctor on June 25, 1979. He initiated the lawsuit in Florida on June 26, 1980. Florida law allows four years to file a claim after becoming aware of the disease's occupational origin, while Tennessee law mandates a one-year filing period from the discovery of the cause of action. The court analyzed which state's statute of limitations applies, referencing the en banc decision in Meehan v. The Celotex Corp., which established that the relevant statute is determined by where the last act forming liability occurred. In this case, since the diagnosis was made in Tennessee, the court ruled that Tennessee's statute applies. The crux of the appeal centers on whether Colon discovered his cause of action on June 25, 1979, making the claim time-barred, or on June 28, 1979, which would allow for a timely filing. Colon's earlier sworn statements indicated he learned of his diagnosis on June 25, while a later affidavit claimed he did not receive the official diagnosis until June 28. The defendants argued that Colon could not contradict his prior statements to create factual disputes. However, the court found that the recent decision in Ash v. Stella suggested that a genuine issue of fact existed prior to the later affidavits being submitted, warranting further examination. In Ash, the court addressed the commencement of the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim stemming from a negligent misdiagnosis. The trial court had granted summary judgment for the defendant, asserting that the plaintiff should have been aware of the alleged misdiagnosis on March 23, 1977, following a visit to a second doctor who provided a correct diagnosis. However, the supreme court reversed this decision, clarifying that the trial court's reliance on the initial diagnosis was misplaced, as it was merely preliminary and had not been substantiated by conclusive tests until March 30. The court emphasized that a tentative diagnosis does not trigger the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims. This reasoning was applied similarly to the plaintiff's case, where a preliminary diagnosis of asbestosis made on June 25, 1979, did not necessarily initiate the statute of limitations. An affidavit from the plaintiff's doctor indicated that a final diagnosis of occupational diseases typically awaits test results, undermining earlier statements by the plaintiff regarding his awareness of a potential cause of action. The court concluded that defendants must demonstrate a clear causal link between the plaintiff's injury and exposure to the product before the statute of limitations period expired. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings.