Ex Parte Children's Hosp. of Alabama

Citations: 721 So. 2d 184; 1998 WL 544928Docket: 1970089, 1970092 and 1970098

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; August 28, 1998; Alabama; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Alabama addressed petitions for writs of mandamus from The Children's Hospital of Alabama, The University of Alabama Health Services Foundation, Dr. Patricia Aronin, Dr. Michael Rauzzino, and Dr. Alan F. Jacks (collectively known as the "Health Care Defendants"). They sought to transfer medical malpractice claims against them from the Circuit Court of Walker County to the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, asserting that Jefferson County was the proper venue under Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-546, since all alleged malpractice occurred there.

The case involved Curt Howell, a minor who suffered severe injuries from an automobile accident in Walker County. Initially treated at Walker Regional Medical Center, he was later transferred to Children's Hospital in Jefferson County. In 1992, Howell, through his parents, filed a complaint against the automobile owner and other non-health care defendants. By May 1993, he amended the complaint to include medical malpractice claims and additional health care providers, naming fictitious defendants responsible for the alleged negligence at Walker Regional Medical Center.

After four years of extensive discovery and several amendments to the complaint—including a fifth amendment in May 1997 that reiterated prior claims while continuing to list only fictitious health care providers—the trial court accepted the final amendment in September 1997. Following this, the Health Care Defendants filed motions to transfer the case to Jefferson County, which were initially denied by the trial court. However, during a hearing in October 1997, Howell's attorney indicated that no Walker County health care providers would be named as defendants. The Supreme Court ultimately granted the petitions for transfer, recognizing Jefferson County as the appropriate venue for the malpractice claims.

On October 8, the trial court denied the Health Care Defendants' motions to transfer due to untimeliness. The defendants petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the Walker Circuit Court to transfer medical malpractice claims to Jefferson County, arguing that the venue is proper there. They contended they timely objected to venue in Walker County under Alabama Code § 6-5-546. In contrast, Howell argued that the defendants did not make a timely objection to venue in Walker County, despite it potentially being proper in Jefferson County under the special venue provision.

Prior to 1987, medical liability cases followed general venue rules in the Alabama Code, which included provisions for venue based on the defendant's residence or where the injury occurred. The 1987 Act introduced a specific venue statute for medical malpractice actions, indicating dissatisfaction with the general provisions. The new law aimed to address the rising costs associated with medical liability litigation, signifying a legislative intent to establish clearer venue guidelines for such cases. The document also outlines the timing rules for challenging venue, emphasizing that failure to adhere to these rules results in waiver of the challenge.

Section 6-5-546 mandates that any legal action for injury, damages, or wrongful death against a healthcare provider due to a breach of the standard of care must be filed in the county where the act or omission occurred. If the alleged breaches span multiple counties in Alabama, the action should be brought in the county where the plaintiff resided at the time of the incident for personal injury claims, or where the decedent resided for wrongful death claims. The court may transfer the case to a more appropriate county for convenience or order separate trials as needed.

In the case of Ex parte Kennedy, the court clarified that 6-5-546 takes precedence over Rule 82(c) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for proper venue based on any claim or defendant. The court ruled that a medical liability action must be filed in the county of the act or omission, establishing that if a healthcare provider's negligence occurred in one county, the action must be initiated there. If negligence spans counties, the action needs to be in the county of the plaintiff’s residence.

In the current case concerning Howell, since no defendants were named for alleged acts in Walker County, the healthcare claims were required to be transferred to Jefferson County upon motion by any defendant, as per 6-5-546. Howell argued that the transfer motions were untimely, but the court disagreed, citing that the statute provides specific timing provisions distinct from general rules. It stipulates that if it is shown before trial that the claims did not involve multiple counties, the action must be transferred to the county where the acts occurred.

A party may challenge the venue for malpractice claims at any time before the trial begins, as stated in 6-5-546, allowing a single defendant to file a motion to transfer if improper venue is shown. The statute emphasizes that this mechanism is intended to ensure that health care defendants benefit from the new venue provisions without being limited by the timing rules outlined in Rule 12(h)(1) and Rule 82(d)(2)(C)(i). Despite this, Howell contends that these timing rules govern whether Health Care Defendants have waived their venue challenge rights, arguing that although 6-5-546 may conflict with Rule 82(c), its timing does not conflict with Rule 82(d). However, this argument is flawed because it fails to prevent conflict between the statute and the rules, particularly since Rule 82(d)(2)(C)(i) permits venue challenges even after a trial commences, while 6-5-546 explicitly requires such challenges to occur before the trial starts. Additionally, Rule 82(d)(2)(A) allows for discretionary transfer motions from fewer than all defendants, contrasting with the mandatory transfer provision in 6-5-546 upon a motion from any defendant. Thus, even if one were to interpret the statute's phrase "at any time prior to the commencement of the trial" as modifying only the showing of improper venue, it would still conflict with Rule 82. Furthermore, if the phrase does not modify either the showing or the motion, it becomes meaningless, which contradicts the principle that legislation is presumed to be purposeful and informed by existing laws. Consequently, the analysis reveals that 6-5-546 and the rules are inherently at odds, undermining Howell's attempt to reconcile them.

The court refrains from modifying the language of venue statutes as established by the Legislature, specifically concerning the timing of venue challenges. It interprets the timing provision of Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-546, to allow health care defendants to file for a venue transfer "at any time prior to the commencement of the trial." This interpretation supports the Legislature’s intent from the 1987 Act to mitigate rising costs associated with medical liability litigation. 

The Health Care Defendants filed motions to transfer for improper venue before the trial commenced and prior to a concession by Howell's counsel that eliminated claims against Walker County defendants. Thus, the motions were deemed timely under § 6-5-546. The court concludes that the Health Care Defendants are entitled to have the claims severed and transferred to Jefferson County, where the alleged malpractice occurred, and grants their petitions for writs of mandamus.

Concurrences from Justices Hooper and Houston emphasize the necessity for plaintiffs to split their causes of action when multiple claims arise, proposing that satisfaction of one judgment should only reduce the other rather than barring it entirely. Justice Lyons highlights the complexities between the Medical Liability Act and civil procedure rules, asserting a presumption against procedural inconsistencies to ensure public interest in uniformity. The statute mandates transfer of cases if plaintiff injuries did not arise from acts in multiple counties, reinforcing the court's decision.

The phrase "at any time" is interpreted to pertain to the timing of the showing rather than a standard for the timeliness of a motion. Fictitious parties can be eliminated in two ways: under Rule 4(f) when a plaintiff is ready for trial against other defendants, or under Rule 21 via a motion by any party at any stage of the action. The Howells were required to amend their complaint at least 90 days before trial according to Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-551, though the statute does not clarify whether this period begins with the first trial setting. A continuance permits the start of a new 90-day period for amendments. The Howells' fifth amended complaint, which still named fictitious health care providers, was submitted after they had the opportunity to amend. The defense of improper venue, per Rule 12(h)(1), is waived if not included in a responsive pleading; however, it was not available when the pleadings were served. The Howells dismissed the fictitious defendants only after oral arguments regarding venue transfer, thereby initiating the timeline for the Health Care Defendants to seek a change of venue. Under Rule 82(d)(2)(C)(i), a motion for transfer based on improper venue must be filed within 30 days of a voluntary dismissal of a party unless the trial is imminent. The Health Care Defendants filed their motions two weeks prior to the dismissal, making them prematurely filed but harmless. The main opinion's analysis of the timing provisions between the statute and Rule 82(d)(2)(C)(i) is deemed unnecessary for this case, as neither the timing of a transfer motion made during trial nor partial defendant transfers are present. The author agrees with the issuance of the writ of mandamus but emphasizes the need for the statute to not allow defendants to delay addressing venue defects until trial. Additionally, the author supports Justice Houston's suggestion to revise judgment laws in cases where plaintiffs must divide their causes of action.

Shores, Kennedy, and Cook, JJ. concur on several key points regarding venue and jurisdiction in civil procedure. Rule 82c of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure allows a lawsuit with multiple claims or parties to be initiated in any county where any claim could have been properly brought. It permits the joinder of additional claims and parties in a properly initiated action without needing to establish venue for each independent claim. Rule 12(h)(1) stipulates that defenses concerning personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and process deficiencies are waived if not included in an initial motion or responsive pleading. Rule 12(g) allows a party making a motion to include other available motions but bars subsequent motions based on omitted defenses unless specified exceptions apply. 

Prior to a 1987 amendment, Rule 82(d)(2)(C)(i) required motions to transfer after voluntary dismissal to be served promptly or within thirty days of dismissal. The amendment changed the trigger for the thirty-day period to the service of notice of dismissal. Alabama Code § 1975. 6-3-2 outlines that personal actions can be initiated in the county of the defendant's permanent residence or where the action occurred. Additional provisions in the Code address venue for actions against unincorporated organizations and foreign or domestic corporations, allowing lawsuits in counties where those entities conduct business, with specific stipulations for personal injury actions. Finally, the Alabama Legislature has explicitly addressed timing related to venue challenges in § 1975. 6-3-20.

A party in a civil action can request a change of venue at any time before the final trial by submitting an affidavit stating that a fair trial cannot be achieved in the current county. The court may grant a change to the nearest county without objections from either party, potentially requiring the applicant to provide a bond for costs. A party can only seek a venue change once. Howell contends that the Health Care Defendants should have realized by August 12, 1997, that he would not include Walker County health care providers as defendants, based on his final expert-witness disclosure indicating no negligence from them. Despite this, the Health Care Defendants' motions to transfer, filed a month after Howell's disclosure, were timely and did not imply a waiver of venue. 

According to Rule 82(d)4. of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, only defendants named within 75 days of a motion to transfer are considered for venue determination. Howell argues this rule undermines the Health Care Defendants' assumption that they could compel him to name Walker County providers, as they would have been aware of any malpractice claims across multiple counties. The plaintiff, who knows the claims best, could have named or excluded those providers. Howell's argument is flawed because neither the statute nor the rule mandates that health care providers force the plaintiff to name all defendants before trial starts. 

Rule 82(d)(2)(C)i. stipulates that a motion to transfer after a voluntary dismissal must be filed promptly if trial is within 30 days of dismissal, or within 30 days after the plaintiff files notice of dismissal. Interpreting "at any time prior to the commencement of the trial" as only modifying improper venue would render it meaningless in relation to Rule 12. Historically, plaintiffs could demonstrate improper venue at any time before trial, and the Legislature is presumed to have considered existing law when enacting new legislation. The right to challenge venue can be waived, distinguishing it from subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court may schedule a hearing on venue matters as needed.

The trial court can rule on the applicability of a transfer for improper venue after granting continuances to resolve factual disputes. If a defendant fails to file a writ of mandamus promptly, they waive any further challenges to venue. Relevant cases emphasize that a mandamus petition is the appropriate method for contesting venue rulings, and any delay in filing can render such petitions untimely if it causes prejudice. Rule 15a allows for amendments without court permission if made over 42 days before trial, while Rule 82(d)(4) stipulates that defendants still designated as fictitious parties cannot influence venue determinations if not properly identified within 75 days of a transfer motion. Although there is no duty for a defendant to file a motion to compel joinder of another defendant, delays in filing enable plaintiffs to amend pleadings to substitute fictitious parties with their correct names, which will relate back for venue determinations. Importantly, Rule 82(d) has a waiver provision that applies if the Health Care Defendants do not serve their transfer motion within 30 days following the dismissal of fictitious defendants.