Morgan County Dhr v. Bwj & Aj

Citations: 723 So. 2d 689; 1998 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 693; 1998 WL 737939Docket: 2970735

Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama; October 23, 1998; Alabama; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama addressed the case of Morgan County Department of Human Resources (DHR) v. B.W.J. and A.J. regarding the constitutionality of Ala.Code 1975, § 38-10-8. DHR appealed a district court ruling declaring the statute unconstitutional. B.W.J. was ordered to provide child support for three children from two mothers. Due to insufficient funds received from B.W.J.'s employer, DHR prorated the payments between A.J. and C.M. according to the support orders. 

The district court found § 38-10-8 unconstitutional, asserting it violated the separation of powers by allowing DHR to ignore a court-issued Income Withholding Order (I.W.O.) and deprived A.J. and her children of their due process rights regarding court-ordered support. On appeal, DHR contended that the district court lacked jurisdiction to declare the statute unconstitutional since the attorney general had not been notified of any constitutional challenge, as required by Ala.Code 1975, § 6-6-227. The record indicated that the district court had raised the constitutional issue on its own, without input from any party. The appellate court reversed the district court's judgment.

In Ex parte Northport Health Service, Inc., the Alabama Supreme Court established that a trial court's order is void if it declares a statute unconstitutional without serving the attorney general and providing an opportunity for input. However, in the present case, the attorney for Morgan County DHR, acting as a specially appointed Attorney General, had a duty to represent the state and was present when the court issued its order. Consequently, the court did not err in not declaring the order void, as the attorney was effectively served and had the opportunity to respond. The district court allowed a motion for a new trial regarding the constitutionality of statute 38-10-8, presuming its validity and emphasizing the need to uphold legislative intent. The court noted that the Child Support Act aims to ensure children are supported by responsible parents and that all child support orders must include income withholding orders (I.W.O.s). The DHR is responsible for managing child support collections as mandated by law. The court acknowledged that administrative tasks could be delegated to an executive agency without breaching the separation of powers, especially in cooperative efforts between government branches. Thus, allowing DHR to allocate payments received from an employer towards child support obligations, even without a corresponding I.W.O., does not mean the executive branch is ignoring judicial orders.

DHR's allocation of child support payments from B.W.J.'s employer to A.J. was compliant with the law, as A.J.'s support order included an Income Withholding Order (I.W.O.), while C.M.'s order did not. If DHR had only sent funds to A.J. and excluded C.M., it could have been accused of ignoring C.M.'s court order. The pro rata distribution aimed to ensure that children receive support from responsible parents, as mandated by Alabama law. The Alabama legislature's grant of authority to DHR to allocate child support payments was upheld by the state’s supreme court, confirming it did not violate the separation of powers doctrine, as long as clear standards were established for execution. Specifically, Alabama Code § 38-10-8 outlines that when multiple support orders exist and total payments are insufficient, DHR must distribute payments proportionally among families. The court found this provision constitutional and confirmed that it did not infringe upon A.J.’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. A claimant must demonstrate a legitimate property interest in the benefit for due process protections to apply. The court emphasized that mere loss does not invoke these protections; rather, the focus is on whether the interest is recognized as 'liberty or property' under the Fourteenth Amendment. If a property interest exists, the adequacy of procedural safeguards is evaluated based on the private interest at stake, the risk of wrongful deprivation, and the government's interests and burdens.

A.J. and C.M. each have a property interest in the full payment of their respective child support orders from B.W.J., but neither has a legitimate entitlement to prioritize their support payments over the other’s. The State of Alabama is also concerned with ensuring that each child receives some support monthly. The legislature may have determined that imposing additional procedural requirements on the Department of Human Resources (DHR) and the court system for obligors with multiple child support obligations would create an undue fiscal and administrative burden. A.J. did not specify which rights were violated or what due process procedures would protect those rights, leading the court to refrain from speculating on necessary procedural requirements. The court concluded that Alabama Code § 38-10-8 does not violate A.J. and her children's due process rights, reversing the district court's judgment that deemed it unconstitutional and remanding for further proceedings. The decision was supported by Justices Yates, Monroe, and Thompson, with Robertson concurring in the result. Notes clarify that the right to receive child support is considered a property right, which justifies the assignment of rights under Alabama law.