Willis v. County of Sherburne

Citations: 555 N.W.2d 277; 1996 Minn. LEXIS 749; 1996 WL 628199Docket: C6-95-363, C5-95-371

Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota; October 31, 1996; Minnesota; State Supreme Court

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Galen Willis filed a lawsuit against Sherburne County and Dan Nickols after his employment was terminated, alleging wrongful discharge, breach of contract, discrimination due to a medical disability, defamation, and interference with his employment by Nickols. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the wrongful termination claim but denied it for the breach of contract, discrimination, and defamation claims, as well as the interference claim. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the wrongful discharge claim due to lack of timely writ of certiorari for the breach of contract claim, while upholding the denial of summary judgment for the defamation and discrimination claims. 

Willis had been employed as an appraiser and later became the manager of the mapping department, which was reorganized into the Land Information/Mapping Office where he served as director. He reported directly to the county board, which authorized hiring a registered land surveyor based on his recommendation. After Willis disclosed his multiple sclerosis to the county board chairman, he was assured his job was safe but advised not to inform the county coordinator. Despite this, as Willis' condition became known among other department heads, Nickols began to undermine him, expressing dissatisfaction with his qualifications to county officials.

County commissioners received anonymous letters accusing Willis of wrongdoing in his role at the Land Information/Mapping Office. Willis believes Nickols authored or encouraged these letters to damage his reputation. He claims the board did not investigate the allegations and that his job performance was discussed in meetings from which he was excluded. Willis also alleges that local newspapers published false statements about him from Nickols and county commissioners. In mid-1993, the county board reorganized the Land Information/Mapping Department, with Nickols becoming supervisor of the mapping division and Willis leading the Geographic Information System (GIS) division. Despite assurances regarding his job security, Willis was reassigned to report to Nickols shortly thereafter. He disclosed his multiple sclerosis to Nickols, requesting confidentiality, but Nickols later indicated he would share this information. On June 15, 1993, the board terminated Willis, citing the discontinuation of the GIS project, which he claims continued under Nickols. Willis asserts he was not offered other suitable county positions post-termination. Nine months later, he filed a lawsuit against Sherburne County and Nickols for breach of contract, disability discrimination, defamation, and interference with prospective advantage. The defendants sought summary judgment, arguing the exclusive means for judicial review of employment decisions was through a petition for certiorari. The district court dismissed the wrongful termination claim but allowed Willis to amend his breach of contract claim. The court denied summary judgment for the other claims. The defendants appealed, and the court of appeals upheld the dismissal of the wrongful termination claim while affirming the denial of summary judgment for the disability discrimination and defamation claims, but reversed the denial for the breach of contract claim. Willis sought to overturn the dismissal of his breach of contract claim, citing the need to reconsider the precedent set in Dietz v. Dodge County, while the county aimed to expand legal interpretations related to defamation and discrimination claims against local government employee discharges. The court of appeals acknowledged that the principles from Dietz were relevant to the current case.

Approximately six months after the county terminated Ms. Dietz's employment, she initiated a wrongful discharge lawsuit. Nine months later, Willis filed a similar wrongful discharge claim under a 'Breach of Contract' count. The district court dismissed both wrongful discharge claims but allowed Willis to amend his complaint to assert a 'pure' breach of contract claim. Following the precedent set by Stadum v. Norman County, the district court ruled that Willis could pursue this claim without being limited to certiorari review, rejecting the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

However, the court overlooked that both Dietz and Willis based their actions on breach of contract. Willis attempted to redefine his wrongful discharge claim as a breach of contract claim, asserting that the county failed to follow termination procedures outlined in his employment contract. The core allegations and prayer for relief in Willis's complaint remained unchanged, seeking reinstatement, back pay, and damages for mental anguish.

The court noted that specific performance as a remedy for breach of an employment contract is generally unavailable, citing Bussard v. College of St. Thomas, Inc. Furthermore, the Dietz case was interpreted as a breach of contract action, where Dietz argued she was wrongfully discharged without cause, thus necessitating judicial review via writ of certiorari. The court reiterated that the principles established in Dokmo v. Independent School Dist. No. 11 informed their decision, emphasizing that certiorari was the proper avenue for seeking review of the county’s termination decision.

Dietz was not statutorily entitled to appeal her termination from the county nursing home administrator position through traditional means because the county lacks statewide jurisdiction and is not governed by the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act. No specific statute allows for court appeals from such administrative decisions. The standard of review for certiorari is deemed more suitable for assessing the board's discretionary actions rather than for independent proceedings. Dietz’s claims, including reinstatement and damages for mental anguish, emphasize that her case involves administrative discretion rather than a standard breach of contract claim. This distinction suggests that the county’s termination decision has quasi-judicial implications, justifying certiorari review. The determination of whether her employment was 'for cause' or 'at will' is a legal question appropriate for certiorari review, and the existing record is sufficient to address this. Furthermore, allowing a wrongful termination claim would be impractical, involving a lengthy statute of limitations and extensive discovery that could leave such claims unresolved for years. Similarly, Willis alleges breach of his employment contract due to improper termination procedures, seeking reinstatement and damages akin to Dietz’s claims. He calls for the adoption of the Stadum rationale, although it is noted that Stadum’s case differs significantly from Willis's and has not been officially adopted as Minnesota law. The rationale from Stadum is explicitly rejected in this context.

Claims related to the breach of an employment contract for a governmental employee, such as Willis, must be contested via certiorari if the termination was executed by a local executive body without statewide jurisdiction, similar to the situation involving Ms. Dietz. Willis argues that his breach of contract claim does not connect to the county's termination decision; however, it is deemed implausible for a discharged employee to prove a breach of termination procedures without implicating the discharge itself. The claims for reinstatement, back pay, and fringe benefits, while originating from a statutory action for disability discrimination, are intertwined with the breach of contract claim in a single legal context. If Willis seeks a separate jury trial for his breach of contract claim, his complaint primarily requests reinstatement and damages, complicating the assertion of a 'pure' breach of contract action.

The county disputes the district court's subject matter jurisdiction over Willis' defamation and disability discrimination claims, arguing they stem from the same facts leading to his termination, thus limiting recourse to certiorari. However, the courts found that the defamation allegations occurred well before Willis' termination, suggesting they are independent of the discharge decision. The courts concluded that the inquiry into the county board's awareness regarding defamation does not involve the discretionary termination decision, allowing Willis' defamation claim to proceed separately from the certiorari process.

Furthermore, Willis' disability discrimination claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act is not restricted to certiorari review, as the statute allows for district court actions. Unlike Ms. Dietz, who lacked a statutory appeal right, Willis can pursue his discrimination claim, which also applies to state and local governmental entities. The precedent established in Graham v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1 reinforces that employees can challenge retaliatory actions if unlawful discrimination by the employer is involved.

The district court has subject matter jurisdiction over Willis' disability discrimination claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, despite implications related to his discharge. The court affirmed this jurisdiction and remanded for further proceedings. Chief Justice Keith dissents, agreeing that Willis' defamation and disability discrimination claims do not align with the precedent set in Dietz v. Dodge County but disagrees with the majority on the breach of contract claim. Willis argues that his breach of contract claim does not require the court to assess the County's justification for his termination, thus not restricted to the writ of certiorari process. He contends that the County failed to adhere to established termination and lay-off procedures in his employment contract, warranting compensation without delving into the reasons for his termination. The dissent emphasizes that interpreting the Dietz decision to bar judicial review of contract breaches would undermine public employees' rights. Willis seeks monetary damages for breach of contract, and his requests for reinstatement and related benefits are linked to his discrimination claim, not a wrongful termination claim. Justice Gardebring and Justice Page express support for Chief Justice Keith's dissent. Additionally, while generally nonappealable, an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is immediately appealable.

The origin of certiorari review for executive branch matters is traced to *State ex rel. Ging v. Bd. of Educ. of Duluth*, establishing that courts have limited jurisdiction to review school board decisions, specifically concerning jurisdiction, procedural regularity, and whether the board's decisions were arbitrary or lacked evidentiary support. Courts cannot replace the board's findings or review errors made within the board's jurisdiction. The tenure act provides no right of appeal for discharged teachers, only allowing for review via prerogative writs like certiorari, which cannot address purely factual decisions or conflicts in evidence.

The dissent's interpretation of *Dietz* as depriving Willis of a remedy is incorrect; it clarifies that a timely writ of certiorari is the appropriate remedy. Willis did not seek this remedy on time, a situation not attributable to *Dietz*, which reaffirmed principles established in prior cases and was not unexpected. The court of appeals may have mischaracterized Willis’ original complaint as a wrongful termination claim, while his amended complaint is focused solely on breach of contract regarding the County's termination procedures. This amendment is permissible under Rule 15.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as it was made before discovery concluded and did not prejudice the County. Thus, the district court's decision to allow the amendment should not penalize Willis.